Anja Šofranac is a graduate student at the Belgrade Open School and a research and communications intern at the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD).

An old African proverb says, “When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.” The post-World War II period set a stage that reflected the established division of the world into two parts: the red, underdeveloped East and the blue, democratic West. The idea that the world would once again become united and equal in the post-Iron-Curtain era is now being fundamentally challenged in regions crucial to both the United States and Russia.

 

The 1990s represented a time of change. The world had entered a whirlpool whose currents were harnessed for prosperity by some, while others found themselves swept into chaos and disorder. Whatever the outcome, terrorism spread like a contagion. Regardless of whether the United States formally imposed itself as the “international fighter of terrorism” as part of its “global policeman” agenda, its actions demonstrated a lack of consistency in sanctioning the work of terrorist organizations. This was evident when the U.S. utilized Al-Qaeda as a conduit to provide support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria. To better understand how and why the United States hypocritically used terrorist activities as part of its broader global agenda of weakening and isolating Russia, the theoretical and historical background of terrorism, as well as the geopolitical importance of regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East, warrants further exploration.

 

The Entrenchment and Rise of Islamic Terrorism

The sensitivity of researching a topic like terrorism lies in the fact that its actions cannot be categorized within a clear social context. Behavioral patterns cannot be considered a definitive argument in explaining terrorist activity, precisely because of the moral questions and the dual perceptions of its consequences.

 

Historically, terrorist actions have relied on a specific guerrilla-type of attack aimed at intimidating enemy populations and sowing fear to fulfill ideological goals. What delays the classification of these attacks as criminal enterprises on a global scale is the subjectivity of their political justification. Presenting terrorist organizations as the sole and true leaders of a certain community in moments of political and ideological crisis prevents the population from objectively assessing the situation on the ground and pursuing diplomatic means of negotiation.

 

As political Islam struggled to gain its position in a globalized world, the turbulent twentieth century and the colonial policies of the West—which gave birth to the political form of Islamic theology—became significant factors. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movement formed in 1928, acted as a support base for other movements that shared the idea of a state based on Sharia law. Events such as the creation of the state of Israel and the withdrawal of Western colonial powers from the Middle East gave the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestine Liberation Organization the role of preserving Islamic presence and integrity.

 

Considering the continuity of militant action since 1948, guerrilla/terrorist responses emerged as the only tool for addressing population issues in the Middle East. Such movements, as well as the state of war—which acquired a cultural tone as a struggle between Islam and the West—became clearly visible in Afghanistan through the Soviet invasion and the struggle of Islamic fundamentalists supported by the United States. The irony lies in Washington’s cooperation with or disregard for Al-Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan during its fight against the Soviets.

 

The financing of radical Islamist movements in the Balkans (such as the KLA or the so-called Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the deployment of mujahideen to foreign battlefields in the 1990s did not raise red flags for Washington, precisely because their goals aligned with the West’s policy of geopolitical hegemony. The U.S. never attempted to condemn the activities of these terrorist groups or the violence they brought to war-torn countries. Despite the terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, which led the U.S. to launch its “war on terror,” Washington never truly engaged in sanctioning radical Islamic organizations—a pattern that would later become evident during the Syrian Civil War, or rather, a regional power struggle with Russia.

 

Politics in Practice: Yugoslavia and the KLA

To say that the Cold War ended in 1989 would be an understatement. Serbia, as a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, faced economic sanctions and war crime allegations while also enduring frequent and politically unarticulated attacks in its province of Kosovo and Metohija. As a geopolitically and culturally significant territory, certain groups of Albanians began conducting criminal raids and attacks on police stations and members of the Yugoslav army, laying the groundwork for terrorist activity.

 

These groups’ efforts, aimed at the “liberation and Albanization” of Kosovo and Metohija, gained momentum once they became strategically useful for the West to secure a geopolitical position in Southeast Europe. Enter the United States.

 

Through lobbying and financing, the KLA magically shed its terrorist label—acquired in 1997—and was paraded through Western media as a liberator from what was increasingly being labeled the “genocidal regime” of Slobodan Milošević. For the Serbian population in the southern Serbian province, however, this was far from reality. As terrorist attacks became more frequent, their targets gradually expanded to include civilians.

 

The Albanian party to the conflict worked tirelessly to promote and orchestrate a series of events that would lead to the inevitable military intervention of Western partners in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—of which the Račak case is considered a key event.

 

By illegally bombing Yugoslavia in 1999 and pressuring the political leadership in Belgrade to withdraw its military troops from its territory, the KLA—in addition to receiving financial aid from the United States—gained a military advantage on the ground. By setting up a NATO base and securing the support of the United States as its main financial and political ally, the KLA became institutionalized, positioning itself as the legitimate political representative of Kosovo Albanians.

 

Syria: A Reflective Benchmark for the Balkans

A fair number of arguments have been made that the Arab Spring only fanned the already simmering flames of the Middle East. This, in turn, helped great powers reposition themselves and adjust to new realities on the ground. Syria—a country that stood at the forefront of the fight against the Islamization of Middle Eastern politics due to the secular/socialist policies of the Assad government—was a thorn in the side of Western allies and those who saw positives in the systemic changes that took place in the Middle East in 2011. What can be understood as the ultimate goal of this political turmoil is the removal of Syria as the last bulwark of Iranian defense—or better yet, a Tehran-led bloc that geopolitically defies Israeli dominance and the completion of Western hegemony in the region.

 

In 2011, peaceful protests rapidly escalated into an armed conflict, bringing Syria into a civil war. As an additional factor, the activities of terrorist organizations could not bypass the Syrian battlefield, as evidenced by the presence of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra. As a faction of al-Qaeda, its original mission aligned with transnational jihadism, a radical Sunni ideology aimed at establishing an Islamic Syrian emirate. Since the U.S. could not risk exacerbating relations with Saudi Arabia (al-Qaeda’s traditional protector), the issue of terrorism on Syrian soil was easily ignored.

 

The irony of this policy was Washington’s passionate advocacy for fighting terrorism, as al-Qaeda was held responsible for the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. To make matters more contradictory, then-U.S. President Barack Obama authorized the CIA to train Syrian rebels as part of what was deemed the “national interest of the United States.”

 

Bearing in mind that the civil war brought in Russia as an ally of the Assad regime, Washington had a vested interest in maintaining its presence in the region. For Moscow, Syria had never been a primary interest per se—Bashar al-Assad was previously a frequent guest in many Western countries. However, two key factors led Russia to support the Syrian president: first, the belief that the Syrian war was a U.S.-orchestrated “color revolution,” and second, the need for Russia to make a grandiose return as a broker of global peace and security after the 1990s.

 

Unwilling to tolerate foreign interference in the shaping of the regional political landscape, the United States found it necessary to create new dynamics on the ground. Coincidentally, during the period of insurgent “training,” a faction called the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) splintered off, resulting in a more effective wave of terrorism. The belief that this would further weaken the Assad-Iran-Russia alliance shifted the war’s focus to counterterrorism, specifically pitting the U.S. against ISIS, which served as a justification for Western allies to remain involved in the conflict. However, due to Moscow’s effectiveness and changes in the U.S. administration, Assad managed to regain control over the majority of Syrian territory. Initially, this was seen as a success for Moscow, reinforcing its image as a “great power,” but it also posed a challenge for the West.

 

Nevertheless, 2022 marked the beginning of Russia’s decline in global influence due to the war in Ukraine, creating fertile ground in Syria for the rise of groups labeled as “extremists.” On December 8th, 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—factions of which were previously known under the name Jabhat al-Nusra—succeeded in capturing major Syrian cities and declaring victory over Assad.

 

Regardless of the various perspectives on Assad and his regime during the war, the takeover by HTS and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, underscores the failure of the Western fight against terrorism. Despite continuing to list HTS as an active terrorist organization, the U.S. has shown no interest in questioning or sanctioning Syria.

 

The al-Jolani case could serve as yet another example of Western complicity in the institutionalization of terrorism—one instance being the KLA, with German and American diplomats meeting with its representatives, and now HTS, with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock making two official trips to Damascus in 2025.

 

The institutionalization of terrorism represents one of the essential links to understanding the current state of political hegemony across different affected regions. As terrorism occupies a liminal space in theorizing and defining its basic principles, its presence in formal “democratic” institutions is often not recognized as a global security threat. For this reason, the political power of movements like the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija and HTS in Syria remains unquestioned by the political West, despite their ideological and financial links to al-Qaeda.

 

One can safely speak of double standards regarding acts and perpetrators of terrorism, taking into account their ideological and global support. Thus, the world’s fiercest opponent of radical Islamic terrorism, the United States, selectively approaches terrorist actors—some are considered threats and actively fought against, while others receive the highest level of support.

 

It is also possible to place this phenomenon in a historical context, linking certain terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija and Syria to Western efforts to diminish Russia’s influence in strategically contested regions. The Balkans and the Middle East, both regions with turbulent histories and significant geopolitical importance, have long been battlegrounds for Russian influence, which remains embedded through cultural and religious ties.

 

Fully exercising its unchecked power, fueled by victory in the Cold War, the United States has long held a ruthless stance—one that ultimately exacts the highest toll on the citizens of war-torn nations. In its campaign to hegemonize the region and prevent Russia from exerting any influence over Western decision-making, the U.S. has been creating a security cordon, evident in the Balkans through the inclusion of Serbia’s neighboring states in NATO, effectively sealing off a military corridor with Russia.

 

In the Middle East, the loss of Syria represents a major setback for Russia’s foothold in the region—albeit not a lost battle. Iran, as the last remaining actor actively challenging Israel’s security and one that has yet to experience its own variant of the “Arab Spring,” continues to maintain close ties with Russia, given that the two nations still share common enemies.

 

It is important to emphasize that Saudi Arabia could play a critical role in maintaining Russia’s presence in the Middle East, particularly in light of the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian deal in 2022 and the close relations between Riyadh and Moscow.

 

Whether Russia, through the creation of an alternative economic and trade-driven alliance, can provide a sustainable counterweight to Western-backed institutions that foster terrorism remains to be seen.

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