Dr. Farkhod Tolipov is Director of the non-governmental research institution “Knowledge Caravan” in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The geopolitical arithmetic of the “C5+1” emerged in Central Asia (a region comprised of five states, all of which are former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) over the more than 30 years since the region’s republics gained independence. Numerous “C5+1” formats have been set up by different major and mid-ranking powers. Since the 1990s, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, India, the Gulf states, Germany, and the United Kingdom have all crafted their own versions of the “C5+1” format. During the 78th UN General Assembly session in September 2023, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said that around 10 “C5+1” formats already exist, thereby pointing to the emerging profile and special role of the Central Asian region in the international system.

The leaders of the Central Asian countries with U.S. President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken during the 2023 C5+1 Summit

It must be said that not all of these formats are compatible with each other. The multiplication of such formats signifies a twofold reality. First, the geostrategic importance of the Central Asian region is increasing, and it is being regarded by many actors from a holistic perspective as a single region. Second, global geopolitical actors are positioning themselves on the map of the new world order vis-à-vis each other, while taking the Central Asian context into account.

But why is the importance of the region growing, why do great and mid-ranking powers advance their own version of the “C5+1” format? What is the role of the C5 in this format and what is the role of “1” in it? Analyzing these questions addresses the issue of how Central Asian states respond to the increased attention of the “1s.”

Overall, some scholars argue that a new geopolitical Great Game is unfolding in and around Central Asia. This is partially true. The fate and future of countries of the region will depend not only on the modality of geopolitical competition of external powers but also, to a great extent, on intra-regional relations and developments.

In this web of “C5+1s,” the agency of Central Asian countries as a single region in the international system is being tested. Interestingly, the very fact that such a geo-arithmetical formula is being proposed and advanced by extra-regional powers illustrates, among other things, their acknowledgement of the region’s existence as a special grouping of five states. The question is how will these five countries benefit from the “C5+1” geopolitical game of chess, and whether they will lose themselves in this web.

This essay explores only the geopolitical triangle involving the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China with the aim of illustrating the tense nature of their competition (be it implicit or explicit) in Central Asia.

 

American “C5+1”

The United States came up with the “C5+1” concept once it accrued substantial experience in interacting and cooperating with Central Asian states. For example, the United States was among the first world powers to recognize the independence of the former Soviet republics, having adopted the Freedom Support Act as early as 1992, which was designed to support the newly independent states. By 1999, Washington’s policy had become more focused and specific, as it adopted the Silk Road Act, targeting five Central Asian and three Caucasian countries with assistance programs. After 9/11, the United States turned even more of its attention to the region, and in March 2002, Uzbekistan and the United States signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership. In the wake of this Declaration, an American military contingent was deployed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to assist in the military operation in Afghanistan.

Finally, in 2015, the United States launched the new format of partnership with Central Asia: the “C5+1.” Many interpreted this format as Washington’s intention to counterbalance the growing Russian and Chinese geopolitical influence and pressure on Central Asia. The latter trend was one of the reasons for the increasing profile of Central Asia in American global policy. Then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who officially launched the “C5+1” in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, stated that “this is not a zero-sum game. Every country has the right to manage its relationships with whichever country it chooses, or not; to be free from external pressure and from intimidation. And that is a fundamental principle which brings us to the table.” In the wake of the Samarkand meeting, participating states set up several working groups on the regional economy and trade, environmental protection and renewable energy, and regional security.

When President Mirziyoyev paid a visit to Washington in May 2018, it was officially announced that the “new era of strategic partnership” was upon us. It is thus safe to say that U.S.-Central Asian relations have been on an upward trajectory ever since 1991.

On the margins of the 78th UN General Assembly session, U.S. President Joseph Biden met with the five Central Asian presidents. The joint statement issued on this occasion mentioned the establishment of the C5+1 Secretariat in 2022 and the launching of Working Groups on the Economy, Energy, Environment, and Security, all of which played a role in further deepening engagement. The Secretariat and the Working Group signify a steady process and indicate priority areas of cooperation. Interestingly, the parties emphasize the goal of seeking regional solutions to global challenges.

The United States seems to have boldly placed an emphasis on security and economic development of Central Asia. For example, in the security realm, issues such as defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism, border security, and safe migration are mentioned. In the economic realm, cooperation is envisioned through the U.S. Department of State, the Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This model aims to support the infrastructure in accordance with the priorities outlined in the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, including critical transport, clean energy and critical mineral supply chains, and digital connectivity. And traditionally, normative issues such as democratic reforms, human rights, and the rule of law are constantly on the American agenda in its strategy toward Central Asia.

Notably, from one strategic document to another, Washington has repeatedly articulated its official support for the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Central Asian states. While this is strategically and theoretically very clear, this position is rather vague in practice. The question is how resolute Washington would be if the Central Asians really faced threats to their independence, territorial integrity, and security. The sudden withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 was understood by many around the world—and especially in Central Asia—as a sign of American strategic and geopolitical ambivalence.

Symptomatically, the attractiveness of the Central Asian region is explained by many, including within the United States itself, through its wealth of natural resources. The list contains oil, gas, gold, cotton, uranium, and other non-mineral resources. Conventional wisdom, as a rule, dictates prioritizing just these items on the list. Naturally, economically motivated geopolitical activities (and competition) in Central Asia were only to be ramped up from there. This scenario was certainly anticipated by Western and Russian scholars soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, in his brilliant 1997 book The Grand Chessboard wrote: 

“Access to that resource and sharing in its potential wealth represent objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate corporate interests, rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations and fuel international rivalries […] The geostrategic implications for America are clear: America is too distant to be dominant in this part of Eurasia but too powerful not to be engaged […] Russia is too weak to regain imperial domination over the region or to exclude others from it, but it is also too close and too strong to be excluded.”

Nevertheless, one must be careful not to overemphasize the economic aspect when assessing the strategic importance of the region for the United States. Economic interests are self-evident and, no doubt, important. However, any calculation of the extent to which Central Asia is strategically important to the United States based solely on the principle of economic determinism, would be misleading and short-sited. Strategic partnership is all-encompassing and, due to its reliance on the historical, geographical, political, economic, military, and other circumstances, may evolve in various directions. From this perspective, the fundamental and unique role that the United States can play in this part of the world is its resolute political and practical support for regional integration of the five Central Asian countries. Some contours of this role are already taking shape.

Meanwhile, as American diplomat Richard E. Hoagland argued in a March 2024 piece for the Caspian Policy Center:

The current U.S. C5+1 understands the need to focus on trade and investment with USAID’s current Central Asia Trade Forum and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program.

“Other developments that regional and international businesses would certainly value would be the creation of a Central Asia Regional Chamber of Commerce and a Central Asia Regional Coordination Council on electronic commerce and other sector-specific coordination platforms. The establishment of a Council of Coordinators after the most recent Dushanbe Summit is most definitely a move in the right direction… Let’s hope that the next step, sooner rather than later, will be the official establishment of an Association of Central Asian States.”

This statement is slightly reminiscent of the 1947 Marshall Plan for Europe that stimulated regional integration across the Old Continent. Something similar could be imagined within the “C5+ the U.S.” format. Let’s call it “Marshall Plan 2.0,” and this time it can be designed and implemented by the United States in tandem with the European Union.

 

Russian “C5+1”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s efforts centered on preventing a complete disintegration and preserving its imperial control over of the vast geopolitical space of Central Asia, with Moscow attempting to impose its own version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” In its pursuit of this goal, Russia has crafted multiple formats and organizations, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as the most prominent among them. The CIS was created in 1991 and the EAEU in 2015.

Portrayed as a model for peaceful divorce of the former Soviet republics, the CIS has already existed for 32 years and stagnated as an inefficient structure that failed to turn the divorce into a reintegration project that Russia originally wanted to achieve. Of the 15 former Soviet republics, only nine are members of the CIS. Of those nine CIS countries, four are Central Asian and the other five are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—the Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan, although a founding signatory, never became a full member of the CIS. The structure of the EAEU is even smaller: two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in conjunction with Russia, Belarus, and Armenia.

Over nearly one third of a century, the young independent states have adapted to the international system and global politics, diversifying their foreign policies and partnerships. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further spurred diversification in all spheres, thereby making the CIS even less relevant. Among the former Soviet republics, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia seem to have found their own independent paths outside the CIS or EAEU. Central Asia is thus perhaps the last bastion of Russian imperialism, as most Central Asian states remain “unshakeable” CIS members with two of them participating in the EAEU as well. Now, the Central Asian five are engaged with Russia in its own version of the “C5+1” format.

Obviously, the Russian version of the “C5+1” format is designed, to a great extent, as a counterweight to the American one. It is evident that Moscow promotes anti-Western and Russia-dominated views within this format. A notable recent trend in Russia’s Central Asian strategy is an explicit effort to multiply and combine summits and official meetings within the CIS, EAEU, and “C5+1.” Moreover, Moscow even goes so far as to act in tandem with China to maintain its imperial leverage in Central Asia. For example, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow in March 2023, he and Russian President Vladimir Putin made a surprising Joint Statement on Central Asia in which they addressed their geopolitical rivals. Putin and Xi declared that they would not accept the replication of color revolutions in Central Asia and would not tolerate interference in the domestic affairs of Central Asian states.

During Putin’s visit to Beijing in May 2024, the two leaders issued another Joint Statement, making a tendentious reference to Central Asia. This statement involved the assertion that the United States and NATO are responsible for the 20-year long occupation of Afghanistan and should thus not make attempts to deploy military infrastructure in this country or the adjacent region. The latter most definitely referred to Central Asia, where U.S. military contingents were once deployed with the aim of supporting the war effort in Afghanistan.

Moscow and Beijing’s tendency to speak on behalf of Central Asian states without their authorization creates the impression that both Russia and China regard the region as a condominium. Indeed, since the U.S. National Security Strategy indicated Russia as an enemy and China as the main competitor, Moscow and Beijing have been attempting to project an image of unity vis-à-vis the United States. Undoubtedly, the war in Ukraine became the main factor driving Russia’s strategic drift toward China.

Interestingly enough, the past, present, and future of Russia’s engagement with Central Asia can be analyzed in the geopolitical context of the war in Ukraine. In fact, this is what Moscow itself aspires to in the geopolitical messages it sends, first and foremost to the former Soviet republics, and then the international community as a whole. Russian policy in Central Asia goes hand-in-hand with the unfriendly rhetoric of many Russian officials and experts—most of which is filled with imperial impulses. Take, for instance, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s “collection” of hate speeches, which frequently target not only distant enemies but also former Soviet neighbors.

With all this in mind, the Russian “C5+1” vision can hardly bring anything different from its previous imperial attitude toward Central Asia. The anti-Western spirit has always been present in the Russia-Central Asia format. For instance, during the fifth ministerial meeting of the “C5+Russia” format in April 2022, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov criticized the deployment of American military infrastructure around Afghanistan.

Similarly, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin delivered an inflammatory speech at the Valdai Club’s Central Asia conference on May 14th, 2024. Galuzin made a very harsh statement, claiming that the West wants to reformat the region in line with its own ambitions and secure access to its natural resources. Furthermore, he believes the West is bent on placing the region’s transport corridors under its control and turning Central Asia into a bridgehead for threats to Russian security. “Our partners,” he said, “are promised multi-million investments, extended access of goods to the European market, at the same time being required to comply with anti-Russian sanctions to avoid secondary sanctions on them. The U.S. and NATO try to involve Central Asian countries in “partner” programs and trainings, do not refrain from joint exercises on the territory of the region and from deployment of its own military infrastructure. They intrusively offer assistance in border protection, fighting terrorism and drug trafficking with the usage of their own equipment and software… In parallel, public opinion is being influenced through mass media and NGOs loyal to them. Current governments of Central Asian countries are no longer fellow travelers for the West.” 

 

Chinese “C5+1”

In addition to or in parallel with the Moscow-Beijing tandem, China has been implementing its own Central Asia strategy. The first “C5+China” summit took place in the Chinese city of Xian in May 2023, where the Xian Declaration was adopted.

It’s worth recalling that ever since 1996, China has been engaging Central Asia (and Russia) within another structure, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From its inception, the SCO was designed to engage with the newly independent states of Central Asia and remained for many years a Central Asia-focused organization. This only changed with the SCO’s first expansion in 2016, when both India and Pakistan became full members. One can argue that the SCO has served as a leverage-making toolkit of Beijing for “preparing and educating” Central Asian neighbors for the future “One Belt, One Road” or briefly “Belt and Road” (BRI) mega-initiative. Further, BRI, in turn, which was fully supported by Central Asian states, itself logically led all involved parties to the Chinese version of the “C5+1.”

In the Xian Declaration, the parties expressed their aspiration to jointly create a community of common destiny between Central Asia and China. It should be said that the slogan “community of common destiny” has become a novel mantra that China has promoted globally alongside its other three catchphrases: ‘global development,’ ‘global security,’ and ‘global civilization.’ What common destiny could mean in the context of these three global initiatives remains vague, but it sounds ambitious and even attractive. Beijing proposed setting up a permanent “Central Asia-China” secretariat (likely in response to the American “C5+1” Secretariat)—something that even the Central Asian countries have not yet established among themselves.

Interestingly, according to the Xian Declaration, China “firmly supports the development path of Central Asia, efforts at protection of national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as their independent foreign and internal policies.” Moreover, “China supports dynamic processes of regional cooperation in Central Asia, highly acknowledges the mechanism of Consultative meetings of heads of states of Central Asia as a key factor of regional security, stability and sustainable development, as well as the significant contribution of Central Asian states to peace and development in the region and in the whole world.”

So, such positive intentions on the part of China with respect to its Central Asian neighbors sound very friendly, sincere, and geopolitically neutral—so much so that one could detect similarities with American and European perspectives on Central Asia. Both the United States and the EU express full support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity as well as the regional integration of Central Asian states. However, this Chinese goodwill stands in contrast to the anti-Western geopolitical tandem that Beijing has developed with Moscow.

Given the rapidly expanding nature of China’s globally significant BRI, its “C5+1” format appears to be a structural subdivision or branch of the BRI. It is further noteworthy that China has not yet set up special “+1” formats with other regional groups, such as those in South or East Asia. For this reason, the Chinese “C5+1” should be viewed within the broader BRI framework.

The essential question arises as to whether Beijing’s infrastructure and other connectivity plans entail Chinese power projections. Regardless of the reassurances from the Chinese authorities of their good-will and “win-win” intentions, power projection often follows any grandiose undertaking, irrespective of intentions.

What appears to be an inevitable increase of Chinese influence will be further underpinned by asymmetric gains. For China, with its incomparably large financial reserves, any resources devoted to the Central Asian segment of the BRI will be relatively minor compared to other BRI undertakings, like the Maritime Silk Road. For Central Asians, on the other hand, these resources will be significant and are expected to cover much of their needs. This makes it easier for Beijing to manage its Central Asian strategic vector than it could ever be for Central Asian capitals to cope with the Chinese push for influence.

If the meaning of the American, European, and Russian “C5+1” is more or less explicit due to their century-long geopolitical rivalries in the Heartland of Eurasia—to borrow the term coined by British geographer Halford Mackinder—the Chinese geopolitical formula looks rather uncertain and controversial. 

 

Central Asian “C5+0”

Since 1991, the five Central Asian states have been engaged in the strategic project of regional integration—a process that has not been smooth and has gone through numerous ups and downs. One of the major challenges that they have constantly faced on the way toward integration was geopolitics. The C5+1 formats have, in some sense, become a new geopolitical burden for the “Central Asian five” and a source of geopolitical leverage for the “plus one.” As one can clearly see, the three powers analyzed in this essay have pursued three different strategies in Central Asia.

In these strategic circumstances, Central Asians find themselves facing awkward choices. All C5+1 formats are different from each other, distinguishable by the different core ideas they espouse, which also play a crucial role in determining the format. However, all of them display one important fact: there is a growing recognition of Central Asia and its geopolitical importance as a single region for international politics. Paradoxically, while the world perceives Central Asia as a single region, the five states of the region have thus far been quite slow in institutionalizing their regional integration project. In 2018, they launched the so-called Consultative Meetings of presidents framework, having since organized six meetings.

One of the reasons for such slow progress lies in the dramatic and crash-test-like period of regional integration that these states have experienced—the process that had gradually and successfully evolved between 1991 and 2005, but came to an abrupt end and freezing of integration prospects after Russia’s admission to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004. This episode of frozen integration lasted for about 10 years and was eventually revitalized in 2018, at the initiative of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The new initiative took the form of Consultative Meetings of the five presidents. However, Consultative Meetings are, by definition, just about consultations.

The multiplication of the C5+1 formats symbolizes the geopolitical game of great and mid-ranking powers, each striving to assume the initiative in Central Asian regionalism. In this context, a new symbolic and practical formula can be prioritized by the Central Asians themselves. Namely, the “C5+0,” which would imply the region’s states giving priority to their own regional integration prospect first, and participating in different “C5+1” formats based on this priority. In other words, whereas much of the old C5+1 analysis focused on the interests and policies of external powers, the new formula would reflect a geopolitics-free process and the intrinsic value of regional unification for the Central Asian states. 

 

Pursuing One’s Own Agency

By summarizing the brief analysis presented in the paragraphs above, we can assume that all versions of the “C5+1” format have strong roots in the recent past—dating back to the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, these formats have gradually and logically evolved by going through a series of engagements. In particular, the U.S.-Russia-China geopolitical triangle, discussed in the previous sections of this essay, has also entrenched itself in public, academic, and political consciousness—with each power of the triangle pursuing different strategies in the region. Meanwhile, elements of ambiguity remain in all C5+1 formats. While this does not yet constitute a strategic trap for Central Asia, it already poses an existential challenge for the region, as it inevitably points to the necessity of choice or maneuvering between the aforementioned external powers.

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy treats the Russian Federation as an enemy and China as the main competitor. However unfortunately, Central Asia is located exactly between America’s two principal rivals. Exposed and susceptible to geopolitically galvanized environment and global trends, Central Asia needs to shape its own international agency as a single region. Ironically speaking, while the five states of the region are currently sovereign, they are not yet fully independent. Therefore, the region’s new grand strategy, symbolically expressed here as the “C5+0,” is sorely needed. This means that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan need to design and embody their own fundamental regional integration project. This is indeed an urgent task: Central Asian regional integration should be made in Central Asia, not under the mentorship of great powers.

That Central Asians must withstand geopolitical stress-tests is obvious, but how can this be achieved? Some experts argue that the region should engage in a balancing act between great powers, keep an equidistant position and constantly maneuver between and among them. But what would this balancing entail? What does equidistance mean? What does maneuvering mean? This terminology is too ambiguous and perhaps even unachievable, as balancing cannot be precisely measured, equidistance cannot be precisely fixed, and maneuvering can be misleading and exhausting—especially if one accounts for the complicated nature of great powers and their rivalries.

Therefore, Central Asians must learn to engage with foreign partners based on their national interests. The C5+1 can serve the C5 as a strategic carte blanche for shaping their joint positioning vis-à-vis the “+1.” At the same time, the countries of Central Asia should not delegate the process of institutionalizing regional cooperation to external actors simply because of the slow progress of intra-regional integration. The pace, modality, and efficiency of intra-regional cooperation and integration should not depend on external drivers and triggers. On the contrary, the Central Asian five should, to some extent, dictate their conditions and proposals to the “+1” external actor to avoid the rather lopsided nature of the current “C5+1” dynamic.

By and large, external powers’ attitudes toward regions like Central Asia, including under the “C5+1” banner, can be driven by resources, geopolitics, or norms. Can the Central Asian group’s response be symmetrical? What is the full potential of this regional group in world politics? I believe the answers to these and related questions will largely depend on their ability to go beyond narrow national interests and realize—as the European Union did—the value of organic regional integration and unity vis-à-vis external powers, which seem to allure Central Asian countries by pursuing their own agendas against each other. The more we become distracted by other, albeit attractive, directions, the less we will be focused on our own regional grouping, identity, agency, and perspective.

Back to Table of Contents