Jorge Castañeda Gutman is a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University. A renowned public intellectual and political scientist, he is a prolific writer on Mexican and Latin American politics, as well as U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Latin American relations. You may follow him on X @JorgeGCastaneda.

 

The impact of the 2024 U.S. presidential elections on Latin America varies from country to country. The difference between a Kamala Harris victory and that of Donald Trump is far greater in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean than it might be in Chile or Brazil. This is not to say that the entire region is unaffected by events in the United States, but rather that the intensity of the American campaign resonates more strongly the closer one is to the U.S. borders. Even in Argentina, whose sitting president is a clear Trump supporter, the impact of either outcome is significant. Perhaps the best way to gauge the influence of the U.S. presidential vote is by examining issues individually, rather than by region or country, understanding that certain problems are more critical for some nations than others.

Migrants walk along the U.S.-Mexico border

 

Because it affects all countries of the Caribbean Basin, as well as Venezuela and Ecuador, immigration is likely the most salient topic for Latin America in this campaign. However, it is important to note that for nations of the Southern Cone, for example, this issue is not as significant. Thus, the relevance of immigration is central for some and secondary for others. At first glance, a Trump victory might seem catastrophic for countries with large numbers of people attempting to emigrate, whereas Harris’ success might be perceived as less harmful. However, considering the striking similarities between the policies of the first Trump and Biden Administrations, as well as Harris’s campaign statements, the contrast becomes less clear. The clampdown on asylum, the insistence that third-country nationals wait in Mexico for appointments, the return to Mexico of non-Mexican migrants or asylum seekers detained in the United States, and the pressure on Mexico to police its southern border and chokepoints en route to the U.S. are standard features of both Trump and Biden’s terms in office. There is every reason to believe that Harris would only continue down the same path. The 30,000 monthly humanitarian parole visas for citizens of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—a major Biden initiative—would likely be interrupted by Trump and maintained by Harris. However, conservative opposition and court actions may still end the program.

 

Trump has threatened mass deportations, which Biden did not carry out and Harris would likely avoid implementing. Yet, Trump’s threats of mass expulsions during his first term never materialized—he actually deported fewer people than Obama—and the legal, logistical, and political challenges to such actions remain formidable. The most likely conclusion is that, on immigration, the next U.S. president will adopt a harder line than any predecessor, though still constrained by the courts, immigration activists, and the governments of “sending” countries, many of which will resist accepting large numbers of deportees. In particular, nations like Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and even Mexico (in the case of non-Mexicans) are unlikely to readily accept the return of hundreds of thousands of expatriates—many of whom left with tacit or explicit encouragement from their governments—and which already have strained or non-existent relations with Washington.

 

On another key issue for some Latin American nations—drugs and organized crime—a similar situation is likely. The paramount focus of the U.S. war on drugs is now fentanyl, which primarily involves Mexico. While cocaine shipments from Colombia through Central America and Mexico continue, they remain relatively stable and no longer impact a significant share of the American drug-consuming public. Fentanyl, on the other hand, is responsible for nearly 100,000 overdose deaths per year. Both Harris and Trump have taken a hard line on this issue, with Trump being more strident, as usual. It seems likely that a new Democratic administration would continue pressuring Mexico and China to do more to halt the transfer of precursor chemicals from their respective territories, where the pills are produced and shipped to the United States. Trump has even threatened to bomb cartel laboratories in Sinaloa and target cartel leaders, which is an implausible scenario, but a more intrusive approach by Washington is almost certain, regardless of who is elected. The Biden Administration has already begun to apply greater pressure on Mexico in this domain. The prominence of fentanyl deaths in the presidential campaign increases the likelihood of a tougher stance.

 

The crisis in Venezuela, triggered by its dictator Nicolás Maduro’s theft of the June 2024 presidential elections, is yet another point of contention between the United States and much of Latin America that the next administration will have to address. Despite clear evidence of the opposition’s nearly three-to-one victory, as well as overwhelming international support for exiled candidate Edmundo González, few obstacles appear to stand in the way of Maduro remaining in power and starting a new term on January 10th, 2025. This situation leaves Venezuela’s neighbors, along with the next U.S. administration, in a no-win scenario.

 

If Trump is re-elected, he may consider reinstating the “maximum pressure” strategy he pursued against Venezuela during his first term. It failed. If Harris wins, she may lean towards maintaining Biden’s carrot-and-stick approach, applying some sanctions while lifting others in exchange for political concessions from the Maduro regime. It also failed. Brazil and Colombia, whose presidents boast of their friendly personal ties with Maduro, have pushed him to either schedule another election or accept his defeat in the June election. They, too, have failed. Other Latin American nations have suspended diplomatic relations and airline connections with Venezuela, to no effect. Some former regional presidents suggested involving Cuba in finding a solution to the Venezuelan impasse, but that idea too went nowhere. In short, no one knows exactly what to do, except that a new mass exodus from the beleaguered oil-rich nation—nearly 8 million people, or a quarter of its population, have already fled to various parts of the Western hemisphere—is a near certainty. For Harris, Trump, as well as other Latin American and European leaders, there appear to be no attractive or effective solutions.

 

While the Cuban issue has plagued Washington since 1959, and although unprecedented waves of migrants from the island have created new tensions with the United States, it is perhaps a less pressing concern today. Several hundred thousand Cubans have arrived in the U.S. since 2022, as the island endures its worst economic crisis since the revolution. Indeed, Trump’s tightening of sanctions against the Havana regime did little to topple it or make it more flexible in its negotiations with Washington, while Obama’s 2015-2016 normalization made little political difference either. Under normal circumstances, the next administration might choose to simply ignore the island, but the migration issue makes that impossible. Trump would likely cancel the humanitarian parole visas, but that would only lead to more Cubans traveling through Nicaragua and Mexico to reach the United States. As a first-term president likely aiming for re-election in 2028, Harris would hardly push for the politically near-impossible lifting of the American trade embargo on Cuba. The status quo is thus likely to endure.

 

Finally, the growing rivalry—or a new Cold War—between the United States and China will have a lasting and profound impact on Latin America. Paradoxically, this issue, which likely affects the largest number of countries in the region and will continue to do so over the long term, is also one where differences between the two U.S. presidential candidates are the smallest. Until now, the expanding Chinese presence in the region has caused little friction between local governments and Washington. That could soon change. Tensions between the two superpowers will increasingly spill over into Latin America, affecting trade, investment, strategic minerals, and even military relations. Both U.S. candidates are moving in this direction.

 

On trade, the main threat to Mexico and other nations lies in the possibility that Chinese firms may have—or intend to—set up operations to circumvent American tariffs on goods imported directly from the mainland. Mexico has a ten-to-one trade deficit with Beijing, importing over $100 billion worth of merchandise. Few believe the Mexican economy can absorb such a magnitude of exports from China, and many suspect that part of this vast sum involves triangulation or re-exports from Mexico to the United States. Trump has warned of high tariffs on cars shipped from Mexico northward if they included Chinese content, while the Biden Administration has raised the issue at the highest level with Mexican authorities. As it stands, China is capturing a growing share of Mexico’s relatively small new automobile market, and U.S. carmakers are voicing their concerns. Although this trend may not yet affect other Latin American nations, many of them—Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Central America, and the Dominican Republic—have free-trade agreements with the United States. It would not be surprising if Chinese manufacturers sought to exploit this fact.

 

This is why the United States is increasingly wary of Chinese intentions and announcements pledging to invest in Mexico and other countries, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean. Until now, Chinese investment in Latin America has largely focused on commodity-based activities: land for planting soybeans, mines, infrastructure, oil, and minerals such as lithium. Washington has mostly overlooked these ventures, concentrating its warnings on high-tech activities like fiber optic cables, 5G systems, and scanners at the U.S.-Mexico border. This focus is beginning to shift and may intensify in the coming years. A changing U.S. position on the issue will force many governments in the region to pick sides in the escalating rivalry, with neither option being entirely favorable for most nations. Chile, Brazil, and Mexico have already confronted this dilemma, and Argentina and Colombia may be next.

 

These challenges are compounded by two other difficulties stemming from the new Cold War. Chinese military involvement in Latin America is currently minimal, with the possible exception of an earth station in southern Argentina. However, it stands to reason that other manifestations of this involvement may soon emerge. For countries with close geopolitical ties to China—like Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua—the temptation to strengthen these connections may be hard to resist, as it will be for Beijing itself. As the United States expands its presence in the Indo-Pacific and strengthens alliances like the Quad, it is reasonable to expect China to respond accordingly, especially if there are willing partners in Latin America. Both Trump and Harris would react negatively in such cases, creating awkward situations not only for the governments engaged in these exchanges but also for third countries indirectly involved.

 

Finally, China’s leadership in the so-called Global South, coupled with its close relationships with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others, will also fuel diplomatic concerns for several Latin American countries. Brazil, already a BRICS member, is not entirely comfortable with China’s growing influence within the group and its increasingly anti-American stances. Argentina was invited to join but declined after electing a new president. Most nations in the region refused to apply sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, and several reacted with unease or even anger to Israeli incursions in Gaza and Lebanon. So far, Washington has not made much of this, but a second Trump administration might take a different approach, given the former president’s transactional style of dealing with international relations. On Ukraine, he might even align with pro-Russian factions in Latin America, though Israel would likely be an entirely different matter.

 

Conversely, a Harris administration might be more flexible on the Middle East, but likely not on Ukraine. Either way, the upheavals currently taking place in the world are bound to affect Latin America, and whichever side the region aligns with will inevitably bring some form of disagreement—either with Washington or Beijing. Latin America has experienced this before, between 1947 and 1989, and the memories of that period are not always pleasant.

 

In conclusion, the team that ends up taking office next January in Washington will face a series of severe challenges in Latin America, and the region’s leaders will be compelled to navigate an administration that will, on several fronts, be scarcely accommodating. None of the issues reviewed here will be resolved over the next four years, and most of them—migration, organized crime, Cuba, and trade—have been persistent for decades. Regardless of who occupies the White House, or the presidential palaces in Latin America, various forms of accommodation, negotiation, and management of disagreements will be found, and perhaps even improved. Significant steps forward in the relationship between the two halves of the hemisphere are unlikely, but neither are dramatic setbacks. The most probable scenario is a continuation of the status quo—an uninspiring prospect, but an acceptable one.

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