Milan Krstić is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Belgrade. He is a recipient of the 2022 Marshal Memorial Fellowship program. Krstić is one of the founders of the Center for Social Dialogue and Regional Initiatives (CDDRI).

The U.S. Presidential elections are so important that people around the world should also have the right to vote. This claim reflects the common-sense attitude of many who follow the electoral process—curious to see who will become the 47th President of the United States in January 2025. Considering that the United States remains a leading superpower by many measures, it is not surprising that governments around the world analyze and monitor the election process closely. While both major American parties have maintained at least a narrow bipartisan consensus on foreign policy for much of the post-World War II period, the ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats appears to be widening. As a result, the outcome of this election will be watched more closely than it was a few decades ago.

A protest against Rio Tinto’s lithium mining plans in western Serbia, an environmentally questionable strategic project prioritized by the U.S. and allied EU governments

 

The Western Balkans is a region where the United States took direct military action following the Cold War, leaving a lasting impact. In the 1990s, Balkan affairs were prominent in American political campaigns, though their significance waned somewhat in the 2000s. American influence is still evident today, most notably through NATO’s extensive presence in the region, the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Kosovo as part of the KFOR mission, and the remnants of the Army Headquarters in Belgrade, bombed-out in 1999. With unresolved challenges in the Western Balkans, it’s no surprise that regional leaders and the public are closely watching the U.S. election. However, they have yet to hear clear signals from either side about future American policy toward the area, as it remains a lower priority on the political agenda.

 

There is a general expectation that the United States will pursue a more liberal and values-based foreign policy if the country’s sitting Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election, especially in contrast to the prospect of former President Donald Trump returning to the White House. However, regarding the Western Balkans, this appears presumptive and simplistic, overlooking the key drivers and characteristics of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Both prospective administrations would likely be guided by similar geopolitical thinking: prioritizing competition with major challengers, employing pragmatic logic, and focusing on strategic projects and resources. Democratization as a signature liberal foreign policy tool will not be in the primary focus of neither Republicans nor Democrats. Therefore, describing U.S. foreign policy toward the region as fundamentally “liberal” or “conservative” would be to exaggerate what are, in reality, relatively minor differences.

 

However, a deeper look into these smaller differences shows that they are not necessarily indicative of a more liberal approach by a Democratic administration, as one might expect. Harris’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans could actually be more conservative in the sense that it would strictly adhere to previously established guidelines and objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Counterintuitively, a Trump administration might place more emphasis on a typically liberal foreign policy tool—such as promoting free trade in the region and expanding American economic interests. Additionally, it could be more flexible in deal-brokering, potentially supporting “out of the box” solutions to unresolved issues, such as the Belgrade–Priština dialogue. In contrast, a Harris administration might more conservatively stick to the existing hierarchy of priorities and maintain strong alignment with NATO and related Euro-Atlantic structures.

 

The Western Balkans in the Dominant Geopolitical Paradigm

The dominant U.S. geopolitical paradigm drives its foreign policy to maintain its leading position by containing or reducing the influence of its competitors in key strategic regions. Politicians and analysts’ assessments differ in defining which regions are critical to American interests. While the more interventionist branch views the entire world as a battlefield where the United States should work to limit the influence of rival powers, those critical of the “imperial overstretch” advocate for a narrower approach, pointing to numerous failures of U.S. interventionism.

 

Regarding the Western Balkans, however, there appears to be a solid consensus among relevant actors—while no one sees it as the most critical region, all consider it important. It is the ‘backyard’ of NATO and the EU—the only part of Europe west of Belarus and Moldova that remains outside the Euro-Atlantic security overlay. Following NATO’s integration of its ‘rimland’ (completed with the accession of Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020), Western fears of the Western Balkans becoming a battleground for proxy competition were somewhat alleviated. However, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the region has gained renewed attention. Some indicators of this increased focus include the more direct American involvement in the Kosovo issue, the establishment of the U.S.-North Macedonia Strategic Dialogue, and the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement on energy with Serbia. There is sufficient reason to believe this logic would guide both prospective administrations.

 

Despite expected personnel changes (Secretary of State Antony Blinken has announced he has no desire to stay), Harris’s campaign has repeatedly indicated its intention to maintain general continuity with President Joseph Biden’s foreign policy. Her National Security Advisor, Philip Gordon, is expected to play a significant role in continuing the existing course of U.S. strategy toward the region, given his expertise in Europe. The chief of staff for Democratic vice-presidential candidate Tim Walz, former Under Secretary of State Elizabeth Allen, is also expected to advocate for this continuity. As the highest-ranking American diplomat to recently visit the Western Balkans, she has put considerable effort into countering Russian and Chinese influence in information flow and ‘soft power.’ As for a second Trump administration, the fact that this approach dominated his previous term suggests a high likelihood of continuity. A more direct confirmation of this assumption came recently from Trump’s foreign policy advisor, Richard Grenell (a well-disposed candidate for Secretary of State or National Security Advisor), who publicly advised Serbia to “break away from Russia and China.”

 

Additional signals that the United States will continue—and possibly even increase—its involvement in the region, regardless of the election’s outcome, are coming from Congress. In the spring of 2024, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee supported the “Western Balkans Stability and Prosperity Act.” One of the bill’s stated goals is to counter Russian and Chinese “malign influence.” The bill expands the tools available to U.S. foreign policy in the region—from more generous development funding through USAID and the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), via increased cultural exchange programs, to more structured and enforceable sanctions against individuals. These measures are aimed at strengthening America’s ability to compete with other foreign actors in the region.

 

The Prevalence of Political Pragmatism

Another important element of similarity is the general dominance of pragmatic logic in regional affairs over normative and values-based approaches. This means that both prospective administrations would formally insist that democracy, human rights, and adherence to EU standards on the rule of law in the region are very important. Still, they would practically consider improvements in these areas as lower priorities on the U.S. regional agenda. Backsliding in these areas would not prevent the United States from deepening or maintaining good relations with strategically important actors in the region, except in the unfortunate—and currently unforeseen—case of radical and widespread political violence.

 

Donald Trump does not hide his transactional approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes gains for the United States based on the “America First” principle. While support for democratization and human rights is not necessarily at odds with such an approach, it tends to be far lower on the American priority list relative to immediate benefits. To make deals that he believes are in the American interest, his administration will not hesitate to engage with anyone, including open autocrats such as the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Regarding the Western Balkans, the fact that his previous administration refrained from sanctioning regional actors for backsliding on democracy or human rights indicates that deficits in these areas will not present a significant obstacle to cooperation. While often personally accused of similar practices, Trump does not hesitate to compliment foreign leaders characterized by democracy-monitoring organizations as populists.

 

While the Harris campaign emphasizes a values-based foreign policy, significant changes are not expected. Current U.S. policy toward the region is primarily pragmatic. Although several Balkan individuals are now more intensely sanctioned for corrupt practices or destabilizing the region, it appears that the criteria for sanctions are more geopolitical than universal—most of the sanctioned persons are associated with Russia. Conversely, when leaders demonstrate a willingness to reduce cooperation with Russia, engage with the West on other important issues (such as the extraction of strategic resources, arms sales, and diversification of energy sources), or simply claim to be the most pro-American, their internal issues are often overlooked or only mildly criticized. A similar policy of pragmatically sanctioning anti-democratic and illegal practices—only when individuals are linked to China or Russia—is expected to continue.

 

The main difference in this regard would be the level of support for integrating the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO. While both administrations would generally endorse this process, Democrats might push more aggressively for its implementation than Republicans, particularly under NATO-skeptic Donald Trump. The newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Kasanoff emphasizes Euro-Atlantic integration in his public statements far more than his predecessor, Gabriel Escobar, even referencing this term in the context of militarily neutral Serbia. However, this should be viewed more as a pragmatic desire to expand the Euro-Atlantic framework to the region than as a values-driven intention to normatively reshape it. In fact, it is conceivable that the United States might advocate for the EU or NATO accession of certain states even if they do not meet the entrance criteria, based on pragmatic considerations and geopolitical logic.

 

Strategic Projects in Focus

Regardless of who wins the election in November, strategic resources remain the most important objective of the American geopolitically driven efforts to prevent the rise of competitors in the region through direct engagement. Western control over lithium in the region is significant not only as a resource for battery production in Western-owned car factories but also as a means of preventing Chinese access to these resources. The construction of an electric vehicle factory by the Chinese company BYD (the largest competitor to Tesla) in Hungary is prompting Western companies to seek competing projects in the region to reduce Chinese influence in the European market. The only expected difference would be that Trump’s administration would focus more on comparative gains for American companies, while Harris’s administration would likely coordinate its approach more closely with the EU. Neither Republicans nor the more “pro-green” Democrats appear to be substantially skeptical regarding the environmental impact of lithium extraction in the Western Balkans.

 

In addition, the United States will continue to focus on expanding the region’s infrastructure for energy production and transportation. Apart from the direct American economic interest in these projects (such as the announced construction of the “Djerdap 3” hydroelectric power plant on the Danube River between Serbia and Romania), this expansion also serves to prevent Chinese companies from establishing a stronger presence in this sector, evident over the past ten years (especially in Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Furthermore, it helps reduce Russian and Chinese influence, as three countries in the region (North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia) remain dependent on imports of Russian natural gas. Once again, Trump would be more motivated to position American LNG as a substitute for Russian natural gas, while the more environmentally conscious Democrats would likely prefer substituting it with Azerbaijani gas, considering their skepticism toward LNG production for export purposes.

 

Finally, general control over the arms and ammunition trade in the region will remain important for either of the two possible U.S. administrations. From an import standpoint, the American interest is to prevent any actors (especially non-NATO states) from relying on Chinese or Russian military technology in the long term. From an export perspective, it has recently become evident that the Ukrainian and Israeli armed forces are using a significant amount of ammunition and arms produced in the region. Given that the two stated conflicts are still active, continuing these (indirect) export patterns will remain important for American interests. One easily imagined difference would be in what each administration would consider the most desirable destination for this arms flow. A Harris administration would likely be rhetorically more skeptical toward Israel, which could make it less favorable for the White House to continue sending arms in the same manner. Conversely, considering the tendency to end the war in Ukraine, the flow of ammunition and arms directed toward Kyiv might be less important for Trump.

 

Same Logic, Different Opponents: Russia or China?

Different leaders have different geopolitical visions and perceptions. On the global level, there is a consensus among major Democratic and Republican foreign policy strategists that China is the main challenger to the United States and that its foreign policy should primarily focus on Beijing. In this sense, there has been strong continuity between the Trump and Biden Administrations, with the next administration likely to follow along this path, regardless of who wins the election in November. However, the spillover of this general global focus to the Western Balkans will differ depending on the election’s outcome.

 

In the context of the Western Balkans, a Harris administration would likely concentrate on countering Russian influence. Russia is currently the primary opponent to the West in the Euro-Atlantic context, and the focus will be on diminishing Moscow’s sources of power and influence. This would represent an unchanged continuity with Biden’s existing approach, which places this goal at the center of its regional efforts. Militarily neutral Serbia has completely ceased military exercises with Russia and the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, the recently built pipelines allow countries to diversify their energy sources by increasing imports from countries like Azerbaijan, and Russian trade with the region has decreased over the last two years. All this indicates that this policy has yielded certain results. Harris would continue to address what Americans label as “malign Russian influence” in the region.

 

On the other hand, during the presidential debate with Harris, Trump announced that one of his priorities would be to pressure Kyiv and Moscow to end the war. A reluctance to further support Ukraine in resisting Russia is also evident among his closest associates, from vice presidential candidate JD Vance to his son Donald Trump Jr. After a recent meeting with Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky, Trump emphasized that he had a good relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Therefore, Russian influence will not be as much of a focus for his administration as that of China. That does not mean Moscow’s impact would be ignored. During his first Administration (2017-2021), Trump took steps to reduce Russian influence—from expanding NATO to Montenegro and North Macedonia to insisting on energy diversification in the 2020 U.S.-brokered Belgrade-Priština Agreement. However, countering Russian impact would not be a priority.

 

Instead, a second Trump administration would prioritize addressing the rising Chinese influence in the region. Chinese companies have recently completed significant infrastructure projects in the Balkans, including the Pelješac Bridge in Croatia, a highway in Montenegro, and a high-speed railway in Serbia. This rising influence is particularly evident in Serbia and Hungary. Budapest and Belgrade were, along with Paris, the only capitals that Chinese President Xi Jinping visited during his European tour in 2024. Serbia and China signed an agreement on the closest level of strategic partnership known as the “Community of Common Destiny.” Hungary serves as a strategic hub for many Chinese projects. While Trump’s recent praises of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban indicate that this is currently not an insurmountable obstacle, it is clear that the goal of his administration would be for the United States to replace Chinese influence in the region. A Harris administration would also thoroughly monitor and counter Chinese influence, but with relatively lower intensity due to the focus on the Russian threat.

 

A Liberal Trump?

Given that both administrations would base their respective policies on geopolitical considerations and pragmatism, neither can be labeled essentially values-based. While both administrations would rhetorically support reform in the Western Balkan states, preferably leading to the functional democracy, the rule of law, and the respect of human rights (with a particular focus on the rights of groups such as the LGBTQ+ community), neither would invest too much political or economic resources in them at this moment. However, when it comes to methodology, it seems that a Trump administration’s policy toward the Western Balkans might exhibit two more liberal traits than that of Harris.

 

The first is the expected primary focus on regional economic integration. During Trump’s first presidential term (2017-2021), the United States strongly supported the project of economic integration in the Western Balkans, initially known as the “Little Schengen” and later renamed “Open Balkan.” The main logic of this project was based on a liberal assumption that free trade benefits all parties and that economic interdependence positively spills over to political relations among actors. The generally positive American attitude toward this project (which has since experienced its internal ups and downs) continued during the Biden Administration. However, the United States began to provide (at least formal) parallel support to the competing project of economic integration—the Common Regional Market, as part of the EU-supported Berlin Process. Consequently, it became less engaged in facilitating regional economic integration. Considering that another Trump administration would not prioritize coordination with the EU, it is expected to push harder for economic integration through the regionally owned “Open Balkan” project.

 

The second trait is the more ‘out-of-the-box’ approach to the Belgrade-Priština dialogue. During the first Trump Administration, he appointed then-U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as his special envoy for the dialogue on the Kosovo issue. Washington effectively initiated its track of dialogue between the two sides, separated from the EU-facilitated process that began in 2011. This meant less adherence to previously achieved agreements, many of which remained unimplemented. Rumors surrounding the process included the assumption that John Bolton, then National Security Advisor to President Trump, supported delineating or partition (change of boundaries) between the two sides as a possible solution. The 2020 U.S.-brokered deal between Belgrade and Pristina, signed in the White House in Trump’s presence, focused on economic normalization and was based on an essentially liberal logic that this would, over the longer term, lead to easier resolution of the remaining political issues between the two sides. A second Trump administration would likely continue pursuing this path and more strongly pressure Priština to restrain from its unilateral policy of pressuring Kosovo Serbs, while motivating Serbia’s leadership to engage in a compromising dialogue.

 

A Conservative Harris?

Given the U.S. internal political context, it might seem awkward to qualify the attitudes or plans of a person with the most progressive legislative track record in the Senate as conservative, especially as she is being labeled a “Marxist” and “radical leftist” by her GOP opponents. Even when focusing on her general foreign policy agenda, it would be hard to describe her as conservative, despite the public support she receives from some prominent neocons, such as the Cheney family. There is a general degree of conservatism in the Democratic agenda, which aims to maintain functionality and restore the existing institutions of the world order (under U.S. domination). However, her foreign policy agenda also proposes significant reformative elements, including a greater focus on Africa, climate change, and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, alongside more effective multilateralism and global governance. This is a progressive agenda, especially in comparison to Trump’s unilateralist approach, who demonstrated a relative disregard for the UN during his first term.

 

However, focusing on the expected policy toward the Western Balkans, as elaborated in the previous sections, we can identify some layers of genuine conservatism relative to Donald Trump. The first layer is the adherence to existing structures and institutions. This includes reliance on further NATO expansion and the prolonged engagement of NATO in Kosovo (KFOR) and, albeit in a different form, Bosnia and Herzegovina (NHQSa). Trump would not seek to leave NATO (and would be prevented from doing so without the support of Congress, due to the bipartisan act passed in December 2023). Still, his administration would not prioritize NATO expansion in the regional context to the extent one might expect from the Democrats. His NATO policy would be guided by the relative spending of alliance members, where reaching the 2 percent defense spending benchmark would be considered a condition for the American collective defense commitments. Additionally, reluctance to shift the dominant focus from Russia to China in the regional context could also be attributed to conservatism, which tends to view the Balkans through the old (and static) Cold War lens.

 

Who is the Region Rooting For?

Both administrations’ policies on the Western Balkans are expected to be fundamentally similar, with the geopolitical struggle against the influence of other powers as their main goal, pursued through pragmatic instruments and oriented primarily toward controlling strategic resources. However, the implementation methodology would differ in the sense that a Trump administration would be less conservative/more liberal in its approach. Considering these findings, those who are satisfied with the current situation are expected to cheer for Harris, and the rest for Trump. However, it seems that very few of the region’s actors are completely satisfied with the current state of affairs, and many exhibit revisionist or restorative tendencies.

 

The current leadership of Kosovo Albanians is vigorously cheering for Harris, as they benefit from the current situation more than they would from any government that puts substantial pressure on Priština. Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti even posed for a photo with Harris on the margins of the Democratic National Convention. On the other hand, certain opposition leaders are likely rooting for Trump’s return, especially Hashim Thaçi, who might hope for his release from prison, where he is charged with war crimes. Kosovo Serbs have reason to favor Trump’s victory as well, hoping for American pressure on Priština to grant them their basic rights—although they also have reasons to fear a potential reduction of U.S. forces in KFOR. Serbs south of the Ibar River might fear a potential revival of partition plans and a possibility of being left entirely to the mercy of Priština.

 

Bosniak leaders support a greater focus on NATO, hoping that Bosnia could soon join the alliance, and would consequentially favor the victory of the Democratic candidate. Bosnian Serbs strongly cheer for Trump, hoping his administration will ease the pressure on them to accept a more integrationist—or as some would argue, unitarist—course within Bosnia and stop pressuring them to distance from Russia. Croats do not seem to have a particular favorite in this competition. The Montenegrin opposition favors Harris, while the government remains quiet. A similar situation can be observed in North Macedonia, with the only difference being that the government has more discreet sympathies for Trump’s victory. The leadership of Albania appears to be working on deepening relations with Trump’s close aides through the major project of Jared Kushner’s company in Tirana. However, they too have not publicly backed any of the candidates.

 

The most intriguing case is Serbia. While it might be expected that President Aleksandar Vučić would follow his close ideological ally from Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and openly support Trump, Serbia looks poised to avoid putting all its eggs in one basket. On the one hand, in the spring of 2024, Serbia donated the bombed-out Army Headquarters building in Belgrade city center to a company of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. Serbian leaders maintain cordial relations with Richard Grenell, while Donald Trump Jr. visited Belgrade in late September 2024. On the other hand, in the summer of 2023, the Serbian Foreign Minister participated for the first time in a NATO Summit, while Labor Minister Nemanja Starović attended the Democratic National Convention. Serbian leadership has deepened relations with the sitting Democratic administration, including the signing of a document on strategic cooperation in the field of energy in September 2024.

 

The case of Serbian (but not only Serbian) balancing is paradigmatic. It indicates not only that the race remains very tight but also that the government might hope for certain benefits from both sides. To return to the initial thesis of this essay, it also indicates that the strategic priorities of Democrats and Republicans in the Western Balkans are not substantially different.

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