Márton Ugrósdy is Deputy State Secretary in the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister of Hungary, where he also serves as Head of his Political Director’s Office and Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Strategic Advisory Council. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily correspond to the official position of the Government of Hungary.

The upcoming U.S. election will be of crucial importance to Europe, although not in the sense than most pundits anticipate. The real question is whether the Old Continent can regain its own agency and capacity to define and pursue its own political and economic interests. A strong Europe can also serve as a strong ally and partner of the United States in preserving Christian-humanist values. Since most, but not all of our security interests coincide, an honest discussion about burden-sharing could set the stage for an enhanced and mutually beneficial transatlantic partnership for the decades to come. But all of this should start with a wake-up call, urging Europe to snap out of the trance in which it has been since February 2022.

Hungary’s 2024 Presidency of the Council of the EU is arguably a rare attempt to discuss European strategic independence

 

The Gospel of Transatlanticism

The United States and Europe appear to be history’s most perfect allies. A country that holds all Christian-humanist values dear, a nation that has saved Europe from totalitarianism three times, and a superpower that embodies everything that the Old Continent wanted to be but is still friendly with—this is the impression that one can get from mainstream transatlantic circles. Europe and America stand united: they fight common enemies in all corners of the world, and in the epic fight between democracy and authoritarianism, our democratic values will prevail once again.

 

This rosy image is as naïve as it can be. America’s history of relations with Europe is more than complicated. The United States did not enter both world wars to save democracy. Instead, it was a core American interest to intervene. Like all naval powers in the world’s history, the United States had to avoid the rise of a large and powerful continental power—the Second and Third German Reichs. This strategy was not much different from the British tradition of continental balancing. Thus, it is no surprise that Washington and London worked hand in glove to counter the rise of the main challenger to their interests of the day. The difference lay in the aftermath. After World War I, the United States turned its back on Europe and let the fatal flaws of the Treaty of Versailles unfold. Mired in its isolationist politics and later the Great Depression, the United States did not have the political will to seriously engage in the ever-stronger European political rivalries of the 1930s. But America was not to commit the same mistake after the fall of Nazi Germany, and ever since VE Day, American troops have been permanently stationed in Europe. Some call this occupation, and others view this as their insurance policy against a resurgent Russia. Still, one thing is for certain: the American (military) footprint in Europe is undeniable.

 

The Cold War did justify prolonged American presence in Europe. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Red Menace, American troops in Europe became somewhat useless. Eventually, if you only have a hammer, everything looks like or becomes a nail—and these American troops, especially the presence of the U.S. Air Force, came in handy during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, as well as to the support of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations in the 2000s and beyond. Europe became a useful and willing staging ground for American ambitions beyond the former Iron Curtain. And even with the significant downsizing of U.S. troops stationed on the Old Continent, elements of the U.S. Armed Forces remain the strongest army on European soil.

 

Apart from the boots on the ground, soft power spin-doctors have left their impact on future European leaders. NGOs and other organizations in and around the U.S. federal government made sure that the most promising Europeans were exposed to American ideas. Scholarships, fellowships, summer universities, and other programs were offered in abundance to get future European elites acquainted with the American way of life, dining, thinking, and living, therefore tying most leaders and future leaders of NATO allies to the American establishment. These personal ties ensured that whoever is elected to lead a European country will have as many ties as possible to Washington and beyond, and also that no sudden moves can be expected from any European ally.

 

During the Cold War, when the enemy was clear and armed to the teeth on the other side of the Iron Curtain, this close cooperation needed no further explanation. After the Cold War, however, especially as the Soviet Union withdrew from its satellites and Russia seemed to crumble under the enormous weight of its own transformation process, transatlanticism needed to reinvent itself once again. And reinvent it did: as democracy won the Cold War, now the only thing that the transatlantic allies had to do was to ensure that the march continued. Things looked jubilant with the “end of history” as long as the Democrats were in power in Washington. But after the September 11th, 2001 attacks, and the subsequent Global War on Terror, things turned south with major European countries opposing President George W. Bush’s Iraq invasion. After 2008 and the attempted “Reset” policy, Europe seemed to benefit from U.S.-Russia rapprochement, with even then-Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk embracing then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s apology for the brutal massacre of Polish officers in the Katýn Forest. But resentment did not work, and a resurgent Russia needed a resolute answer. Enter the 2013 EuroMaidan, Victoria Nuland, the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, and lastly, an all-out war against Russia in 2022. Today, almost all European leaders believe as a dogma, that Europe cannot survive without the United States, and the American foothold in Europe seems to be stronger than ever.

 

The Rise and Fall of Strategic Autonomy

Not all Europeans were happy to accept American control of their destinies. The first serious European leader to challenge the “Gospel” was Charles de Gaulle, who realized that American influence over Europe was not something that the most important (at least according to the French thinking) European land power would like to see. So, de Gaulle disengaged from NATO, and France sunk into an endless series of post-colonial wars around the world, relinquishing its potential to remain a serious player in Europe, and ceding the leadership role to the United States. Former French President Jacques Chirac later led the charge against the 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq, prompting Donald Rumsfeld to vent his frustration over the different levels of docility in Old and New Europe.

 

The realization that European and American interests diverge should not come as a surprise to anyone. After all, the North Atlantic Ocean separates the two partners. Furthermore, the United States, as a naval power, has the luxury of turning its back to the rest of the world if it wants to. Europe, on the other hand, as a patchwork of several dozen countries with a history of mutual annihilation and enmity stretching back at least two millennia, does not have the luxury of being distant from or unaware of major threats to its security. Poor in natural resources and divided by borders, languages, cultures, and religions, Europe needs to exert considerable pressure to keep its game together. This unstable construct tends to bend, and maybe even break, if exposed to conventional and non-conventional challenges like illegal migration or a traditional war of attrition on its eastern frontiers.

 

Ironically, the realization that Europe cannot completely rely on the United States emerges usually at times when U.S. leadership does not seem reliable. As a seemingly subjective assessment, this usually coincides with the terms of Republican presidents in the White House. After the end of the Cold War, it was only twice that it was chic to talk about challenging American supremacy in Europe. We already alluded to the first of these occasions, in 2003 when—according to the mainstream European point of view—the arch-redneck Texan president wanted to invade Iraq for its oil, and take revenge on the dictator who wanted to kill his father. The second was when Donald Trump served in the White House: the utter disgust and Schadenfreude in Europeans vis-á-vis another Republican President, as well as Trump’s comments on U.S. commitment to NATO, prompted most European capitals to at least initiate discussions about their desire to exercise some elementary self-defense against an outside adversary.

 

Ironically, these loud calls for Europe to develop a capability to defend itself instantly abated once President Trump lost the 2020 election and Joe Biden took over. Touted as the most European president of recent times, mainstream European leaders pretended as if the last four years never happened. Furthermore, they had never questioned the rationale for the continued American presence and meddling in Europe. Whoever dared to ask the question of why we needed the Americans in the first place was labeled as a Russian agent, a Trump supporter, or both. And after February 2022, this whole rhetoric spiraled out of control.

 

The Ukraine Quagmire

Speak softly and carry a big stick. While this bon mot of Teddy Roosevelt should be the lodestar of European leaders, those who frequent the halls of power in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and beyond do not heed to the advice of the Rough Rider. 

 

Europe was unable to achieve anything militarily even before the invasion of Ukraine. The failure to contain the Balkan wars, the calls for U.S. military involvement in the Libya campaign in 2011 after the two most well-armed European powers ran out of ammunition in three days, the legendary comment of Victoria Nuland about the EU in 2014, and the miserable state of the European armed forces depicted a hollow picture of Europe’s hard power. But at least for a long time, there was a desire to do something, and to do it on our own—independent of American interests, guidance, and advice.

 

This came to a screeching halt in early 2022. While Europe watched in awe as Russian military columns approached Kyiv, it became apparent that the good times of enjoying the peace dividend were over. Defense spending had to go up, and as one American expert said succinctly at a closed discussion not long after the war escalated, European defense spending had to go to American companies, too.

 

Because the Ukraine War is being fought with a similar ferocity in the online sphere as well, whoever dared to question the notion that only the Americans could save this poor and weak Europe from the inevitable Red Menace was lampooned by “The North Atlantic Fella Organization” and other online trolls. Those who dared to ask whether an open-ended war (remember: “as long as it takes…”) was in the European interest were immediately labeled Russian agents with Ukrainian blood on their hands. Anyone who did not openly believe and worship the “Slava Ukraini” gospel was denounced as being on the wrong side of history, failing to recognize the importance of the imminent final battle between Good and Evil on European soil in the twenty-first century.

 

It is more than obvious now that Europe is not capable of defending itself on its own. Central and Eastern EU member states rely so much on U.S. material and moral support that they have become American proxies in all the major European fora. Germany, with its Zeitenwende—but even more due to the deeply engraved feeling of guilt—is bending over backwards to show they will not even think about touching the Russians again. The UK, now out of the EU, has fully reverted to the policy of continental balancing and is more than happy to rub salt into the open European wounds—whether this means meddling in the Istanbul talks between Russia and Ukraine, exacerbating the pains of the German economy, or emboldening Poland and the Baltic states to be even more aggressive (if that is physically possible) in their proposals to widen and deepen European sanctions against Russia.

 

As a result, Europe is getting poorer, less safe, more unstable, and more exposed to outside threats. A significant part of European weaponry has been donated to Ukraine, and subsequently destroyed on the front lines. Replenishing the stockpiles will not be easy: not only have prices shot through the roof, but production capacities are also inhibiting the replacement of donated and lost materiel due to production bottlenecks, the lack of raw materials, and the traditional guns vs. butter questions. To make matters worse, all of this is occurring on a continent that struggles with the parallel impact of aging societies and the increasing costs of illegal immigration. As long as the war in Ukraine rages, the chances of having a meaningful and objective debate on these fundamental questions on the future of Europe will remain non-existent.

 

The Americans from Mars

The debate on whether the U.S. needs a strong or weak Europe remains undecided. A strong Europe could not only be a reliable market for American products, from shale oil and gas to sophisticated weapons systems. Europe, based on mutual values, shared culture, beliefs, ideals, and history would be an ideal partner and pawn for America in the next round of the Clash of Civilizations: the coming U.S. showdown with China. A strong European economy that has leverage against China—which can foot the bill of a European blue water navy capable of projecting power into the South China Sea and beyond, and a Europe that can talk to third partners with a different voice while delivering the same message—could augment Washington’s efforts to contain the Chinese rise in the upcoming decades. However, whether this would be beneficial for Europe remains doubtful.

 

On the other hand, a weak Europe is also a reliable market for U.S. products, from shale oil and gas (especially if something happens to an undersea gas pipeline) as well as sophisticated weapons systems, albeit on a smaller scale. And if Europe is weak and in need of American security guarantees, European leaders will surely not have second thoughts on whether they should have anything to do with the Sino-American great power rivalry, or whether they would be better off not taking sides and using both major powers to Europe’s strategic and economic advantage.

 

The war in Ukraine, despite being a red herring for the United States in the long run, satisfies many American objectives at the same time. It will tie down Russian resources for the coming decades. It empowers New Europe, the closest American allies within the EU and NATO. It creates a booming market for U.S. products and commodities. It weakens the European companies, which lose access to cheap and readily available raw materials through the supply chains they have built since Ostpolitik started 50 years ago. It, perhaps tragically, weakens the two major European powers that wanted to stand up against too much American influence in Europe, namely France and Germany.

 

But should Europe in such a dismal state assist the United States in the coming clash with China? If Europe needs constant attention and baby-sitting, will the Americans have enough bandwidth, both militarily and politically to face a resurgent China in the upcoming decades? How will Washington deal with the damage to its image outside of the West when most of the world sees the double standards it employs in the respective cases of Ukraine and Israel?

 

The (few) Europeans from Venus

The very reason the European Union was created was to maintain peace on a continent which was not able to control its thirst for blood even for two decades in the last two millennia. In this task, the EU was utterly successful. This is why it is so disheartening to see the EU leaders as the most aggressive, pro-war politicians of our time. According to them, we must fight until the last Ukrainian soldier. They think that the EU should issue common debt to cover the costs of an endless war, and the policy of “as long as it takes” and “let Ukraine decide what a win means” remains very much alive.

 

But most Europeans have had enough of this. Most of them think the war has to stop, and the warring parties must sit down and reach a peace agreement. Because what average people feel as an impact of the war is rising inflation, a feeling of insecurity, doubts about the future, and a generally dim outlook on their personal wellbeing. No wonder that protest parties are rising across Europe, and trust in the traditional elites is plummeting. When the elites are not representing the interests of the people they claim to lead—one should remember a leading European politician who said she does not care about her voters when it comes to Ukraine—consequences usually follow.

 

The outcome of the war in Ukraine is not irrelevant to Europe. It looks like we will have to prepare ourselves for a long standoff with Russia, which means a structurally weak economy and an impending crisis, with deterrence remaining key in the decades to come. But we also have to save the Ukrainian nation. We should focus on stabilizing our neighborhood, bringing peace to the troubled region, and once the conditions are met, enlarging the European Union further to the Southeast and East. In order to succeed, the war has to stop.

 

Further Vassalization or Strategic Partnership

Europe is so strategically autonomous that even its self-perception depends on the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. If President Trump makes a comeback, talks about American irresponsibility and unreliability will be back too. This will lead to the resurrection of the debate on strategic autonomy, and thinking about the fact that European and U.S. interests often diverge will not be an exercise in blasphemy as they might be today. Should Vice President Harris win the election, Europe will remain on autopilot when it comes to its foreign and security interests, and the cult of transatlanticism will only become stronger. But only among the elites.

 

European people do not want to see their homelands suffer. They want a Europe which is strong and free. A Europe that is not a vassal but a partner to the United States, united in diversity, fighting shoulder to shoulder for their common interests, and respectfully disagreeing when these interests do not converge. Recent election results show that the old adage of Abraham Lincoln is still correct: “You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” The radical parties are not getting stronger in Europe because Europeans are becoming more radical: these parties perform better because people do not trust the elites anymore, for these elites do not seem to follow European interests.

 

So ironically, a second Trump presidency might just be the turn of events Europe really needs. A wake-up call to get its house in order, to aim high and stand high, to restore the dignity and sovereignty of European countries. To be able to talk about European interest again. To define who the Europeans are, what they stand for, and are they really the peace-loving people whom they have become after World War II, strange folks from Venus instead of Mars. And Europeans are not only peace-loving, but freedom-loving nations as well. Most of our ancestors fought and many died for freedom. Freedom from external, non-European power. Most of the time, this power came from the East. But occasionally, it came from other directions too. The clock is ticking. It’s time to wake up.

Back to Table of Contents