Winston Dookeran is Professor of Practice at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus. He is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Governor of the Central Bank, and Minister of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago.

Mikhail Byng is a PhD candidate at the Institute of International Relations of the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus. He has lived and worked in Southeast Europe, having obtained degrees from the University of Belgrade and the University of Sarajevo. He is a government official at the Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago.
 

The highly regarded founder and longest-serving prime minister of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, once noted an important reality: “in a world where the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp.” Such is the calculation which must be addressed for small island developing states such as Trinidad and Tobago and its neighbors in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). While not completely analogous, Trinidad and Tobago and Singapore are two small nations with high ambitions. But the former is on a development path with distinctly different circumstances than the latter, which reliable estimates consider one of the most developed countries in the world. 

 

Our focus in this article is to articulate for Trinidad and Tobago and the wider CARICOM region a grand strategic shift away from the historically established orientation of non-alignment to one of multi-alignment. The articulation of this perspective is partly a reflection of the long-debated notion that the world is shifting from unipolarity to a new distribution of power. Many scholars characterize this new order as multipolar. We advance the notion of a more ambiguous and unpredictable transitionary period between these two polarities: of a “nonpower” world (somewhat similar to the “GZERO” concept touted by American political scientist Ian Bremmer). It is within this context that Trinidad and Tobago must engage a new world order, with its own new grand strategy. While tailored to the unique circumstance of Trinidad and Tobago, this article provides an analysis that can contribute useful insights for other similar cases of small- and medium-sized developing countries.

The geostrategic position of Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean | Source: ChatGPT

 

Small states are often viewed as inconsequential to world politics, which requires innovative approaches in the practice of diplomacy. In Handbook on the Politics of Small States (2020), Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel summed up the challenge in the following fashion: 

 

“Small states today remain restrained by limited capacity and capabilities in pursuing their domestic and international ambitions and are stuck as weak actors in asymmetric relationships, creating dependency and threatening their values and interests. However, they also benefit from being weak, since this allows them a bigger action space and success in pursuing coping strategies.”

 

Coping strategies in small-state diplomacy will indeed be tested in this era of “geopolitical reset,” reconfiguring quests for “global solidarity,” and strategic shifts among tired paradigms.

 

Broadly speaking, grand strategy maintains the characteristics of being long-term in scope, incorporating the state’s highest priorities, and engaging the full spectrum of power available to the state; it operates across the DIME model of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, as observed by Nina Silove in a 2017 essay for Security Studies. Approaching the critical question of Trinidad and Tobago’s strategic shift in engaging the international community requires the following: 1. Establishing an understanding of the current nature of the international environment; 2. Articulating Trinidad and Tobago’s key strategic priorities; 3. Clearly highlighting Trinidad and Tobago’s existing capabilities, and a realistic pathway for achieving these priorities. 

 

The latter focuses on the strategy component, within which there are a number of important elements. One focus is the temporal element, which is critical within democracies given the political realities of term limits and other internal dynamics unique to the target society. While a comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned framework is not possible in this article, addressing each through clear and succinct illustrations will lay the groundwork for a much broader discussion.

 

Polarity and its Effects on Small-State Decision-making

As Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Barry Posen noted in a 2009 scholarly article entitled Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care?, that the notion of polarity is rooted in the realist approach to international relations. Each state “must look to its own interests relative to those of others…” Therefore, a shift from unipolarity—the condition where one state holds undisputed superiority across the spectrum of power relative to its peers—to multipolarity—the condition in which there are multiple centers of such power—has extensive implications and consequences. 

 

We contend, however, that the current global landscape is one which may be characterized neither as unipolar nor multipolar, but in transition between these two definite points. This systemic reality does not necessarily determine outcomes: rather, it provides environmental constraints and incentives. In practice, these constraints and incentives only increase the likelihood for particular outcomes probabilistically, not deterministically. This means that even in a multipolar world or a nonpower world, Trinidad and Tobago’s geographic location affects its decision-making, given its relative power imbalance with regard to its neighbors in North and South America. 

 

Importantly, this view does not equate to an undermining of the country’s sovereignty by any means (in the scenario of a neighbor taking aggressive action against the twin-island republic, which we assess as highly unlikely under current circumstances). However, a rational calculation of current policy options insists that Trinidad and Tobago, at the bare minimum, increases its own military capacity so as to disincentivize potentially aggressive postures in this new international environment—not as a war-winning strategy but rather as a means of deterrence.

 

In addition, as Posen emphasized, “equal capabilities are not required for states and statesmen to treat each other as important strategic actors.” This opens the possibility for countries with relatively low latent military potential to be considered as key strategic players internationally. Still, having some capacity does matter, and Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP stands at approximately $27 billion, or 111th in the world: roughly on par with countries like Armenia, Albania, Cyprus, Georgia, and Malta. 

 

Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago’s strategic placement and responsibility for security within the Caribbean regional framework affords a number of benefits. For example, it is the location of most regional collective security agencies and bodies. Within the CARICOM framework, Trinidad and Tobago functions as the country responsible for security within the regional quasi-cabinet. This status puts even further emphasis on the necessity of possessing and advocating—first on the national and then on the regional level—a coherent strategy that clearly indicates the region’s alignment preferences. Even so, nothing contributes more to a strong strategic posture than a strong and stable domestic footing, which is the cornerstone of any future policy.

 

A Snapshot of Trinidad and Tobago’s Key Priorities

As part of her 2015 policy brief published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, former acting Director of the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies, Annita Montoute argued that “Caribbean international relations are in a state of flux.” This is factual. Providing some clarity concerning this area is critical to charting a well-informed strategic course for a substantive shift in alignment for Trinidad and Tobago and the wider region in the twenty-first century.

 

As a starting point, Trinidad and Tobago has since its independence committed itself to a posture that can be characterized as non-aligned—one crafted in the context of a bipolar world and characterized by the tensions of the Cold War, focused on avoiding strong alignments with great powers altogether. To this day, it appears that this approach persists. The officially stated foreign policy of Trinidad and Tobago reads as follows:

 

• Respect for the sovereignty and sovereign equality of all states;

 

• Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, qualified by acceptance of the responsibility of the international community to take collective action in cases of gross domestic violations of human rights or genocide;

 

• Respect and adherence to international law and to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

 

Multi-alignment as an approach does not contradict the aforementioned ideals. In fact, it builds upon them, simply adjusting for a change in the global system and modifying the strategic calculus so as to maximize gains in alignment with Trinidad and Tobago’s priority areas. Notably, economic development remains the primary priority for Trinidad and Tobago and the region, with the goal of first world status not merely a reputational aspiration but a desire for enhanced quality of life for the citizens of the republic. Engagement with the international community is therefore predicated on an appreciation of this priority. 

 

Frankly speaking, the question when engaging with foreign state and non-state actors is how Trinidad and Tobago can benefit economically, over the short, medium, and long term. This calculation is not zero-sum. Rather, it is a positive-sum reality in which Trinidad and Tobago offers to its interlocutors abroad a myriad of opportunities across the spectrum of resources it possesses: human, natural, and economic, among others.

 

One primary example of an opportunity area for engagement with Trinidad and Tobago is human capital. Comprehensively assessing the human capital of Trinidad and Tobago is critical, as this is arguably the primary source of any nation’s true power. The capacity to mobilize economic activity, govern and operate the institutions of state, and devise and implement policies for the efficient operations of both private and public sector institutions are only a few examples of the integral significance of a country’s human resources. With a population of 1.4 million people and a diaspora of approximately 360,000, the country must access the full capacity of this resource. This diaspora, representing 25 percent of the population living in the country, is underutilized. 

 

A brief illustration of this is remittances. Historically, remittances have not been an integral part of Trinidad and Tobago’s economic model. Natural resources in oil and natural gas provided sufficient foreign currency to the country and created an expanded social welfare state, which is unparalleled regionally. This is no longer a reliable option, as Trinidad and Tobago’s oil reserves are depleting, and the new possibilities in this area are fraught with geopolitical uncertainty outside the control of national decision-makers. Furthermore, global energy transitions away from fossil fuels will likely diminish the value of this sector over the long term. 

 

Therefore, creating as many avenues for foreign-based nationals to return funds home via low-cost, accessible, and modern means—such as cash apps—is just one example of a low-cost but high-impact opportunity with the potential to increase local economic activity in the short-term. Furthermore, incentivizing investment into local markets by members of the diaspora will be critical. This will require closer coordination with U.S. counterparts in the area of security to combat fraud and potential misuse. 

 

A policy to couple Trinidad and Tobago’s technology infrastructure with that of the United States and regularize Trinidadian nationals in the U.S. will also support these endeavors. Migration to the U.S. must be a two-way conveyor belt, where nationals freely and efficiently travel back and forth, with taxes returned to their country of origin, and including incentives for regular return to Trinidad and Tobago. Heightened U.S. border security is therefore an opportunity area to boost Trinidad and Tobago’s human resources. A relationship with Trinidad and Tobago’s northern neighbor based on good faith and mutual trust is the only starting point in the nation’s reorientation away from non-alignment to multi-alignment.

 

In the main, a three-step approach to addressing the current geopolitical environment is critical. Broadly, these are:

1. Anchor

2. Navigate 

3. Expand

 

As this essay further articulates, Trinidad and Tobago’s interests lean strongly in the direction of the United States. Geographic proximity to the United States, strong socio-cultural ties, and a fluid trade corridor between the country and wider CARICOM region makes such a calculation relatively simple. Therefore, in the short term, we propose anchoring on this relationship. Leaning in on this particular relationship is likely in the best interest of Trinidad and Tobago. 

 

Furthermore, moving from the short to medium term, a strong relationship with the United States will likely provide Trinidad and Tobago with the ability to navigate the increasingly choppy waters of the current period (notwithstanding the assessed uncertainty at the decision-making level within the United States). In the quest for a stable and peaceful international order, while preserving strategic autonomy, small states will be on a constant search for strategic opportunities. Perhaps the strategic logic of our times will see the advent of “floating coalitions,” in response to countries hedging in this fluid geopolitical climate. 

 

Countries like ours in the Caribbean cannot afford to be bystanders, but must engage constructively in the present order of things. Trinidad and Tobago should therefore enhance communication with major countries and seek avenues for fluid, seamless engagement. In addition, working out flexible engagements in areas of high priority such as technology, health, and finance are high-impact priorities. 

 

Finally, over the medium-to-long term, expanding relationships is of high importance: to areas of opportunity throughout the developing world, amongst BRICS countries, and with other strategically important, increasingly influential countries, particularly in the Middle East. For Trinidad and Tobago, gradual yet bold strategic shifts are in order. This is imperative for realizing Trinidad and Tobago’s shift toward multi-alignment, which will in turn further secure the nation’s sovereignty and overall security.

 

From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment

Whilst there appears to be a growing consensus that the CARICOM region must look beyond traditional alliances, Trinidad and Tobago’s interests unmistakably lean toward the United States as a close partner. Given their advanced position economically, technologically, and militarily, combined with the cultural and human ties, the United States ought to be the first point of engagement when considering alignment preferences. Regardless of the current international implications of the U.S. administration’s “America First” policies, resulting in an increasingly shaken Western alliance framework and some unpredictability in decision-making, taking a sober approach focused on Trinidad and Tobago’s current interests is crucial. 

 

Over the short-to-medium term, the United States is the “only game in town” for Trinidad and Tobago. Quite frankly, it is a much more cost-effective alignment strategy given the strong economic relationship, extensive diplomatic ties, and robust social and cultural connections. Importantly, Trinidad and Tobago maintains a trade surplus with the United States. This volume of trade may appear insignificant to much larger countries, but it is of high significance to Trinidad and Tobago. Therefore, alignment firstly in the direction of core interests is the only plausible and realistic starting point, with incremental shifts to potentially high-impact opportunity areas over the medium to long-term with other countries across the spectrum of mutual interests. 

 

Outreach to Emerging Powers and the Revolutionary Role of Technology

In a world in which it appears that might is increasingly becoming right—as the ancient Greek historian Thucydides noted, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”—developing a more robust military and diplomatic strategy is critical to national and regional preparedness in the medium to long-term. A reliance on any one partner for extended deterrence against aggression, notwithstanding the most robust diplomatic commitments, is not in the best interest of Trinidad and Tobago or the CARICOM region. An increasingly substantial deterrent capability, particularly in the context of the nation’s proximity to a volatile South American (and increasingly volatile North American) continent is critical. 

 

Emerging powers are progressively playing a more crucial role in areas of high strategic priority for Trinidad and Tobago. In areas such as advanced technologies (with military applications, such as drone technology), food security, tourism, and trade, a number of emerging powers are crucial. Many of these countries already maintain representation in Trinidad and Tobago, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As one of us (Dookeran) noted in The Caribbean on the Edge: The Political Stress of Stability, Equality, and Diplomacy (2022), “emerging markets have become the major consumers with increasing national savings and growing capital markets…[with] this emerging trade architecture supported by a growth and expansion of multinationals from the emerging markets.” Notably, “emerging economies hold almost three-quarters of sovereign wealth funds.” 

 

A primary starting point in this regard is to leverage and expand the already robust and well-established strengths which Trinidad and Tobago possesses in the diplomatic arena. For a small island developing state, its diplomatic presence remains strong, with exceptional representation across five continents. In this regard, establishing reciprocal missions in an area of expanding influence such as the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is critical over the short term. This reality poses opportunities and challenges to small states. In a world of geostrategic shifts—adding complex challenges in the diplomacy and grand strategy operationalization—will small nations find their wiggle space restricted or enhanced?

 

In the area of technology, some emerging powers are playing an increasingly pivotal role in moving progress forward. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned surface vehicles are becoming increasingly important in warfare and border security. Trinidad and Tobago’s extensive maritime borders can benefit in this regard. These countries possess low-cost but high-impact opportunities, alongside a willingness to engage with the CARICOM region. The presence of high-level Emirati and Saudi representatives at the 48th Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government in Barbados in February 2025 is indicative of the high regard placed on this relationship. Trinidad and Tobago is well poised to lead this engagement further. 

 

In his 1965 book entitled The Politics of Naval Supremacy, historian Gerald S. Graham noted the following:

 

“It is an interesting commentary on human affairs that Mahan’s exposition of the influence of sea power on the course of European and American expansion should have occurred at the very time when new instruments of the Industrial Revolution were beginning to erode principles and theories upon which his doctrines were based.”

 

The same can be said regarding the role of artificial intelligence within the current technological revolution. AI is likely to transform almost every facet of life, emphasizing its importance to human progress. Engaging this new advancement presents an opportunity for unprecedented development in Trinidad and Tobago and CARICOM, with emerging and traditional powers playing important roles in this field. 

 

The figure included at the beginning of this essay presents a simplified illustration of what Trinidad and Tobago’s alignment can look like in the near future, if a new strategy is adopted. It is important to keep in mind that this list is not exhaustive in any way, and the current forum does not allow for a full exposition and detailed assessment of each potential strategic partner in the proposed alignment framework. Furthermore, this preliminary framework assumes a close alliance with CARICOM which is unquestionable but not illustrated. What this succeeds in achieving, however, is articulating for both small- and medium-sized nations of the developing world that new possibilities do exist. At the bare minimum, they ought to be explored.

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