Eric Alter, a former United Nations civil servant and adjunct Professor at the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po, is Dean and Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European decision-making has become dominated by the conflict. For Europeans, Ukraine is not another regional conflict. It carries the potential hallmarks of a “century of total war,” to borrow the title of a book by French foreign policy expert Raymond Aron.

It has even distorted our vision of what Europe is, alongside the considerable discomfort of an eroding transatlantic security partnership and multiple other foreign dependencies in areas such as industry, digital infrastructure, and energy.

Eric Alter – Rearmament and an ambition beyond present boundaries: French soldiers stack their weapons before a patrol | Source: Alamy

Taken together, these developments present an extraordinary set of threats and opportunities for a European policy that must begin to look beyond Ukraine without discarding the vital role that Ukraine has played in shaping the continent’s security landscape.

 

Arc of Concern

Without American commitment to Ukraine since 2022, Europe would be a very different place today. The U.S. involvement has indeed conclusively proven that, with proper resolve, wars of aggression cannot shape a continent’s fate.

The fact that the United States took up primary responsibility for military aid to Ukraine is widely recognized by European leaders. Privately—and increasingly publicly—they have also urged Washington to see the war through to a somewhat satisfactory conclusion.

What had already served as a major legacy of the Vietnam War half a century ago appears to be re-emerging in full force: a deep reluctance of the United States to engage in similar interventions again. Despite recent assurances, there is growing concern as to whether the American public would even support another U.S. military intervention in Europe if Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty were to be triggered.

With the United States increasingly viewing Europe as a peripheral concern, it is vitally important (and in Europe’s own interest) that the old continent moves decisively towards establishing a collective future security framework—actively preparing to operate in the total absence of U.S.-led military interventionism.

However, Europe risks standing alone in the future, wedged between a burgeoning U.S. and China, if it does not get its act together and concentrate on building state and regional capacities. Already, the transatlantic alliance suffered a first setback and attracted new criticism when U.S. Vice President JD Vance told the 2025 Munich Security Conference that the threat to Europe was not from any external actor, but from within Europe itself through “the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with the United States.”

For now, Europe is only beginning to build up its resilience. Yet without also improving its decision-making process, it cannot progress and stand for the values it believes in. Overall, it must cease acting in a random, Brownian motion and move decisively from preparation to implementation.

 

Consistency Above All

The EU’s tepid and hesitant approach to the Gaza conflict stands in sharp contrast to its staunch support for Ukraine. To avoid accusations of double standards, more “consistency” is required. This concept in European foreign policymaking first emerged as far back as December 1974 in the Communiqué of the Paris Summit. This principle was recently applied by former Vice President and High Representative of the European Commission Josep Borrell, who saw no reason for the import bans on products coming from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine not to be imposed on products coming from illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. He found support for his argument in the 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which stipulates that states should abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory, or parts thereof, that may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory.

This perceived inconsistency has generated wider geopolitical consequences. It has weakened Europe’s credibility among many countries in the Global South, where such asymmetries are interpreted as selective application of international law, meant to serve as a mere conduit of geopolitical interests. This erosion of moral authority has, in turn, complicated Europe’s efforts to build broader coalitions around its Ukraine policy, particularly in multilateral fora. Moral authority is not just symbolic. Once eroded, it undercuts the legitimacy of Europe’s calls for a rules-based international order, particularly when those calls appear conditioned on the identity of the violator.

Even as some European leaders urge the EU to assume a more active role in peacemaking, the bloc, long accustomed to relying on American leadership in the Middle East, continues to face internal divisions over its approach to Israel. Differences related to ongoing international legal investigations, diverging national positions, and trade policy concerns have limited the EU’s ability to present a coherent diplomatic position, relegating it to the margins of international diplomacy.

Above all, despite numerous resolutions by the European Council and the European Parliament, the EU as a bloc still lacks a comprehensive and unified strategy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Competing national approaches, differing institutional voices, and inconsistent responses to external shocks are unlikely to produce the kind of coherence that a renewed European role requires—much less the foundation for a common, values-based project.

 

Raise, Rearm

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which clearly defines Russia as a threat and outlines Ukraine’s general path toward NATO membership, remains at best elusive in the absence of a formal U.S. endorsement. If Europe is now urged to “arm itself” and invest in growing its defense capabilities—as both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz advocate—it must also set a geopolitical ambition and a roadmap that extends beyond its present boundaries. This ambition must be bold enough to reinforce Europe’s autonomy and capacity for action long after the war in Ukraine ends.

Much of the Hague’s 2025 NATO summit centered on the push to raise EU members’ defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, consisting of 3.5 percent in core defense spending and 1.5 percent in broader security-related investments such as weapons and military equipment. Since his first term in office, U.S. President Donald Trump has pressured NATO countries to commit more of their annual gross domestic product to military spending, especially as the United States has sought to shift its attention from security priorities in Europe to the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. A spending review is set for 2029 to monitor progress in the aftermath of the next U.S. presidential election.

The Hague pledge, signed by most Allies thanks to a very particular wording of the final statement, holds only as long as there is no ceasefire in Ukraine. Should the Russian threat diminish, or political will to support Kyiv weaken, European publics may become reluctant to sustain such high levels of defense spending.

According to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the goal is for non-U.S. NATO members to be responsible for 70 percent of the alliance’s total capabilities by 2032—an upgrade from 56 percent today. For European countries such as Spain, Belgium, Slovakia, and Luxembourg, which lack Germany’s fiscal flexibility or Poland’s and the Baltic states’ acute threat perceptions, this objective already represents a significant challenge, and it is unlikely they will abide by it. Nine of the 32 NATO member states—including Spain, which now spends just under 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense—have yet to reach the 2 percent goal set in 2014.

Long-term security cannot rest on the European defense-industrial base and fiscal efforts alone. Without the necessary scaling—and despite the recent rollout of the Readiness 2030 white paper to support the EU defense industry and deepen the single defense market, as well as the adoption of the €170 billion Security Action for Europe initiative—Europe is unlikely to make a meaningful impact in the near term. Recent reports indicate that Europe’s defense industry will not be able to fully replace key U.S. capabilities in the air and maritime domains within the next decade.

In the interim, the risk of crucial capability or deterrence gaps must not be overlooked. In the absence of any collective nuclear deterrent under the control of a European institution, allies should discuss the level of U.S. nuclear commitment. France, the UK, and possibly Germany and Poland are beginning to review their roles, positioning, and limited (but evolving) capabilities in this domain. Existing formats of intelligence-sharing should also be part of any conversation, with the consequence that Europe would almost certainly need to develop more of its own space-based and cyber capabilities. Efforts to develop various geometries of partnerships—like the E3+1 initiative, bringing together France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland—represent temporary solutions aimed at regionalized defense coalitions until a unified European defense leadership emerges.

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, without cooperation, partnerships, co-production, and joint development to maintain interoperability and efficiency, Europe alone is insufficiently equipped to meet its existing defense production needs or to duplicate essential capabilities quickly enough. Despite a return to Cold War levels of defense spending, this is likely due to fragmentation within the continent’s own defense industry, which remains unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Against this backdrop, American commitment to European security continues, the U.S. military presence in Europe persists, and America’s direct financial contribution to NATO remains at approximately 16 percent of the alliance’s budget. A coordinated evolution is the only way for Europe to reduce its dependence on American conventional resources without having to go entirely its own way.

Any sign of abandoning Ukraine—such as the pausing or interruption of weapons transfers due to particular national interests or real stockpile depletion, or the revision of the U.S. military footprint in Europe—would immediately test European solidarity and realize former French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s fears that the United States no longer recognizes that “there is neither peace nor security for America if Europe is in danger.”

Even without such a bleak scenario, the extent to which the United States would continue to play a convening role in European and transatlantic security affairs may possibly become a greater concern. This has already manifested itself through the Trump administration’s relative disinterest in Ukraine, the largest issue in transatlantic security today. Europe’s lesser deference to American diplomatic initiatives, or its interest in the U.S.-China competition, might also bear the unintended consequence of weakening Europe itself.

Beyond Russia and the goal of transitioning to a more balanced alliance between the United States and the EU, Europe’s other major vulnerabilities—in spite of all its integrative structures—include its political division and its broader geopolitical marginalization. Both are in part a result of EU member states’ ongoing struggles to overcome narrow national interests and start seeing themselves as a unified whole.

Recent events—namely the U.S. Liberation Day tariffs and the on-again, off-again approach to economic cooperation and competition—could indeed catalyze deeper European economic and financial integration through a new single market strategy, a scenario that, while challenging, remains attainable. To enhance its hard power capacity and economic independence, the world’s largest single market must address serious inconsistencies in capital markets, energy, and technology.

Expanding the international role of the euro through by calling for a new round of joint borrowing akin to the stimulus package that helped the EU cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as preparations for the launch of the digital euro initiative towards the end of 2025, could also help reduce financing costs and attract investment, thereby boosting Europe’s resilience.

Efforts to build a coherent European defense industrial policy continue to be hindered by structural fragmentation, national procurement preferences, and insufficient cross-border coordination. Despite numerous declarations of intent, the defense market remains heavily segmented, with parallel investments and overlapping capabilities. For example, European countries currently operate over a dozen different types of main battle tanks, while the United States relies primarily on a single system. This lack of standardization reduces economies of scale, delays interoperability, and undercuts the EU’s ability to efficiently project force. Unless Europe undertakes serious reform of its defense procurement rules—favoring joint projects, co-production, and pooled innovation—its current trajectory will remain both costly and strategically inadequate.

 

Democracy, Cohesion, and Strategic Competence

If Europe is to project hard power, secure itself against aggression, and exercise real diplomatic agency, it must also focus on its internal architecture: political, institutional, and democratic. A fragmented or distracted Europe will always struggle to act with unity abroad. While much of the current security debate has focused on defense spending, industrial readiness, and NATO burden-sharing, the future of European power will be equally determined by its capacity to preserve political cohesion at home.

Rising polarization, electoral volatility, and illiberal trends within some EU member states have strained the democratic consensus that underpins the European project. The political center is eroding, not only in domestic elections but also in the European Parliament, where the 2024 elections brought significant gains for far-right and anti-establishment parties. While these groups remain fragmented, their growing influence threatens to further dilute Europe’s common foreign policy positions, particularly on issues such as migration, enlargement, the rule of law, and relations with Russia and China.

In addition, institutional inertia within the EU, combined with the unanimity rule on foreign and security policy, makes it difficult to respond swiftly or cohesively to geopolitical shocks. In practice, a single state can block collective action, as seen in recent disagreements over arms transfers or sanctions regimes. This has prompted calls for reform, including proposals to move toward qualified majority voting in select areas of foreign policy. Such reforms are politically sensitive but increasingly necessary if Europe is to act as a strategic actor rather than a forum of diverging national interests.

The enlargement question further complicates this picture. Ukraine, Moldova, and several Western Balkan countries are now on the EU accession path. While this signals a strong political commitment, the Union must avoid repeating earlier mistakes in which expansion outpaced institutional readiness. A larger EU without deeper cohesion could paradoxically become less capable. Europe’s geopolitical relevance depends not only on expanding its borders, but also on fortifying its internal governance and updating its decision-making structures.

Democratic resilience also involves shielding European societies from disinformation, foreign interference, and domestic polarization. The war in Ukraine has shown that conflict today reaches far beyond the battlefield. Russia’s information warfare, cyber operations, and targeted propaganda campaigns continue to undermine social trust and national unity. Responding to these threats will require greater cooperation between governments, civil society, technology platforms, and intelligence services.

In short, Europe’s security cannot rest on defense doctrines and fiscal efforts alone. It must build the institutional and democratic foundations that allow it to speak with clarity, act with unity, and withstand both internal disruption and external pressure. In an increasingly contested world, strategic competence is inseparable from political coherence.

 

Is There a Better Way?

The growing rivalry between Beijing and Washington, where economics becomes increasingly subordinate to geopolitics, calls for a different kind of strategy. While maintaining firm boundaries with Russia, Europe must find ways to continue engaging with both China—as a potential off-ramp to its ongoing trade war with Washington—and the United States, by adding a European signature to a Trump-era-compliant tariffs and trade deal, as a concession to the “America First” agenda.

With China in particular, Europe’s balancing act might prove difficult, since little progress is being registered on a host of disputes, including rare earths, electric vehicles, and, most critically, the war in Ukraine.

Due in part to the close Russia-China relationship and the pair’s increasingly close ties to North Korea and now possibly Laos on humanitarian pretexts, the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security theaters are more linked than ever. The concept of interdependent alliance networks, conceived by the U.S. and British militaries at the beginning of the Cold War, continues to elevate and highlight the roles of each European and Pacific ally. While representing two distinct frameworks, the two Western alliances—NATO in Europe and the hub-and-spokes alliance in the Indo-Pacific—depend on each other for peace and stability, and not only on military support from the United States.

The relationship between Russia, China, and other Asian countries clearly represents a danger to the NATO alliance because it strengthens Russia and further threatens European security. To improve the security landscape of each region, the EU probably has no other choice than to seek closer military, economic, and political cooperation with its West Asian allies.

Taking a long view, it is unrealistic for Russia to remain an outlier of the international community, left only to lament its glorious past and threaten its neighbors. The long-range aim should be to persuade Russia to deal with Europe in more or less the same way China’s Asian ambitions were tentatively dealt with during the Nixon presidency. When Washington realized that China was no longer vulnerable to a U.S.-imposed isolation and that there was no hope of bringing about its downfall, a policy of firm restraint without excommunication was implemented.

The primary guardrails against Russia’s ambitions should be imposed by European nations themselves through a “containment without isolation” policy and a marshaling of European forces for the sake of a lasting, peaceful solution—ultimately backed by the might of the United States. In the long run, and to foster new trust, a new security architecture would need to be developed, one in which the interests of all parties would be considered.

This long-term goal should not detract, however, from addressing the present European challenges and reading the lessons of history. Soon after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union understood that a change in policy was necessary once the West reshaped conditions on the ground. Quite notably, Western allies propped up European defenses, rebuilt European economies, and cemented NATO, which forced Moscow to seek a form of accommodation with the West.

Only when the institutional and operational apparatus of European nations becomes strong enough to mount more effective deterrence will Russia be persuaded to turn its energy inward rather than outward. And that will be the time for renewed dialogue to begin and for a stable regional order to be established.

This way, it would be less likely for the United States to seek an end to the war through concessions that incentivize Russia. In other words, the need to offer further territorial concessions to Moscow in Ukraine and ease Western sanctions would be minimized.

Whether this strategy can be implemented fast enough to meet rising expectations remains one of the defining questions Europe will face in the coming years.

The concept of the transatlantic partnership was forged out of the wreckage of the two world wars, when Europe was rebuilt and a westward advance of the Soviet Union was contained. There is no reason to think that, in the second quarter of the twenty-first century, the European Union cannot finally become this community of purpose and mutual assistance with American support, to serve as the main counterforce against the imperial designs of Russia.

As global power becomes multipolar, being more adept at negotiation and compromise is not a trait reserved for rapidly rising powers. Economic prowess, diplomatic weight, and global reach remain invaluable, especially when urgency is driven by necessity or realism.

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