Konrad Szymański is a Member of the Council of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, having formerly served as Polish Minister for Europe (2015-2022) and a Member of the European Parliament (2004-2014).

For decades, the process of European integration enjoyed an unprecedented level of political comfort. Governments came and went across Europe, there were political upheavals, yet the European project continued—and even progressed—largely undisturbed.

The theory of output legitimacy seemed to be working. Europeans—despite Eurosceptic rhetoric—were not overly concerned about the opaque nature of Brussels trilogues, the composition of successive European Parliament terms, or even the role of lobbying in Brussels. This was also true of political elites in national capitals. Corruption or moral scandals were met with a cool reception and rarely led to a broader questioning of the liberal democratic system as a whole.

The energy and climate transition has become a key rallying point of anti-EU sentiment | Source: Guliver Image

A key reason for this was the—then obvious and credible—belief that, in the end, we would enjoy economic prosperity and peace, allowing us to look to the future for ourselves and our children with optimism. That output was fairly convincing. The peak of this Euro-optimism came with the major EU enlargement in 2004, which welcomed 10 new states—made possible by an even greater breakthrough: the defeat of the Soviet Union, the dismantling of its sphere of influence after 1989, and the overcoming of Europe’s post-war division.

 

A Normative Superpower?

At that time, we were inclined to believe that Europe’s future held only further success, culminating in the attainment of status as a normative and moral superpower—as Ian Manners formulated it in his 2002 essay “Normative Power Europe.” Moral, because it would not rely on bayonets, but rather on values and norms whose philosophical and humanistic appeal would inspire the rest of the world to emulate our social, political, and economic model. We came close to believing that this path would lead us to eternal peace and the end of history.

Even then, this idea was met with open resistance in America. Just a year after Manners’ publication, Robert Kagan released his essay “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,” in which he portrayed Europe critically—as post-heroic and strategically helpless, living in a “postmodern paradise” under the protective umbrella of traditional American power. “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus,” Kagan declared, without enthusiasm.

Reality, however, soon began to challenge our beliefs. The Eurozone debt crisis after 2008 raised serious doubts about the viability of monetary integration—particularly when it lacks a fiscal pillar. Northern nations suddenly realized that Southern public debt directly affected their own prosperity, for instance through the weakening of the currency in which they held their savings. Disillusioned Southern nations bitterly learned that EU solidarity had its limits. After years of cheap credit, they collided with fiscal reality; the cost of servicing debt rose, and devaluation was no longer an option. It all ended in bitter reforms imposed by the Troika (EC, ECB, and IMF). That disillusionment persists to this day.

The Arab Spring of 2010 appeared to confirm the theory of spontaneous democratization, but apart from toppling dictators, it ushered in radical regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, destabilized Libya, and triggered a civil war in Syria. The subsequent 2015 refugee crisis brought a sense of isolation in Germany, which unilaterally decided to accept a million Syrians and then expected the burden to be shared among other countries. The relocation decision in 2015—due to its limited, pilot nature—brought no real relief to anyone. Instead, it planted the still-prevalent belief in many Central European countries that external forces were trying to influence their migration policy and societal composition. Nations without colonial or migratory experience reacted with vehement opposition.

In 2016—contrary to Euro-optimists on both sides of the English Channel—the Brexit referendum delivered a negative verdict on the UK’s EU membership, followed by years of bitter divorce proceedings. Meanwhile, in 2020 came the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which revealed to Europeans the dangerously high level of their trade dependence on China. This was a direct consequence of the very model of globalization that the EU had long promoted. It turned out that this dependency extended not only to basic protective gear but also to the active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) of many crucial, urgently needed medicines. After the health crisis came Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine—right on our borders. Europe’s reaction this time was far more relevant than during the 2014 attack on Crimea and the Donbas region, and the 2008 war with Georgia. However, the scale of the security and humanitarian crisis was unprecedented in Europe’s post-World War II history. We are still in the process of formulating an adequate response to Russia’s strategic threat to our security.

Completing this picture of multi-crisis is the climate crisis. For the younger generation in particular, it carries apocalyptic overtones and presents a real threat to the very foundations of life on Earth. Hence the despairing tones of Extinction Rebellion and Last Generation. At the same time, the EU’s climate policy—the most ambitious response model to this crisis—is perceived by many Europeans as a genuine threat to their social interests and to the economy itself.

Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that all these events—experienced by Europeans in just the past 15 years—have brought an unprecedented level of anxiety. Everyone, in some way, feels let down, impacted, tested. For the first time in our post-war history, there is such a strong sense of losing control over our future and status on the economic and strategic map of the world. This is leading today to a colossal erosion of the social base of the European project. It poses an existential threat to the continent’s unity and development.

Our initial response has been chaotic. The very foundations of integration—such as the Schengen area, the EU’s multiannual budget, or even the single market—are increasingly being questioned. Political resistance to a united Europe is growing under various banners, from left to right. Europe’s political system is not equipped to deal effectively with these problems or to manage a cross-cutting, multi-dimensional crisis of this magnitude. It was designed for times of fair political weather and prosperity. Now that history has once again burst into our countries, we need extraordinary political attention and responsibility in national capitals. The clock is ticking.

Careless, piecemeal, chaotic responses to what are often very real problems will only magnify the disorder, potentially trapping Europe for years in a deadlock of internal disputes and reckonings. This would only encourage the rest of the world to construct a new global order not only at Europe’s expense but while disregarding almost everything that Europeans hold dear. Such a scenario would be welcomed by Europe’s competitors—and by its overt adversaries.

Every country has its own specific problems to solve and its own political circumstances. This is evident from the diverse map of protests in Europe. However, there are also problems that must be addressed at the European level. These include security, migration, climate, and global trade. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of solving these issues one at a time. We must address them all simultaneously—and urgently. It is true that crises create unique opportunities for real change, but this by no means implies that solutions will come on their own. They require commitment.

 

Security and Trade

Russia’s war against Ukraine is a European war. Our response to it will define Europe’s condition for generations. Contrary to expectations, Europe has already proven that it can adopt real and coordinated sanctions alongside the rest of the world. It is capable of delivering humanitarian, macroeconomic, and military aid on a scale comparable to that of the United States. But this war also signifies a profound shift in our thinking about our own security. When U.S. President Donald Trump demands that Europe does more for security, there is no European capital today that disagrees.

For some countries—led by France—this will still mean seeking “European autonomy.” For others, including Poland, greater EU engagement in security is a path toward strengthening and renewing the transatlantic alliance. We need to align our thinking here.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Europe doubled its defense spending. Today it amounts to €326 billion. However, this is still almost three times less than what the United States spends. In terms of R&D spending in the defense industry, the difference is more than tenfold (€11 billion vs. €130 billion in 2024). This increase in spending has led to a rise in the share of U.S. arms in European purchases. Between 2015 and 2019, the U.S. accounted for 52 percent of European arms imports. Between 2020 and 2024, the U.S. share rose to 64 percent. This state of affairs is unsustainable. Europe must increase its own domestic production capacity.

And here we need clarifications on the American position. Is the call for Europe to take greater responsibility for security backed by a vision of a renewed NATO partnership, or is it the sole ambition of the new U.S. administration to balance trade accounts through European purchases of American arms? No one realistically proposes replacing NATO today, but the EU’s role in designing, producing, and procuring weapons must grow.

If we are to set such a course, we need not only a multidimensional compromise with the U.S., but also within Europe itself. The EU’s role is potentially important in strengthening and developing the European defense industry’s capabilities. However, we are too integrated with the U.S. to begin with protectionist exclusion of non-European producers from this process. The urgency of these tasks requires cooperation with Washington. To leverage economies of scale, we will also need long-term European solutions and thus an evolutionary process of greater self-sufficiency in arms production. According to the latest Bruegel report, “Europe may need 300,000 more soldiers and an increase in defense spending of at least €250 billion annually to deter Russian aggression.” This task exceeds the efforts of countries that do not cooperate. In the absence of an EU-wide solution, we will be left with coalitions of the willing. The example of the Czech ammunition initiative shows that such a pragmatic model may be easier to implement.

To avoid a repeat of the negative scenario from the last EU budget negotiations, this budget must be available to all who want to develop industrial capabilities. This also applies to smaller companies, which play an increasing role in innovation and in the production of dual-use goods. Reluctant northern states will have to find new funds. Only then can we solve the key problem of the new EU budget, where defense spending cannot eliminate funding for regional policy in Central Europe—usually for front-line countries. Only then will realistic scenarios for significant changes in the budget architecture open up. Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are already signaling readiness to change their previous stance.

Without these interconnected compromises, Europe will not play a new role in security. A compromise on arms procurement could help find a pragmatic solution to what is today the most difficult issue: the trade relationship between the U.S. and the EU. Europe’s economy is twice as dependent on trade as the American economy, making us more vulnerable to trade pressure. A large part of this dependency lies with the German economy, which tempts some to treat it as a German problem, which would be shortsighted. Chancellor Friedrich Merz proposes a traditional solution in the form of a trade agreement with the U.S., which would prevent costly escalation. However, a significant portion of European protest parties have built themselves on opposition to free trade, including the EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership deal. Another contradiction to resolve.

Even if an EU budgetary solution does not pass—which is highly likely—alternatives should be closely monitored. Options being tested include a fund based on bonds, expanding the mandate and increasing the capitalization of the European Investment Bank, and establishing a new financial institution for defense industry development—possibly within a narrower coalition than the EU 27, potentially including the United Kingdom.

 

Migration

The legacy of the 2015 migration crisis in the form of a relocation mechanism still negatively affects mutual trust between states—especially those, like Central European countries, that have no history of colonialism and migration from the Middle East. Maintaining such solutions in the Pact on Migration and Asylum, as well as present Germany’s unilateral actions on the border with Poland, unnecessarily prolong this tension. As a result, the significant evolution of the EU’s stance on migration and asylum is not sufficiently recognized by Europeans. Yet much has changed. Today, EU policy is focused on border protection, readmission, and returns. Willkommenskultur is no longer in force—not even in Berlin.

Even radical restrictions on the right to asylum, including in Poland and Germany, no longer spark controversy. When the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border emerged in the summer of 2021, the European Council reacted unequivocally, recognizing the transport of migrants as “instrumentalization of migration”—a threat to the security of the entire EU. The European Council declared on October 22nd, 2021, that it “will not accept any attempt by third countries to instrumentalize migrants for political purposes. It condemns all hybrid attacks at the EU’s borders and will respond accordingly.”

Individual countries face very different situations regarding migration. This does not change the fact that the new consensus should continue to demonstrate the European added value in facilitating and increasing the effectiveness of combating illegal migration and protecting common borders. Otherwise, as at the Polish-German border today, we will start getting used to the suspension and eventual abolition of the Schengen zone.

On May 22nd, 2025, the heads of government of Denmark, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Belgium issued an appeal to amend the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights in the area of asylum and migration law:

“Fortunately, in some areas, we are moving in the right direction. Many European countries have chosen to tighten their national policies on irregular migration. A majority of EU Member States are ready to consider new solutions to Europe’s challenges with migration. These are crucial steps, and we should continue this work, because there is much more to be done before Europe regains control of irregular migration.

However, as leaders, we also believe that there is a need to look at how the European Court of Human Rights has developed its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights—whether the Court, in some cases, has extended the scope of the Convention too far compared with the original intentions behind it, thus shifting the balance between the interests that should be protected.”

Specific demands refer to ensuring “more room nationally to decide on when to expel criminal foreign nationals” and “more freedom to decide on how our authorities can keep track of, for example, criminal foreigners who cannot be deported from our territories.” “We need to be able to take effective steps to counter hostile states that are trying to use our values and rights against us—for example, by instrumentalizing migrants at our borders,” the nine leaders wrote, emphasizing that “the safety and stability of our own societies should have the highest priority.”

 

Just Transition

The energy and climate transition is a project that affects almost everyone, from large enterprises to ordinary citizens. In many countries, it has become a key flashpoint fueling anti-European sentiment. Gilets jaunes, or “yellow vests,” in France over transport emissions limits; farmers in the Netherlands over fertilizer restrictions; and until recently, the most pro-European Poles, concerned about emissions costs in housing, heating, and transport. These protest elements may seem isolated individually, but cumulatively they form a critical mass dangerous for the entire EU.

Due to election outcomes in Europe and the United States, these are not the only parts of the EU’s climate agenda currently under review. “Too much of our top talent is leaving the EU because it is easier to grow their companies elsewhere. And too many firms are holding back investment in Europe because of unnecessary red tape,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the 2025 World Economic Forum in Davos. In response to Trump’s speech, she then announced a 35 percent reduction in EU regulatory burdens on businesses.

The automotive industry is preparing for a possible reversal of the decision to ban the registration of new internal combustion engine cars after 2035. An opportunity for this will come in 2026, when the law is due for review. Changes already adopted will eliminate fines for failure to meet inflated vehicle emission standards, which would have burdened the industry with billions in costs as early as 2025.

In recent months, due diligence rules have been relaxed—previously burdening companies with costly obligations to report on respect for labor and human rights, not only within their own operations but also among their suppliers. Germany and France are even demanding a complete repeal of this law. Small and medium-sized enterprises (80 percent of entities) are to be exempt from responsible business standards (CSRD) and border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM). A directive regulating environmental claims in marketing (greenwashing) was just withdrawn—at the very end of the legislative process—adding to the growing frustration of the left in the European Parliament. Together, these and other reforms are expected to bring €37.5 billion in annual savings for European businesses. Earlier, the EU had already softened its stance on agricultural requirements (Nature Restoration Law) and trade controls regarding forest impact (deforestation regulation).

As many as 18 EU member states have issued a call for a revision of how CO2 emission costs are calculated in housing and transport. Just two years ago, this did not attract even a fraction of such interest among EU capitals. Europe—regardless of our principled stance on climate —must show political sensitivity. The political damage from a suite of regulatory changes hidden under the “Green Deal” name is already significant. This marketing brand has become a negative symbol for the European Union.

 

Reinventing Governance

The issue of revising the EU’s climate policy reveals something very important—a systemic problem within the EU. It is worth asking at the outset: how come that the rational arguments, now so popular in European capitals, did not prevent the EU from repeatedly making mistakes in designing climate policy in recent years? This is, above all, a glaring manifestation of the member states’ abdication from actively shaping the future of the EU.

The establishment of a permanent Secretariat of the EU Council and a permanent President of the European Council under the Lisbon Treaty was meant to build a strong political component of integration. This way, the member states were supposed to be strengthened within the EU political process. In the early years of the new treaty, which entered into force in 2009, this was indeed the case (Angela Merkel’s Unionsmethode). However, over time, the Council’s increasing silence has given the European Commission almost full freedom to present legislative proposals—proposals that raise doubts even among many states, but whose governments are too scattered and reactive. This situation would only change if obtaining the European Council’s opinion were required before the Commission begins any legislative process—but that is not the case today. Admittedly, such a far-reaching solution could also have negative consequences in the form of paralysis of the Union.

Solutions in the area of climate could have been much more politically secure for Europe if the EU member states had chosen to make fuller use of their prerogatives to set even detailed conditions for each piece of legislation. First, they did not do so due to a growing internal weakness. More and more states, including the largest ones, are represented at EU summits by leaders whose mandates are shaky or even minority-based. The second element is that the interests of states, economic sectors, and social groups differ greatly today, while climate and energy are highly cross-cutting issues. A common position therefore requires the reconciliation of many variables. Unstable, often siloed governments are increasingly unable to achieve this. There is also a third element: the temptation to “hide behind Brussels” when presenting difficult and controversial decisions is as old as the Union itself. All of this results in the Commission’s growing practical advantage over the member states, leading to a lack of proper political assessment of individual proposals and a lack of a more realistic approach.

As a result, we increasingly encounter technocratic dictate—even determinism—often detached from the social and economic realities of the highly diverse EU states, which are losing the ability to chart a vision for Europe’s future due to numerous crises. This poses an existential threat to the EU itself. It is hard to find a more glaring example of the principle that “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” It seems that even President von der Leyen has understood this for some time now—and so have the member states. The European Parliament, however, understands this the least: it is currently the main center of resistance to the necessary adaptation of EU policy to new circumstances.

Changes in political governance in the European Union are now far more important than treaty reforms, which remain caught in the conundrum of balancing the Union’s community and intergovernmental dimensions. An even bigger problem is the treaty change process itself: it requires increasingly lengthy negotiations, and the ratification process in national capitals is becoming ever more politically difficult. The package proposed in 2022 by the European Parliament, envisioning 245 Treaty amendments, would certainly not pass ratification in several European states, and the debate itself would generate another wave of distrust and Euroscepticism.

Only the restoration of political agency and policy reform can help re-establish the transatlantic community, which remains the proper response to the strategic problems facing the West. All the challenges ahead are of a scale that surpasses the capabilities of individual states. What we need today is a new consolidation of the Western world, not its disintegration.

 

Reinventing Liberalism

In addition to urgent political changes, strategic decisions regarding the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028-2035, and systemic reflection on the practical mechanisms of decision-making in the EU, we are also facing a serious discussion about the order of values and the political philosophy of Europe itself.

In our constitutions and European treaties, we have the same catalogue of values, which point to the meta-political, fundamental goals of our policy. All of them—equality, justice, human dignity, legal guarantees of participation in power, and the rule of law—are equally crucial to all of us. However, their reading and understanding can vary due to the different historical contexts of our legal systems. The second reason is the rich traditions and constitutional identities of our countries, which are acknowledged in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which states: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional.”

The situation is complicated by the fact that all these values interact with one another. Specific cases are usually shaped by multiple values simultaneously. That is why the French Conseil d’État rules differently on the scope of telecommunications data retention than the European doctrine and law would prefer. It simply balances the relationship between the security offered by the state to its citizens and their right to privacy differently, a right that EU law limits by restricting the legal retention period of data from our mobile phones. We can read more about this in the 2024 Conseil d’État annual study titled “Sovereignty.”

This becomes even clearer when comparing freedom of speech standards in the United States and Europe, as Vice President JD Vance reminded in his 2025 high-profile speech at the Munich Security Conference. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes a form of absolutism for freedom of speech. In the U.S., even the most offensive or extremist views are protected unless they directly incite violence or constitute “imminent lawless action.” This model was reinforced by the 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which held that racist and openly antisemitic speech cannot be banned. These are completely different standards from those in Europe, where the “imminent threat test” does not apply, and legal restrictions on speech may be justified by the protection of public order, safety, dignity, and the rights of others. This is elaborated in the case law of the ECtHR on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That is why it should come as no surprise that the criminal codes of Germany and France penalize Holocaust denial, and that Poland prohibits the promotion of totalitarianism and the defamation of groups based on origin, race, or religion.

We do not have a single, definitive answer on how to balance the various protected values, including those as fundamental to democracy as freedom of speech and expression. Each of these approaches has its weaknesses, especially in the digital age. We should talk about this as it is crucial for our future, but we should not lecture one another in political or electoral contexts. This example shows clearly that recognizing the mutual political differences between the U.S. and Europe is a necessary condition for easing tensions. Big Tech’s interest in the American doctrine of freedom of speech is not a conclusive argument.

These considerations do not mean that identity can justify arbitrary interpretations of the rights catalogue. Right-wing politicians should particularly remember this when it comes to media or judiciary matters. But these circumstances should also play a significant role when other politicians try to interpret fundamental rights according to their own beliefs in areas like freedom of speech, the right to asylum, or abortion.

Here, we touch upon an issue that has concerned leading liberal thinkers for over a decade. The liberal order is weakening also because it struggles with its own reinterpretation in the face of real challenges facing the Western world. The search for a proper political form will never end, as our aspirations and understanding of the world and ourselves keep changing. This is inevitable. That is why it is surprising that the tradition born out of rebellion against orthodoxy—the liberal tradition—succumbs to the temptation of establishing a “political orthodoxy.” Even some liberal thinkers see this. Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes write: “Populists are rebelling not only against a specific (liberal) type of politics but also against the replacement of communist orthodoxy by liberal orthodoxy.”

In a 2020 essay for Prospect magazine, Timothy Garton Ash not only encouraged self-criticism as a foundation of the liberal tradition, but also pointed to a “defective” balance between the individual and community. He wrote, “This brings us to Hassner’s second pair of values that liberals would forget at their peril: community and identity. The unhappiness that has accumulated over the last three decades is partly about a defective overall balance between individual and community, resulting from a hypertrophied individualism. But it is also about the kinds of community that liberals have favored as against those they have neglected.”

Let us look into the American liberal mirror to avoid overly current emotions and accusations of bias in judging identity politics. Mark Lilla, a liberal intellectual, published an article in the New York Times shortly after Trump’s 2016 victory, under the strong title: “The End of Identity Liberalism.” “American liberalism,” he wrote categorically, “has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing.” He expanded his forceful critique of the excesses of identity politics in the 2016 essay “The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics”: “It should thus come as no surprise that many Americans react to the word ‘liberalism’ with anger—or at best indifference. The term has come to be seen—rightly—as a slogan promoted primarily by educated, urban elites disconnected from the rest of society, who view current challenges mostly through the prism of various identities. And who focus their efforts on nurturing hypersensitive social movements that disperse rather than concentrate what remains of the left’s energy.”

The most complete and coherent proposal for reforming liberalism came in The Economist’s September 2018 cover story: “A Manifesto for Renewing Liberalism.” It was a special issue for the magazine’s 175th anniversary, written by the editorial board of an outlet that helped shape the entire liberal tradition. “It is time to redefine liberalism. Liberals must spend less time fending off their critics as fools and bigots, and more time fixing what is wrong,” the introduction reads. And further: “Liberal thinkers pay too little attention to matters that people value beyond self-determination and economic prosperity, such as their religious or ethnic identity.”

“Liberals need to temper the most ambitious demands for immigration while finding ways to increase popular support for more moderate flows. They have to recognize that others place greater weight on ethnic and cultural homogeneity than they do, and that this source of conflict cannot be wished away. [...] Systems that offer migrants no path to citizenship, such as those of the Gulf states, are hard for liberals to stomach, and that is as it should be. But that does not mean all distinctions between migrants and established citizens should cease the moment they leave the airport. In America entitlement to retirement benefits kicks in only after ten years of contributions; in France, we hear, no one gets free baguettes until they can quote Racine. This is all entirely reasonable, and not illiberal,” writes this leading voice in promoting international liberalism. The Economist then proceeded with direct encouragement: “Liberals must not make the perfect into the enemy of the good” because “open borders are rarely if ever politically feasible.”

The article contains diagnoses and recommendations not only for tightening immigration policy, but also for correcting free-market mechanisms, welfare systems, and defense capabilities. “Liberals should thus ensure that the states which protect their way of life are able to defend themselves decisively and, when necessary, to blunt the ambitions of others. America’s European and Asian allies should spend both more, and more wisely, on their arsenals and training their troops,” we read in 2018.

Much has changed in our politics since then, but the article did not spark a real renewal of the liberal project, and its condition in the Western world is increasingly in question.

The aforementioned joint statement by nine European countries from May 2025 is so far the boldest attempt to adapt the European Convention on Human Rights to today’s European conditions. “We belong to different political families and hail from different political traditions. Yet, we agree that it is necessary to start a discussion about how the international conventions match the challenges that we face today. What was once right might not be the answer of tomorrow,” write the countries’ prime ministers and leaders.

Many conservatives today are enchanted by nativism or populism. Likewise, much of the liberal camp has been colonized by the left. These two variants of identity politics are damaging our societies and our capacity for cooperation. But I see no alternative to a substantive conversation about our future. A creative dialogue between conservatives and liberals is now key to saving the liberal model in the Western world and preventing conservatism from being swallowed by populism.

We could have avoided many mistakes if the early twenty-first-century controversy sparked by publications (such as those by Ian Manners and Robert Kagan, mentioned at the beginning of this essay) had been properly concluded. Europe is, first and foremost, expressed through its norms and values, as Manners argued—but it cannot afford to abandon heroism, community and strength as the ultimate tools for defending its subjectivity and uniqueness in the world. After all, as Kagan pointed out, it is a world that increasingly often chooses other paths, sometimes openly at the expense of our interests and convictions.

Today, we need not only urgent corrective actions in the areas of migration, climate, and defense, but also a no less important debate about the political nature of Europe and the very foundations of our Western civilization.

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