Andrey Sushentsov is Dean of the School of International Relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University).

We live in a pivotal moment in history, caught between two distinct systems of international relations. On the one hand, we see the rise of a polycentric world order; on the other, we witness the lingering presence of the U.S.-led unipolar world. Small wonder that the U.S. presidential elections have lately been in the spotlight of global attention: although the role of the West is diminishing, the United States remains a center of economic power and political influence. Moreover, the 2024 U.S. presidential campaign was marked by a number of extraordinary events: a series of lawsuits against one candidate and relatives of another, assassination attempts on Donald Trump, and, finally, the unprecedented situation of forcing the sitting president out of the race for a second term by none other than his own party.

 

Trump’s victory brought discord to the Euro-Atlantic community. It was warmly welcomed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who expressed expectations of immediate economic benefits for his country. In contrast, French President Emmanuel Macron shared his concerns and called on EU partners to consolidate in the face of Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy and “work for a more united, stronger, and sovereign Europe.” U.S. domestic politics is ‘spilling over’ to the rest of the world, igniting the growing dissatisfaction of the global majority with the intense attempts by the United States to maintain its leadership.

 

However, it is crucial to temper expectations regarding potential shifts in Washington’s policies under a new administration. Regardless of party affiliation, U.S. leaders consistently adhere to a worldview rooted in the framework of American dominance. The escalation in Ukraine may mark the beginning of a protracted period of conflict, as the United States confronts its declining influence in a transforming global landscape. In this regard, the key international issues—the security crisis in Europe, the crisis dynamics in the Middle East, contradictions between the United States and China, including the Taiwanese hotbed of potential conflict—are structural in nature and testify to the fact that the world is at an early stage of a profound global crisis today, one that will eventually give rise to a new international order to replace the architecture established after the Cold War.

Russia’s BRICS engagement as a pillar of structured multipolarity. / Source: Guliver Image

 

What did the previous world order look like? Following World War II, the United States emerged as a dominant global power while a war-ravaged Europe was left in ruins. Even its closest allies often felt the strain of U.S. foreign policy decisions, as pragmatic self-interest increasingly shaped Washington’s actions. For instance, the waves of decolonization and the open markets, useful for strengthening U.S. global influence, were a hard blow to the British and French colonial empires. Over time, this pragmatism became more blatant. The U.S. dollar, once heralded as a ‘common good,’ is now less seen as neutral. The U.S. sanctions regime compels American allies to forgo profitable trade relations for fear of secondary sanctions, while the sanctions themselves do not produce tangible political or diplomatic results. The conceptual foundation of liberal hegemony rests on two pillars: the trust of allies, who view the hegemon as a provider of collective benefits, and the fear of adversaries, who perceive its threats as credible. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine starkly illustrates the erosion of both. The United States is increasingly unable to command the trust of its allies or instill fear in its rivals.

 

The Ukrainian crisis, as seen from Russia’s perspective, is not merely a bilateral conflict but a symbol of the broader tensions over the future of a new international order. Moscow views Kiev as a Western pawn in a larger strategic confrontation. For Russia, resolving the Ukrainian crisis is not just about territorial or political concessions but about reshaping the global order. For the United States, Ukraine is a valuable tool for implementing its hegemonic strategy. On the one hand, the continuation of the Ukrainian crisis will allow Washington to mobilize European NATO allies to increase defense spending to the target of three percent of GDP. In essence, this means intensive purchases of American arms by the EU, ultimately boosting the U.S. military-industrial complex. On the other hand, by providing active support to Ukraine, the United States draws Russia deeper into an expensive military campaign and thus solves the problem of deterrence without a direct clash. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian crisis became a stress test for the American ‘pyramid of confidence.’ Washington hoped to implement a crushing strategy by creating a situation of military defeat for Russia on the ground, economic destabilization through sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. However, this plan proved ineffective, as Russia adapted its economy to the sanctions pressure and continued to pursue an active foreign policy. In turn, European allies, faced with economic problems and rising costs, are beginning to doubt the sustainability of continuing confrontation with Russia.

 

The Ukrainian crisis probably represents the climax of the structural confrontation between Russia and the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia anticipated working in cooperation with Western Europe on reorganizing the European security architecture. Instead, Russia was left on the sidelines of European integration and later was mainly seen as a threat to this process. Western efforts to integrate post-Soviet countries soon no longer contributed to the security architecture. On the contrary, the process became a destabilizing factor in the region. Russia had to join the zero-sum game that the West started with its expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. The rise of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, NATO enlargement, and the aggression against Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1990s forced Russia to step back from the common agenda with the United States, highlighting the geopolitical argument in its foreign policy. At a certain point in time, Russia stopped committing itself to the Western thesis that partnership is possible only on the basis of common values. From that time on, Russia stressed that the diversity of development models was important and that a focus on internal affairs would lead to dysfunctional relations. Russia’s consistent and unyielding insistence on multipolarity as an objective tendency and strong normative preference produces a specific assessment of threats to international stability, notably global imbalance as a product of unilateralism.

 

At the same time, a core assumption underlying U.S. foreign policy as it confronted the end of the bipolar Cold War order was that NATO is a necessary condition for American presence in Europe, which itself is a necessary condition for European peace and stability. Unresolved problems of European security and the obsolete bloc approach to it left Russia no choice but to view NATO as a potential military adversary and an institutional expression of the instability threat. With the outbreak of the armed conflict in Donbass in 2014, the situation around Ukraine only escalated by February 2022. The absence of a clear long-term solution to the Ukrainian crisis, combined with the West’s opportunistic behavior, ignited a full-fledged conflict.

 

American unilateralism has also instilled fear of restrictive measures in the countries of the global majority—like those the United States has already implemented against Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China. This fear has forced some to explore alternative development paths outside the liberal consensus. There is a growing awareness among these countries of the need to set their own rules of the game, which would then pave the way for a new world order to function. The identity of the Global South is not homogenous, as its countries are at different stages of their path toward more comprehensive sovereignty and independent strategic thinking. Some countries continue bandwagoning with the United States. South Korea, for example, seeks to maintain constructive relations with the U.S. in the face of growing tensions in the Pacific. Countries aligned with the leader continue doing so because, while they may wish to enjoy more autonomy, they are forced to find the most workable ways to keep their feet on the ground at a time of a ‘crumbling world order.’ In such countries, the question of identity is often resolved in the simplest way possible—by importing ideas, values, and narratives. Other countries—such as Russia, China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, for instance—move toward developing their own approaches to world politics, reflecting the specifics of their national identity and corresponding to their national interests. These countries are actively experimenting with alternative trade and financial networks, digital currencies, and new negotiation formats. Sometimes, they test the boundaries of what’s possible, acting rather opportunistically and even resorting to force.

 

The rise of the global majority represents a significant shift in global politics, and Russia sees itself as a structural partner in this transformation. Contrary to the paternalistic tendencies of the West, Moscow’s approach to countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America is grounded in mutual respect and shared interests. By promoting infrastructure development, trade, and cultural exchange, Russia is actively building alliances that challenge the traditional dominance of Western institutions. In particular, Russia’s engagement with BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization exemplifies its strategy of fostering structured multipolarity. These platforms not only serve as forums for economic or military collaboration but also as arenas for crafting alternative narratives to the Western-centric discourse on world politics.

 

The future of the international order now hinges on whether major powers will be able to establish an international architecture based on a realistic assessment of their national interests, balance of power, and mutual respect. In this context, the 1997 “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order” is particularly significant. This declaration was revolutionary for its time. During the 1990s, Western narratives dominated global politics, yet Russia and China demonstrated intellectual courage and foresight by proposing an alternative vision for the architecture of international relations. Russia and China found common ground in describing the global future as “multipolarity”—a “peaceful, stable, just, and rational new international political and economic order” based on the primacy of the UN Security Council. This new order was described as a network of “a new type of long-term interstate relations not directed against third countries” aimed at “strengthening world peace and the common progress of mankind.” The fundamental norms of that order involved respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, peaceful coexistence, and adherence to international law. The Declaration’s carefully crafted language proclaimed that a “diversity in the political, economic and cultural development of all countries is becoming the norm.” The Declaration claimed, thus, that every country had the right to choose a path of development based on its own specific conditions and without interference from others: “Differences in their social systems, ideologies and value systems must not become an obstacle to the development of normal relations between states.” Domestic affairs, China and Russia argued, are a sovereign matter and should remain secondary—if they appear on the international agenda at all.

 

It seems that these statements formulated by our predecessors almost 30 years ago do not lose their relevance and can become a starting point for Russia and China to work out the principles of constructive relations and approaches to ensuring security in Eurasia in the new era, and then offer this image of interaction to other states. Russian thinking on the future multipolar world order is based on strategic patience. It has a sense of inevitability: sooner or later, multipolarity will be established since the world system tends to reach power equilibrium.

 

Today, amid mounting global chaos, the focus of attention has shifted from systemic analyses to the actions of individual states. The yardstick for measuring a state’s standing in the international system lies not only in its material capabilities but also in the quality of its foreign policy strategy. In this context, it is not only major players that are of great importance, but also small countries capable of developing a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that multiplies their power. One can postulate that only top-notch strategies can really work in the premier league of world politics.

 

Let’s try to deconstruct the very notion of strategy. The classical definition says that strategy is the ability to correctly correlate foreign policy goals with resources. But several other components are no less important. Firstly, it is the ability of elites to properly identify the cause-effect relationship in current events and to formulate foreign policy goals based on real, rather than imaginary, needs—in other words, the ability to properly formulate one’s own needs and not set false goals. Secondly, it is strategic culture, which acts as a kind of “credit history” reflecting the use of force in the past and at the same time is the product of the accumulated experience of great power politics. Thirdly, it is leadership, which is the product of willpower, determination, and readiness to make sacrifices. Fourthly, it is empathy as the ability to build a constructive strategy taking into account the interests of all parties concerned. Only an integrated approach, consonant with the general context and the specific features of other players, will be sustainable in the long run. Lastly, it is the organizational resource that implies the potential for internal mobilization and the ability to focus on key development tasks. Satiety and relaxation prevent mobilization and often do not let even successful and well-off powers achieve their goals.

 

In terms of strategy, Russia is a special case. On the one hand, the country is internally fragile, and this problem can emasculate even the most skillful foreign policy strategy. However, in the existing international situation, Russia’s elites have a number of advantages. The pragmatism they have developed with experience (often on the verge of cynicism) makes it possible to better correlate foreign policy goals with available resources. Pragmatism is combined with a sufficient level of empathy and willingness to take into account the interests of rivals. It is for this reason that Russia has proved to be an effective security overseer in the Middle East and built comprehensive relations with China. Russia’s empathy does not apply to the United States and many countries of Europe, though, with the conceptual gap between Russian realism and Western idealism being the main reason. Russia has extensive historical experience of using force and diplomacy, which makes its strategic culture one of the most fruitful of all.

 

The Russian elites have a large reserve of determination. They are able to mobilize resources to achieve foreign policy goals. Apparently, the strategy that stems from these qualities works best at a time when the international order is crumbling and anarchy is rising. Russia’s political culture is built around the state’s status as a great power. The Russian worldview significantly relies on its strategic experience in line with the Realist tradition that was formed by Russia’s rich history of conflicts and negotiations. From Moscow’s perspective, states are major players in global issues, and conflict is a key process. While the world is interconnected, peace, stability, and development are fragile. Major countries share responsibility for the stability and development of a struggling globalized world. They govern and settle disputes through the UN Security Council and should commit to international law. In Russia’s view, the world is too complex, and the international environment is too intricate for unilateralism. This environment requires delicate balancing and mutual recognition of vital interests. International stability is a byproduct of balance and should serve as a key common goal.

 

That the commitment to multipolarity is at the heart of Russia’s foreign policy strategy is just a logical corollary. Russia’s perspective emphasizes that multipolarity is not simply a redistribution of power but a rethinking of how power is exercised. By promoting sovereign equality and strategic empathy, Moscow aims to foster a world where collaboration outweighs competition and where regional powers play active roles in maintaining stability. At its core, strategic empathy underscores the necessity of understanding competitors not only as rivals but as partners in a shared global system. By promoting dialogue over confrontation and pragmatism over ideology, this approach provides a framework for managing the uncertainties of a transforming world order.

 

For Russia, strategic empathy is not merely an abstract concept but a practical tool for navigating the fractured landscape of contemporary geopolitics. This principle is evident in Moscow’s diplomacy in the Middle East, where it has acted as a mediator between conflicting parties, balancing relationships with nations as diverse as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Russia’s ability to engage constructively with these states reflects its nuanced appreciation of regional complexities and its willingness to accommodate divergent perspectives to achieve stability.

 

The West, however, increasingly shows reluctance to exercise strategic empathy, withdrawing from the responsibilities of maintaining global stability. The United States and the European Union are both plagued with egocentrism, obsession with internal affairs, and ideological bias. Western countries have cultivated self-righteous political elites, which have come to believe they are impeccable. Bored with strategic thinking, these elites have preferred to take a break. Quite often, they make decisions that have little to do with genuine national interests.

 

In the emerging world order, despite all the interconnectedness, peace, stability, and development remain fragile. At the same time, the current critical historical moment is a time of opportunity. The world order is evolving towards sustainable multipolarity, and the countries of the Global South are beginning to play an active role in shaping this new world order. The effectiveness and impact of their actions largely depend on the quality of strategic thinking in these countries, i.e., their ability and willingness to identify their national interests based on their own historical experience. The key to stability will be strategic empathy among the major powers, which means that states will independently define their national interests while respecting variable identities, principles of sovereign equality, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Thus, in the era of profound geopolitical change, Russia’s vision of a multipolar world order offers a compelling alternative to the declining liberal hegemony.

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