Yan Xuetong is a university distinguished professor and the Honored President of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University. 

Since the Cold War, terms like “global order,” “world order,” and “international order” have been used interchangeably in international relations, often without clear definition. This has led to confusion, particularly when global order is conflated with the international system or power structure. For the sake of avoiding ambiguity, this essay attempts to define global order through its core components: institutions, norms, and values.

Global order exists when institutions, norms, and values function within the international system. Their breakdown signals disorder or anarchy. War and peace serve as indicators, with international order conceptualized as a spectrum—ranging from war (disorder) to peace (order), and an indeterminate middle zone.

“Beijing rejects Washington’s framing of a rules-based order, insisting that international rules derive from the UN Charter and must be agreed upon by all 193 member states” (Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, votes in a meeting on Non-proliferation) | Source: UN Photo/Laura Jarriel

Since it is difficult to provide a quantitative definition for international order according to degree of changes in peace or war, international order, as I defined it in Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (2019) is “the state of affairs wherein players in a given international system settle their conflicts through nonviolent approaches according to interstate norms.” This definition applies across systems—regional or global—and serves as the analytical foundation for post-World War II global orders.

While both global order and global system involve norms, they are distinct. The global system encompasses norms, actors, and configurations; global order refers to norms, mainstream values, and institutional power distribution. As prominent Chinese academic Zhou Fangyin observed in a 2021 essay for World Political Studies, “order is not an entity but a kind of soft existence.” History shows that while the global system emerged by the nineteenth century, global order was absent during both world wars in the twentieth century.

Global order is also mistakenly equated with international power structure—defined by polarity (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar). Power structure reflects capability distribution among major powers and is part of the global system, not the order itself. Ian Bremmer’s framing of global order transitions—from bipolar to unipolar to “G-Zero”—illustrates this conflation.

Polarity cannot predict the functionality of global order, and power transitions, such as those from Britain to the United States, do not necessarily mean order transitions. Regardless of type, international order is marked by stability, predictability, and cooperativeness. A war-ridden system lacks order due to its instability and hostility. Conversely, order prevails when nonviolent conflict resolution and prevention dominate. Despite proxy wars, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and present periods are considered ordered due to their relative systemic stability.

 

Types of Global Order

Whenever an international order is present, it may shift in type. While scholars agree on its variability, they differ on categorization. American political scientist John Ikenberry identifies balance of power, hegemony, and law-based orders, while his Indian-born colleague Amitav Acharya suggests hegemony, conciliation, and community. Chinese scholars Sun Xuefeng and Huang Yuxing propose hegemony, balance of power, tribute, and community, and Liu Feng outlines seven types, ranging from empire to multipolar coordination.

Rather than limiting analysis to Cold War or liberal paradigms, I propose categorizing global order by its dominant values, norms, and institutional power distribution. Among these, norms most decisively shape types of international order. The post-Cold War era, defined by democratization and marketization, is best termed the “globalization order.” In contrast, the emerging “counter-globalization order” reflects deglobalizing trends.

Some global orders prove beneficial to a greater number of states than others, and thus gain broader international acceptance. A desirable order is one that is both stable and widely supported. Analogous to social entities—such as prisons (stable but unpopular) versus bazaars (unstable but preferred)—global orders that serve collective interests are favored over those serving a few, even if the latter offer greater stability.

This dynamic underpins the current divergence between Beijing and Washington. Both have advocated a rules-based order, but differ on its characteristic. Washington has long argued that China seeks to reshape the order away from universal values. U.S. officials have emphasized defending and reforming the post-World War II rules-based system to uphold peace and rights.

Having itself benefited from globalization, China has been supportive of its continuation but stood in opposition to Western dominance. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has criticized the “rules-based order” as hegemonic, favoring instead rules grounded in international law over selective imposition by the West.

The debate on the characteristic of international order is thus not about rules per se, but whose rules will prevail. All social orders are rules-based, but what matters is the specific characteristic of those rules and their acceptance by the majority. This logic applies not only to modern systems but also to ancient ones—e.g., the Western Zhou’s Five Services defined tributary order in East Asia, while Rome’s preoccupation principle shaped colonialism in Africa and Asia.

In the coming decade, major powers will surely contest the type of global order, but not its existence. Nuclear deterrence has prevented direct wars since World War II and will likely continue to do so. The Ukraine war is another illustration of this paradigm: despite early threats, Russia refrained from nuclear escalation. However destabilizing they may seem, proxy conflicts do not dismantle global order, which is one of the reasons this essay focuses on transformations in the types of order rather than their presence or absence.

 

The Cold War and its Aftermath

Some scholars view the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as different phases of a single liberal order. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, much like Ikenberry, traces its architecture to Bretton Woods and post-World War II institutions like the UN, IMF, and WTO. However, this view raises some logical questions: Why distinguish the periods if the order remained unchanged? Why did the “liberal order” emerge only after the Cold War? Why is globalization central to the post-Cold War but absent from Cold War discourse?

Conflating these periods obscures the evolution of global order. For instance, in his 2022 book entitled The Authoritarian Century: China’s Rise and the Demise of the Liberal International Order, Australian scholar Chris Ogden defined the period from 1945 to the present as the order of Pax Americana while arguing that there was “a new world order” after the end of the Cold War because of actual dramatic change in world affairs. In Is The American Century Over? (2015), Joseph Nye even argued that “the ‘American century’ began in 1941” and was “not over” yet, and would likely last until 2041. To understand today’s state of global order, we must compare it with Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

The Soviet collapse in 1991 marked a shift to U.S.-led unipolarity. U.S. President George H. W. Bush envisioned a “new world order” of peace and prosperity. While idealized, the post-Cold War order differed markedly in institutional power distribution, dominant values, and international norms.

During the Cold War, global leadership was split between the United States and the Soviet Union in political and security institutions, as the UN Security Council reflected this balance, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact embodied regional blocs. Despite its economic superiority, the United States could not exert global political leadership. Ideologically, the Cold War was defined by rivalry between capitalism and communism. Proxy wars were reflective of the struggle to install like-minded regimes, but neither ideology was able to achieve global dominance. The tripartite division—on the First World (U.S.-led), Second World (USSR-led), and Third World (non-aligned)—highlighted ideological fragmentation. The Third World, comprising most UN members, embraced diverse ideologies beyond the bipolar contest.

Above all else, sovereignty was the cornerstone of Cold War norms. The 1945 UN Charter enshrined non-intervention, and even its violators justified their actions under the guise of defending sovereignty. Conflicts like those in Korea, Vietnam, or the Arab-Israeli wars were framed as sovereignty struggles, reinforcing its normative primacy.

The post-Cold War era that followed, saw transformation across all dimensions of global order. With the USSR gone, the United States assumed sole leadership in global institutions, advancing liberal values and globalization norms and giving way to a shift that defined this new type of global order.

The U.S. dominated both economic and political institutions. UN Security Council resolutions—whether on Kosovo, Afghanistan, North Korea, or Iran—were often U.S.-led. Wary of confrontation, China frequently abstained, based on which the international media derided the Chinese representatives at the UN and sticking them with the nickname “Ambassador Abstention.”

Globalization norms, boiling down mostly to political democratization and economic marketization, spread quite widely. While Eastern Europe’s democratic transitions exemplified the former, the latter certainly had broader reach: even non-democratic states embraced market reforms. China and India epitomized this trend. China pursued WTO membership after transitioning to a mixed economy, joining in 2001, whereas India, after decades of protectionism, liberalized its economy in 1991.

To grasp the current global order, one must move beyond Cold War and post-Cold War frameworks. Comparisons with a “new Cold War” have circulated since the 1980s, first applied to U.S.-Soviet rivalry, later to that between the U.S. and Russia, and more recently U.S.- China. Yet repeated claims of a “starting point” have failed to hold, once again reaffirming that today’s order is not a Cold War redux. As Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan observed, invoking Cold War analogies is intellectually lazy and misrepresents the nature of U.S.-China competition.

Unlike the Cold War’s ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, today’s most consequential rivalry centers on technological superiority. Ideological challenges now stem from domestic populism rather than external expansion. Competition unfolds across both natural space (geo- and outer space) and cyberspace, with cybertechnology seen as decisive. Some of Russia’s military mishaps in Ukraine highlighted this, prompting Washington’s “small yard, high fence” strategy to restrict China’s tech progress, and Beijing’s “dual circulation” policy to strengthen domestic innovation. China’s goal is national rejuvenation, not global communism, and since 2017 it has pledged not to export its development model.

For its part, Washington too has abandoned Cold War ambitions of ideological expansion. Capitalism is no longer promoted as a global ideology and liberalism itself has been weakened by populism. And even those who prioritized it, focused on preserving liberalism at home, not spreading it abroad. Despite rivalry, both capitals reject framing their competition as a new Cold War.

Proxy wars, once central to Cold War strategy, are marginal in today’s competition. They do not advance technological superiority and drain resources. Hence, the risk of a proxy war over Taiwan is overstated. Beijing emphasizes peaceful reunification, recognizing that national rejuvenation depends on innovation, not territorial expansion. Lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine reinforce this restraint.

Unlike the comprehensive U.S.-Soviet separation, Washington and Beijing maintain economic and social ties. China continues to benefit from American markets, technology, and education, and thus resists full decoupling, while both sides acknowledge the need for coexistence. Both are also keenly aware that severing ties between the world’s two largest economies would bring about gross destabilization of global markets.

The U.S.-China rivalry will not lead to a new Cold War, since the conditions that defined the Cold War—ideological expansion, proxy wars, and comprehensive separation—are absent. Only mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains, making today’s order fundamentally different.

The dividing line of today’s competition lies in the rise of counter-globalization, distinct from anti-globalization (popular protests) and de-globalization (state-led reduction of interdependence). Counter-globalization emerges when major powers mutually adopt de-globalization policies.

Brexit in 2017 marked the first major step towards de-globalization, but its global impact was limited. The decisive shift came with Trump’s 2018 initiation of the trade war against China, involving economies that together comprised nearly 40 percent of global GDP. The COVID-19 pandemic only accelerated the trend, as states curtailed international connections. Thus, the period between 2017 and 2020 represents the transition from post-Cold War globalization to counter-globalization.

The Ukraine war in 2022 deepened this trajectory and the sanctions imposed on Russia disrupted supply chains, prompting the EU to reduce dependence on food, medicine, raw materials, chips, and digital technology. With no major power advancing globalization, the EU acknowledged a changing order. Reflecting this trend, U.S. officials at some point began speaking of “internationalization” rather than “globalization.”

Unlike Cold War’s bipolarity or the unipolarity of the post-Cold War period, power is diffusing in the contemporary world. Australia’s 2023 Defence Review noted the United States is no longer the Indo-Pacific’s unipolar leader. American withdrawals from institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the Paris Agreement further diminished its global leadership. This trend started from Tramp 1.0, was not reversed during the Biden administration and has certainly continued in the second Trump presidency.

Liberal norms are losing ground around the world and sovereignty has regained primacy, especially since the onset of the Ukraine war. Another testament to this fact is that NATO condemned Russia’s violation of sovereignty rather than emphasizing human rights. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), quite central in the post-Cold War era, has been sidelined. Major powers now selectively invoke sovereignty or human rights to justify policies. During the 2023 Israel-Hamas war, Western governments emphasized Israel’s sovereignty, while Beijing and many developing states highlighted Palestinian human rights. This selective application underscores the erosion of liberal norms and the reassertion of sovereignty as a guiding principle.

Economic norms have shifted from post-Cold War marketization to deglobalization, marked by trade protectionism, sanctions, and technological decoupling. Since 2018, major powers have tightened restrictions on trade, investment, and data flows while subsidizing domestic innovation. The United States, once the champion of globalization, abandoned free-market principles with its trade war against other countries including members of NAFTA, refusal to appoint WTO appellate judges, and passage of the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act—both criticized as protectionist. The EU, formerly globalization’s strongest advocate, now emphasizes “de-risking” and economic security, encouraging members to limit openness and prioritize internal resilience.

Global values have also shifted. Liberalism, dominant in the post-Cold War era, is declining under pressure from populism. This trend originates within Western democracies, where resentment against liberal norms has fueled political upheaval. Events like the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol reinforced perceptions of democratic fragility, and have only emboldened non-democratic states to claim greater legitimacy. Populism now shapes politics across both Western and non-Western powers, with roughly 15 percent of the world’s nations governed by populists in 2025. Unlike authoritarianism, which is a practice rather than an ideology, populism presents itself as a global ideological challenger to liberalism. The current clash of values is therefore between populism and liberalism, not capitalism and communism.

Taken together, these differences confirm the current order as distinct from both Cold War and post-Cold War types. Over these three periods, global order has evolved from ideological rivalry to globalization, and now to counter-globalization. Strategies shifted from proxy wars to democratization and marketization, and now to deglobalization. Institutional leadership moved from bipolar balance to U.S. unipolarity, and currently toward decentralization. Norms transitioned from the primacy of sovereignty, to human rights dominance, and now to a balance between the two. Values shifted from the rivalry between capitalism and communism, to liberalism’s dominance, and now to liberalism being challenged by populism.

 

Characteristics of the Current Global Order

Counter-globalization defines today’s global order, just as ideological rivalry defined the Cold War and globalization its aftermath. Yet other features also distinguish the present era: China’s rise, the digital age, and the spread of populism. Together, they reshape power distribution, strategic competition, and foreign policy priorities.

China’s ascent began with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978 and became undeniable when its GDP surpassed Japan’s in 2010. Alarmed, the United States launched its “Pivot to Asia,” signaling the shift of the world’s center from Europe to East Asia. While Europe remains important, it no longer anchors global competition and only China has the capacity to systemically challenge U.S. leadership. Recently, Trump described China-U.S. relations as “G2” but he did not define “G2” as confrontation or cooperation between two superpowers.

Although it is still considered a junior superpower by some, China’s growing influence decentralizes U.S. dominance in institutions. By 2022, it contributed 15.25 percent of the UN budget, second only to the United States. China has expanded its role through funding, leadership appointments, and new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which by 2023 involved 150 countries and 30 organizations. On the security front, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also broadened its membership and partnerships.

This rivalry forces other states into dilemmas of alignment. European leaders like France’s President Emmanuel Macron have warned against being trapped between Washington and Beijing, while many countries, much like during the Cold War, embrace their “Global South” identity to preserve neutrality.

Strategic competition now extends into cyberspace. Cyberattacks have surged, with over 1,100 weekly incidents per organization in late 2022, intensifying disputes over internet sovereignty. Such attacks are seen as both security threats and violations of sovereignty, as illustrated by U.S. allegations of Russian interference in the 2020 elections.

China has long promoted internet sovereignty to legitimize its cyber policies. Initially, both the United States and Europe resisted, favoring a “single internet.” For instance, in 2010, Hillary Clinton championed universal access, yet by 2020, U.S. policy shifted toward protecting its own digital domain. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s “clean network” initiative excluded Chinese firms from American infrastructure, while the Biden administration later banned U.S. companies from engaging with apps like TikTok and WeChat. Today, terms such as “internet sovereignty,” “cyber sovereignty,” and “digital sovereignty” become popular in global debates, reflecting the centrality of cyberspace in strategic competition.

Counter-globalization defines today’s global order, just as ideological rivalry defined the Cold War and globalization did the post-Cold War. Yet other features also distinguish the present era: China’s rise, the digital age, and the spread of populism. Together, they reshape power distribution, strategic competition, and foreign policy priorities.

 

Xenophobia, Populism, and Economic Security

Populism now prevails in the politics of major powers, accompanied by rising xenophobia and a preference for strongman rule over democratic institutions. Since the 2008 financial crisis, slower growth in democracies compared to China has fueled disillusionment, with many associating a strong leadership with economic progress. Populism blames liberal globalization, deepening xenophobia and enabling leaders to consolidate personal rule. In a 2022 speech as then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet observed that trust in democratic institutions is fading, with more states leaning toward non-Western systems. By 2021, half of 173 countries assessed by International IDEA showed democratic erosion, including 17 in Europe. Today, Trump’s administration is viewed as a semi-authoritarian regime.

Xenophobia manifests in anti-immigration policies and rejection of liberal norms like R2P. In the United States, Title 42 border restrictions persisted under both Trump and Biden, reflecting populist pressures. Likewise, European leaders voicing concerns over immigration at EU summits has become commonplace. In the UN, China’s defense of its policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet was supported by over 90 states, highlighting declining enthusiasm for R2P among developing countries.

Economic security has become a central strategic interest, far more emphasized than during the Cold War or post-Cold War. Washington formally linked economic security to national security in 2018, a stance reinforced by Blinken and Alan Estevez, who cited restrictions on China’s access to advanced technologies. Trump’s administration adopts even stricter policy in this aspect. The U.S. increasingly blurs civilian and military industries, intensifying tensions with Beijing and straining ties with allies. 

China’s conflicts over economic security extend beyond Washington. In 2023, Beijing condemned the EU’s economic security strategy. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identified supply chain vulnerabilities and imposed export restrictions on semiconductor equipment to China. South Korea proposed an “economic security alliance” with the United States to reduce dependence on China, while India passed legislation curbing Chinese investment. These developments underscore how economic security now drives global competition and reshapes alliances while intensifying rivalries.

 

Beijing’s Concern Regarding the Global Order

China is the only state with comprehensive capability to rival U.S. global influence, and thus seeks to shape the order according to its preferences. Its economic, military, and political power, along with ingrained governance values, will significantly impact the coming order. Compared to Washington, Beijing’s leadership trajectory is more certain, given U.S. electoral cycles.

Beijing’s outlook shifted after the Biden administration restored ties with traditional allies, briefly reversing Trump’s unilateralism. In 2020, the CPC still spoke of a “period of strategic opportunity.” By 2022, however, Beijing’s rhetoric darkened. At the BRICS Summit, it warned of “Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation,” while the CCP’s 20th Congress described “hegemonic, bullying acts” and unprecedented challenges. The 2023 Global Security Initiative Concept Paper echoed this pessimism, citing rising protectionism, persistent conflicts, and governance deficits.

By late 2023, Beijing’s rhetoric had grown more combative, emphasizing sovereignty, self-reliance, and systemic rivalry with the West. In parallel, China’s strategic rapprochement with Russia deepened, while initiatives like the Global Development Initiative expanded Chinese influence across the Global South. The 2024 Two Sessions stressed “struggle” and technological independence, and military signaling intensified. By 2025, the CCP’s messaging adopted a dual track: externally promoting multipolarity and institutional reform through BRICS+ and Global South forums, while domestically framing global competition as a long-term challenge requiring resilience and civilizational confidence.

Beijing rejects Washington’s framing of a rules-based order, insisting that international rules derive from the UN Charter and must be agreed upon by all 193 member states. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that “there is but one set of rules in the world.” In contrast, Beijing accuses Washington of undermining norms, citing interventions, sanctions, and selective use of international law. Its 2023 document “U.S. Hegemony and Its Perils” condemned American practices such as “color revolutions,” bloc politics, and unilateral sanctions.

To counter what it sees as an unfavorable trajectory, Beijing launched four initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), Global Civilization Initiative (2023), and Global Governance Initiative (2025). Together, they articulate China’s desire to reshape the order, emphasizing development, sovereignty-based security, and cultural diversity. These initiatives illustrate Beijing’s strong determination to shape a new order and elaborate on the kind of order it desires.

 

The Global Order Beijing Advocates

Beijing envisions a global order distinct from U.S.-led alliances and Western universalism. It promotes non-alliance partnerships, plural political legitimacy, development-first human rights, and open economic globalization.

China opposes U.S. military alliances such as AUKUS or QUAD in East Asia, as well as NATO’s growing hostility. It condemns these as Cold War mentality and instead promotes “no-alliance, no-confrontation” partnerships, exemplified by its relationship with Russia. Beijing argues this model avoids bloc confrontation and offers a new framework for major-power relations.

Beijing also rejects universal values, insisting there is no single yardstick for democracy or legitimacy. It emphasizes institutional competition as central to global rivalry and promotes diverse modernization paths. China positions its own modernization—economic growth, social change, and technological advancement under non-liberal governance—as an attractive model for developing countries, though applicability beyond Confucian contexts remains debated.

China prioritizes economic development over civil and political rights, arguing that freedom from poverty precedes other freedoms. This view resonates with many developing countries, as reflected in the 2022 UN Sharm El Sheikh Implementation Plan. Beijing criticizes Western human rights discourse as a tool of intervention and consistently invokes the UN Charter’s principle of non-interference, reinforcing sovereignty as a core norm.

Beijing distinguishes economic globalization, which it supports, from political democratization, which it opposes. Having benefited enormously from post-Cold War free marketization, China now advocates for an open economic order to counter Western decoupling and protectionism. China also calls on developing countries to resist “small yards and high fences” and urges reform of international financial institutions to amplify their voice. Premier Li Qiang reaffirmed China’s commitment to opening up, pledging cooperation with the U.S. to uphold trade rules and stabilize supply chains.

 

Beijing’s Strategy for Shaping the Global Order

Beijing pursues a comprehensive strategy across economic, political, and security domains, with economic influence as its strongest lever. BRI is the centerpiece of this vision, reflecting China’s reliance on trade and finance to expand global influence. By 2022, cumulative BRI engagement reached $962 billion, making China the top trading partner for over 120 countries. Complementing BRI, Beijing created the AIIB and NDB to reform U.S.-dominated financial governance. While these institutions challenge U.S. leadership, they largely replicate existing norms, as consensus-based structures limit the scope for new rules.

Beijing expands its influence through institutions and forums it leads, often excluding U.S. participation. In so doing, China has established regional forums across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. BRICS exemplifies this approach, with membership expanding in 2023 to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the UAE. Hosting summits at home—such as the South-South Human Rights Forum and the Central Asia-China Summit—allows Beijing to shape collective positions, emphasizing non-interference and skepticism toward Western-dominated norms.

Outlined in the Global Security Initiative Concept Paper, Beijing’s security agenda includes peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, mediation, regional security architecture, and nontraditional security cooperation. It proposes five approaches:

• Engage in UN and multilateral discussions to forge consensus.

• Leverage platforms like the SCO, BRICS, and regional mechanisms for incremental cooperation.

• Hold high-level GSI conferences to strengthen dialogue.

• Support forums such as the Xiangshan Forum and China-Africa Peace and Security Forum to deepen exchange.

• Build platforms for cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and emerging technologies, including training 5,000 professionals from developing countries over five years.

 

Changes in the Coming Global Order

The next decade will likely bring a more segmented and confrontational global order. While specifics cannot be forecast, general trends suggest consolidation of U.S.-China bipolarity, modest rises by India, and declining influence of other major powers.

By 2035, the United States and China will widen their lead over other states. Both already far surpass Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, and Russia in GDP and military budgets. Digital superiority will further enhance their dominance. The absolute gap may grow, with U.S. GDP remaining over $10 trillion ahead of China’s, though China’s relative proportion may rise slightly from 66 percent to over 70 percent. Despite higher growth, Beijing faces “triple pressure”—weak demand, supply shocks, and low confidence—limiting its ability to close the gap. The United States will retain greater material resources than China to shape the order.

India may grow faster than Japan, Germany, the UK, France, and Russia, potentially becoming the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. Its demographic advantage and growth trajectory could elevate its status, though it will remain a regional rather than global power by 2035. Hosting the Global South Summit without China underscored its ambition to lead developing nations.

Germany will remain a clear leader of the EU, but will continue to lack global reach. Japan’s GDP will likely fall behind both Germany and India, with poor ties to Beijing limiting its influence. Brexit has already weakened the UK’s position in Europe, while France looks set to remain a junior partner to Germany. Collectively, these powers will have less impact on global order by 2035. For its part, Russia will remain a regional power and junior partner to China. Even if the Ukraine war ends in near future, the impact of unprecedented sanctions will hinder recovery and prevent prospects for normalization with the West. Despite its demonstrated ability to maintain a war economy relatively well, Moscow’s global influence will remain diminished compared to its pre-2022 role.

 

Strategic Balance in Favor of the U.S.

Although major powers’ de-risk policies are in favor of Washington, this situation is changing in 2025. In the 2010s, many states were prone to hedging their bets, seeking economic benefits from China while relying on the U.S. for security. Since Washington defined “economic security” as a national interest in 2018, however, major economies have reduced interdependence with China and strengthened cooperation with the United States. This trend, reinforced by corporate “China+1” strategies, undermines the previous balance. Trump’s policy on tariff and the Ukraine war is likely to shift the strategic balance between China and the U.S. in favor of China over the next decade. 

By 2035, Washington may consolidate its advantage by expanding alliances into economic and technological domains. The U.S.-South Korea alliance was redefined in 2023 to include economic cooperation, while Vietnam elevated ties with Washington to “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and the U.S. and EU launched plans for a Europe-Middle East-India corridor to counter China’s BRI. Still, ongoing U.S. tariffs—especially on steel, aluminum, and Chinese goods—continued to complicate trade diplomacy, including these strategically important relationships, casting some doubt on Washington’s reliability as a long-term economic partner. These frictions subtly undermined the appeal of U.S.-led initiatives, prompting some allies to go back to hedging between economic blocs. Yet, despite all this, Beijing’s troubles may endure, as China adheres to non-alignment, lacks formal allies, and cannot replicate Washington’s “small yard, high fence” strategy in digital competition. However, Trump’s policy to reduce U.S. protection for allies is diminishing this trend.

The Ukraine war has further entrenched Western reliance on the U.S. and resentment toward Beijing, which has avoided criticizing Moscow. Irrespective of when the war ends, China’s close ties with Russia will continue to hinder relations with most European states, pushing them to side with Washington in global disputes.

Additionally, Beijing’s partnerships with developing countries remain uncertain. Russia may be its only substantial partner, though not an ally. Relations with Brazil hinge on Lula’s tenure, while ties with India are constrained by QUAD membership and growing rivalry. India’s economic growth and leadership in the Global South will intensify competition with China for influence among developing nations.

 

Continued World Peace with Historical Regression

Competition between China and the United States will intensify in the coming decade, likely generating more security conflicts. Global order depends on public goods—security and stability—which are provided by leading powers. Yet both have identified each other as their top strategic threat, reducing prospects for cooperation. Washington views Beijing as intent on reshaping the order to its advantage, while Beijing condemns the United States as the primary disruptor, citing interference in Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and maritime disputes. As China’s officials have repeatedly noted, “the world is not peaceful.”

Despite rising tensions, outright war between the two powers remains unlikely. Beyond Taiwan, there are no disputes that could escalate into a direct military clash. Unlike Washington, Beijing shows little inclination to use military power for regime change abroad. Coexistence between the two powers is possible, sustaining relative peace for the next decade.

However, peace will coincide with regression. Globalization is giving way to counter-globalization, and governance rhetoric will lack meaningful action. Technological and economic progress will continue, but the order will become less stable and predictable. Proxy wars will persist, and AI-driven unmanned weapons may reduce military casualties while increasing civilian deaths, encouraging more attacks. Regression will manifest in heightened military conflicts, diplomatic confrontation, economic deglobalization, and technological segmentation.

Historically, global orders have lasted decades: the interwar period just over 20, while the Cold War lasted about 40 years. If this precedent holds, regression may endure at least a decade, possibly two or three. Counter-globalization, still in its early phase, is unlikely to peak until after the next decade. Those expecting it to be short-lived will likely be disappointed.

 

Political Uncertainty and Conflicts over Economic Security

Populism will become the most influential ideology over the next 10 years, shaping foreign policies across major powers. Currently ascendant but not yet at its peak, populism is likely to spread rapidly, validating itself through foreign policy and resisting any resurgence of liberal global order. Populist leadership prioritizes regime and economic security, increasing uncertainty, undermining liberal norms, and fueling global conflicts.

An increasing number of states will be ruled by populist leaders. In non-Western countries, many incumbents have entrenched constitutional foundations for extended tenure. In the West, populist parties—such as the Trump-led Republican Party in the U.S., Germany’s AfD, Sweden Democrats, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Northern League—are all gaining traction or have already taken positions of power. By the late 2020s, Western parliaments or governments may be dominated by populists. Judging by its current trajectory, the United States could well shift from a democratic model to a semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian state, with populism replacing liberalism as the dominant ideology, driving foreign policy toward protectionism and anti-humanitarianism.

Populist leaders’ focus on regime security often leads to aggressive, unpredictable foreign policies aimed at bolstering domestic support. Unlike national security, which responds to external threats, regime security is conditioned by volatile domestic politics. This volatility drives erratic foreign policy choices, eroding international norms and increasing global instability. Chaos may become the defining characteristic of the coming order.

The rhetoric of “economic security” will intensify xenophobia. Populist leaders scapegoat foreign powers for domestic failures, stoking resentment at home and abroad. Social media accelerates the spread of xenophobic sentiment, while economic interests resonate emotionally with the populace. Leaders use economic security to justify de-globalization policies—delinking, de-risking, sanctions, and protectionism. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, adopted by the Biden administration in 2022, exemplifies this shift, abandoning free-market principles in favor of industrial protection. Other major powers are following suit, adopting stricter economic-security policies. This trend will reinforce populist values and accelerate the abandonment of the liberal order during Tramp 2.0.

 

The Inbound Paradox

The historical trajectory of global order since the mid‑twentieth century demonstrates a clear evolution: ideological confrontation during the Cold War, globalization and liberal expansion in the post‑Cold War era, and the current counter‑globalization order marked by fragmentation, populism, and economic security. Each order has been defined by its own dominant values, norms, and institutional distribution of power. The Cold War was driven by ideological expansion and proxy wars; the post‑Cold War by democratization and marketization; and the present order by deglobalization, technological rivalry, and the reassertion of sovereignty.

Looking forward, the consolidation of U.S.-China bipolarity will be the central feature of the coming decade. Washington will retain greater material resources than China and a more extensive alliance system, while Beijing will continue to rely on economic globalization and non‑alignment as its strategic principles. India may rise as the third largest economy, but its role will remain regional. Europe’s major states will see declining influence, and Russia will remain constrained by sanctions and its junior position in the partnership with China. The strategic balance will tilt further toward China and the United States’s domination will decline.

This balance, however, will not produce stability. Populism is poised to become the most influential ideology across major powers, eroding liberal norms and driving unpredictable foreign policies. Economic security will replace free‑market principles as the guiding rationale of statecraft, legitimizing protectionism and intensifying xenophobia. Governance will stagnate, global institutions will weaken, and selective application of norms will deepen mistrust.

The paradox of the coming decade is that relative peace may be maintained, yet regression will define the order. Outright war between the United States and China is unlikely, but proxy conflicts, technological segmentation, and diplomatic confrontation will proliferate. Advances in AI and unmanned systems may reduce military casualties while increasing civilian deaths, further destabilizing the moral fabric of warfare.

If past experience is any guide, this reversal of globalization is likely to persist for well over a decade—potentially even extending across several decades. Rather than a fleeting disruption, it signals a sustained period of decline characterized by volatility, disunity, and the ascendancy of populist norms at the expense of liberal principles.

The current order is neither a repetition of the Cold War nor a continuation of the liberal post‑Cold War order. It is a counter-globalization order—one defined by rivalry without ideology, deglobalization without complete decoupling, and peace without progress.

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