The Helix of Cooperation | ASEAN Regionalism and Beyond

H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn is the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

From being regarded as a geographic label, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the strategic heart of the twenty-first century. Home to two-thirds of the world’s population and poised to account for half of global GDP by 2040, the region has increasingly become the focal point of vast opportunities. However, alongside these tremendous prospects are complex challenges, including geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, which are increasingly felt across the region and beyond. As great power rivalries intensify, the Indo-Pacific is being defined not only by its geography but by the evolving strategic calculations of states, both large and small.

ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Kao Kim Hourn during the 5th ASEAN-Australia Summit in Kuala Lumpur | Photo: Guliver Image/Getty Images

At the centre of this dynamic strategic landscape is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Established in 1967, ASEAN has since matured as an intergovernmental regional organisation, and as a community, steering the region through decades of development and transformation. As ASEAN approaches its 60th anniversary two years from now, it has become clear that it has laid a strong foundation for peace, prosperity, and progress, particularly given the excellent track record in promoting collaboration and cooperation across the three Pillars: ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). ASEAN has worked tirelessly through the years to build a reservoir of trust, enhance confidence and undertake practical cooperation, particularly in the current strategic environment, which is characterised by a strategic trust deficit.

With the adoption of ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future by the ASEAN Leaders during the 46th ASEAN Summit in May 2025, ASEAN is poised to strengthen its community towards a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centred ASEAN. It has built and sustained a model of regional cooperation that remains vital today—not only among the 11 ASEAN Member States, with Timor-Leste’s recent accession to ASEAN, but also with a growing constellation of external partners through various arrangements and engagements.

 

The ASEAN Way and the Helix of Cooperation

For nearly six decades, from the time it was founded to this date, ASEAN has embarked on having all states in Southeast Asia become part of the ASEAN family. Composed of the five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in 1967, ASEAN first expanded in 1984 with the inclusion of Brunei Darussalam, following its independence from the U.K. Then in 1995, Viet Nam joined ASEAN, followed by Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. After more than two decades since its last expansion, Timor-Leste became the newest Member of ASEAN, bringing the total number of ASEAN Member States finally to 11, encompassing the Southeast Asian region.

Alongside this expansion, ASEAN has championed a brand of multilateralism that is rooted in dialogue, diplomacy, consensus building, and peaceful dispute resolution. These core principles are embedded in the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976, and the successive Bali Concords—Bali Concord II of 2003 and Bali Concord III of 2011. Through these instruments, ASEAN has laid the normative foundation for regional cooperation—anchored on mutual trust, mutual respect, mutual understanding, and a collective commitment to peace and stability. This norm-building has been ASEAN’s important legacy, advocating dialogue, diplomacy, collaboration and cooperation, consultation and consensus building, not confrontation and conflict. It is through such creation of norms that ASEAN has exercised its agency in shaping the regional architecture.

Beyond the norms of dialogue and consensus building, another important norm that ASEAN has promoted is non-proliferation and disarmament. Anchored on the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) of 1971, the norm of keeping the region free from becoming a playing field of the major powers, including their nuclear weapons, was further reinforced with the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty of 1995. Its signing marked the establishment of Southeast Asia as one of the nuclear weapon-free zones in the world. To date, ASEAN is in close consultation with all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) regarding their signing of the Treaty’s Protocol, which would reinforce their commitment to keeping the region free from nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction.

ASEAN’s approach is best described as a “Helix of Cooperation”—different levels of cooperation, and a constantly evolving web of partnerships that reinforces and multiplies opportunities for collaboration, resulting in a cohesive regional framework of close relations, practical cooperation, and dynamic partnerships. This stands in contrast to the conflict-driven security structures as seen elsewhere.

This Cooperation Helix is underpinned by interconnected layers of engagement, both internally within ASEAN and externally with its external partners. Through structured consultation mechanisms under the three ASEAN Community pillars, the network of cooperation and consultation within ASEAN extends widely among the ASEAN Member States and across sectors, including an increasing number of meetings at the senior officials’ level and the ministerial level. Through these engagements, decisions are made in an inclusive manner, with a strong emphasis on consensus-building. Part of this internal web of mechanisms is the ASEAN Centres of Excellence, hosted by individual ASEAN Member States and supported by the rest of the ASEAN Community. They have been established to address challenges, emerging priorities, needs and interests of ASEAN, both individually and collectively.

Externally, ASEAN has developed and continues to cultivate an extensive architecture of partnerships. To date, ASEAN has 11 Dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, UK, and the U.S.), 8 Sectoral Dialogue Partners (Brazil, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates), and 6 Development Partners (Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Peru). These formal partners of ASEAN range from major powers to middle powers from across the globe, which ASEAN has engaged regularly and constructively through what is called the Plus One modality.

Beyond engaging these partners individually through the Plus One modality, ASEAN has also established other engagement platforms known as ASEAN-led mechanisms. These included the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus.

The ASEAN Plus Three is a cooperation platform among the ASEAN Member States and their three neighbours in Northeast Asia, namely China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, which was established following the 1997 Financial Crisis.

The East Asia Summit, composed of the ASEAN Member States plus eight Dialogue Partners of ASEAN is a Leaders-led premier platform for strategic dialogue. It was established in 2005 out of the need to have a platform where leaders of ASEAN’s six Dialogue Partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea) could be strategically engaged. Two other Dialogue Partners (the U.S. and Russia) were strategically included.

The ASEAN Regional Forum was first convened in 1994 as the region was in search of a security dialogue mechanism amidst the state of flux resulting from the end of the Cold War at that time. It was eventually expanded to include 27 participating states. These are Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the U.S., and Viet Nam. These countries joined the ARF at different times since ARF was inaugurated in 1994.

Meanwhile, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus was established in 2010 to promote dialogue and consultation among the defence ministers of ASEAN Member States and eight Dialogue Partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the U.S.), as well as to promote practical cooperation among the defence establishments.

Based on the experiences in the past and ongoing cooperation, these ASEAN-led mechanisms allow ASEAN not only to convene diverse actors and bring them to meet together in one place but also to strategically shape the agenda—to champion regional cooperation and ensure continued support for ASEAN Centrality by its external partners. ASEAN Centrality, as stipulated in Article 1 (15) of the ASEAN Charter, means that “ASEAN [is] the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners.” One of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners admitted and acknowledged that “ASEAN has become the only game in town.”

However, what should not be overlooked are the ASEAN Centres established in ASEAN’s Dialogue Partner countries, such as those located in Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the U.S., and the role they have played not only in promoting ASEAN and increasing its visibility but also in cultivating long-lasting relations between the peoples of ASEAN and those of its Dialogue Partners. They have been working to actively deepen cooperation in all ASEAN Community Pillars.

 

 A Global ASEAN

ASEAN has reached a point where its partnerships are continuously expanding, from States requesting to become High Contracting Parties (HCPs) to the TAC to countries seeking to become formal partners of ASEAN. Originally signed by the five founding ASEAN Member States (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore), the TAC has since been amended three times—in 1987, 1998, and 2010—allowing for the continued accession, respectively, of other states in Southeast Asia, states outside the region, as well as for regional organisations whose members are sovereign states. Today, a total of 58 states are HCPs to the treaty, with the recent accession of Algeria, Finland, and Uruguay in 2025.

Alongside the increase in ASEAN’s formal partners is the establishment of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners. The CSP status signifies that these partnerships are elevated to further ensure that the relations and cooperation are substantive and mutually beneficial. The current CSPs include Australia and China (2021), the U.S. and India (2022), Japan (2023), the Republic of Korea (2024), and New Zealand (2025).

Countries across the globe have also accredited ambassadors to ASEAN, following the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which bestowed ASEAN with important legal personality. Thus far, 96 foreign ambassadors have been accredited to ASEAN, signifying their respective countries’ desire to engage and seek close cooperation with ASEAN.

Meanwhile, playing an equally important role in promoting ASEAN in other countries, whether a formal partner of ASEAN or otherwise, are the ASEAN Committees in Third Countries and International Organisations (ACTCs). Created in accordance with Article 43 of the ASEAN Charter, the ACTCs enable ASEAN to expand its global outreach in all regions of the world. To date, 55 ACTCs have been set up and have been in operation worldwide, promoting ASEAN’s visibility and strengthening engagement with host countries.

ASEAN being global is also evident on the economic front through the expanding network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). ASEAN currently has seven bilateral FTAs (with Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Hong Kong). It has worked towards upgrading its FTA with China, with the upgrade protocol signed at the sidelines of the recently concluded 47th ASEAN Summit. ASEAN is also currently negotiating an FTA with Canada and exploring the possibility of a region-to-region FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Alongside the bilateral FTAs are ASEAN-led economic arrangements, the most notable of which is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest FTA in the world underscoring ASEAN’s commitment to open, inclusive and rules-based economic integration. A number of countries have since expressed their intention to join RCEP.

 

Moving Forward

The future of the Indo-Pacific will be shaped not only by the major powers but also by the strength, coherence, and vision of regional institutions. ASEAN has engaged with major powers around the world through dialogue and cooperation. Today, the region bears witness to the fruits of collaboration—ASEAN’s strategic engagement with its partners, including contending regional powers, has resulted in the strategic development of ASEAN and the region.

ASEAN has engaged its partners in a consistent, incremental and sustained manner through an open, transparent and inclusive approach. ASEAN’s convening power, including its ability and opportunity to set forth the regional agenda, cannot be denied. It is in fact paradoxical that ASEAN has maintained its strategic autonomy precisely through its inclusive approach of engaging everyone.

On my first day in office as Secretary-General of ASEAN in 2023, I highlighted six priority areas—the 6Ps: Peace, Prosperity, People, Planet, Partnerships, and Potentials. In my view, these 6Ps reaffirm the very spirit that has guided ASEAN since its founding.

ASEAN was founded to promote peace so that the peoples of the region could focus on prosperity and reap the fruits of stability. ASEAN’s first step—to accelerate economic growth, promote peace and stability, and encourage active collaboration—set in motion a journey that continues today. Each step has built upon that foundation, allowing ASEAN to shape a regional order that benefits not only Southeast Asia but also the wider Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Through the partnerships that have been built—and continue to be built—ASEAN is charting a deliberate course to address challenges, seize opportunities, and transform challenges and potentials into tangible benefits. I have seen firsthand ASEAN’s ability to convene, mediate, and build bridges in times of uncertainty and challenges. By fostering trust and enabling cooperation rather than simply reacting to crises, ASEAN offers a model of inclusive regionalism and pragmatic diplomacy.

All these are being pursued alongside an increasing realisation that caring for the planet is essential, a reminder from recent extreme weather disturbances that have impacted everyone, whether rich or poor, in a position of leadership or otherwise.

In an era of accelerating change in the Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN’s vision remains clear: a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific and an ASEAN Community that is resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centred, as envisioned in ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future, ASEAN’s long-term vision of 20 years. As we move forward, ASEAN will continue to uphold its central role in shaping a regional architecture that delivers benefits for all.

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