Brendan Simms is Director of the Centre for Geopolitics and Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge.

Hugh Simms is a Policy Assistant for Monica Harding MP, International Development Spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats in the House of Commons.

The Indo-Pacific has long held an ambivalent position in Britain’s foreign policy imagination. The region has been integral to our alliances, maritime power, and trade routes. Yet it has often played a secondary role to more immediate security concerns closer to home. Since World War II, Britain’s presence has fluctuated between engagement and withdrawal—from intervention during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) to the 1968 “East of Suez” decision to remove most military assets from the region.

Naval personnel from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada on the deck of a Royal Navy vessel during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2022 | Source: © Crown copyright 2024, UK Ministry of Defence/Editorial use only
 

More recently, the explosive economic rise of Asia, the growing assertiveness of China, and the return of great power competition have prompted a rethink in strategy. Following the 2016 Brexit vote, the Indo-Pacific has become central to an outward, forward-looking vision of a “Global Britain.” In 2021, the Johnson administration’s “Integrated Review”—and its 2023 “Refresh” (undertaken by the Sunak government)—promised a “tilt” to the region. The Review located the Indo-Pacific as “the center of intensifying geopolitical competition” and designated the region as a “permanent pillar” of UK foreign policy.

The “tilt” toward the Indo-Pacific has already produced a series of tangible results, most notably Britain’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); the AUKUS security pact with Australia and the United States; the Global Combat Air Programme with Japan and Italy; and the UK’s new status as an ASEAN dialogue partner, among others.

However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine understandably redirected much of our attention toward the Euro-Atlantic—a shift that has been intensified by Putin’s colossal military buildup, nuclear saber-rattling, and incursions into NATO airspace. The Indo-Pacific was now implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, given lower salience in British strategic thinking. This decline has been aggravated by serious resource constraints. To put it crudely, the Carrier Strike Group can be either in the Euro-Atlantic or the Indo-Pacific but not in both theatres at the same time.

 

The Indivisible Authoritarian Challenge

The principal threat to stability and security in the Indo-Pacific is the Chinese Communist Party, which has made little secret of its ambition to replace the prevailing rules-based international order with a Sino-centric system of its own design. Through economic coercion, political maneuvering, and military assertiveness, Beijing continues to erode the principles of a free and open region.

However, deeper engagement with the region is not a zero-sum game. Security in Europe and Asia is indivisible, shaped by a shared authoritarian challenge: a coordinated effort by both Russia and China to contest and re-order the international system. What we do in one arena sends signals about our credibility and resolve in another.

This article contends that the Indo-Pacific holds profound strategic importance for Britain. It is firmly in our national interest, and central to our security, to deepen engagement with like-minded partners and to balance China’s rise. This will also constrain Russia and reinforce the region’s stability. As the United States retrenches from its global commitments, the strategic case for a stronger British role in the Indo-Pacific grows ever more compelling. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the ideological frontier of the twenty-first century—the region where the contest between open societies and authoritarian powers is most sharply defined. As former U.S. President Joe Biden observed, it now stands at the center of the “battle between democracy and autocracy.” A struggle that first turned kinetic in Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Britain’s deployable hard power is not what it once was, but its enduring strengths in coalition-building and soft power remain formidable. If the United Kingdom meets this challenge, it can play a powerful role in helping to preserve the strategic balance, champion free and open trade, and uphold the rules-based order in a region that now stands as both the forefront of geopolitical competition and the engine of global economic growth.

Today, Putin’s aggression and Xi’s assertiveness together constitute a single, unmistakable bid to reshape the international order. Moscow and Beijing’s 2022 “No Limits” partnership, which has expanded in recent years, reflects the deepening of their diplomatic, military, and economic ties.

China’s militarization of the South China Sea, its incursions around Japan’s Senkaku Islands, and intimidation of neighboring countries all point to an attempt to replace the rules-based order with one based on force. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan—which many analysts warn could occur by 2027—would once again shatter the principle that borders cannot be redrawn by force, devastating the credibility of deterrence in both Asia and Europe. Just as Ukraine tests Western resolve in the Euro-Atlantic, Taiwan represents its Indo-Pacific counterpart. This is why former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned in 2022 that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

The connection between the two theatres has been repeatedly demonstrated in recent times. North Korea deployed troops to drive the Ukrainians out of Kursk. The PRC and Russian naval squadrons have exercised together in the Baltic Sea. Chinese security forces have conducted “anti-terrorist” operations with Belarus. Beijing has also quietly fueled Moscow’s war on Ukraine—providing economic lifelines, dual-use technologies, and diplomatic cover that have blunted the impact of Western sanctions and prolonged the conflict.

China’s weaponization of economic leverage has also reshaped the balance of power in the region. Its coercive use of trade and investment—most notably against Australia and South Korea—has revealed a readiness to use economic interdependence as a tool of influence. Additionally, through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has extended its reach across the region, creating “debt-trap” dependencies in countries like Sri Lanka and Laos.

Beijing’s ideological campaign in the region has been waged through state-backed media such as Xinhua and CGTN, as well as through cultural and educational vehicles like the Confucius Institutes. At the same time, the export of Chinese surveillance technologies to countries including Cambodia and Pakistan has enabled the suppression of dissent, extending China’s model of control beyond its borders.

China’s actions have also violated the very principles Britain has long championed, such as the rule of law, liberty, and respect for sovereignty. The repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms—prompting hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in the United Kingdom—illustrate the PRC’s willingness to run roughshod over international law and basic norms with impunity.

 

Strategic Drift in the West

Successive British governments have been slow to respond to China’s rise. After 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron’s “Golden Age” was marked by commercial naivety, while his successors—Prime Ministers Theresa May, Boris Johnson, and Rishi Sunak—have oscillated between confrontation and complacency.

The government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer now risks repeating this strategic drift. The Chancellor’s pursuit of deeper trade ties and talk of a “Reset” with the PRC all suggest that earlier lessons remain unlearned. Indeed, the recent spy scandal—with prosecutors dropping charges rather than naming China a threat—reveals a deeper issue: Britain’s unwillingness to stand up to Beijing for fear of alienating an important economic partner.

Furthermore, the United States, under President Donald Trump, can no longer be relied upon to provide a consistent commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The administration’s main focus thus far has been on the American hemisphere: Canada, Greenland, Mexico, the Panama Canal, and latterly Venezuela. On several occasions, Trump has also declined to explicitly reaffirm America’s longstanding commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense.

Traditional allies across the Indo-Pacific—many heavily dependent on U.S. markets and assistance—have also faced sweeping import tariffs and drastic aid reductions since Trump re-entered the Oval Office in January 2025. Following the administration’s dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development, countries like Myanmar, Laos, and several Pacific Island states have faced deep cuts to their budgets.

 

Britain’s Assets and Economic Imperative

History shows that weakness in one region emboldens aggression in another. In the 1930s, appeasement in Europe and Asia invited expansion by the Axis powers. By the Cold War, the West had learned its lesson. Firm stands in places like Korea, Berlin, and the Taiwan Strait signaled to Moscow and Beijing that aggression would be met with resolve, not resignation.

Today, leaders from Tokyo to Canberra, from Jakarta to Taipei, understand that defending Ukraine is a signal of Western resolve across continents—just as defending Taiwan and maintaining freedom of navigation through the South China Sea send a signal of determination to our allies in Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Helsinki, Warsaw, and other friendly capitals.

Britain can help ensure strategic coherence by building a “community of deterrence” that spans continents. This means linking its Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies through shared threat assessments, aligned defense investments, and cooperation with like-minded allies. By committing to “burden-sharing,” we can also gain influence in Washington—helping to shape a more consistent, principled U.S. approach. In short, engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not a distraction from the Euro-Atlantic but a complement to it. Security today is inseparable across theatres: instability in Asia reverberates in Europe, just as weakness in Europe invites aggression in Asia.

Britain is not only well-placed to offer “thought leadership” across the two theatres but brings some important capabilities to the table. The formation of AUKUS in 2021 was a landmark achievement, cementing Britain’s place as a technological and strategic force in the region. The partnership involves the joint development of nuclear-powered submarines and advanced defense technologies. Under “Pillar II,” the technologies extend to encompass artificial intelligence, undersea drones, and cyber defense. The UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG) deployments in 2021 and 2025, led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, were another important development: a mobile, carrier-led task group that enables Britain to project deterrence without maintaining a costly, permanent footprint.

Equally significant is the Global Combat Air Programme—the joint sixth-generation fighter initiative between the UK, Japan, and Italy, launched in 2022—representing the most ambitious military-industrial cooperation between a European and an Asian power since the Cold War. GCAP serves as the “AUKUS of Aerospace”: integrating autonomous drones, AI-driven decision systems, and advanced sensor fusion. The partnership with Tokyo is further strengthened by the 2023 UK-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The accord enables joint operations and exercises on each other’s soil, facilitating joint training, intelligence-sharing, and rapid deployment. Similar models could be pursued with countries such as South Korea, India, and Singapore—deepening interoperability and strengthening collective deterrence across the region.

In addition, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)—established in the aftermath of Britain’s “East of Suez” withdrawal and uniting the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore—remains a pillar of regional stability. Regular FPDA exercises enhance interoperability, maritime awareness, and trust, serving as a subtle counterweight to coercive behavior. Yet the framework must now be modernized and expanded to address cyber, space, and hybrid threats, as well as be underpinned with proper security guarantees.

Underlying these security ties are the deep networks, institutions, and relationships that amplify our global reach. As a founding and key member of the Five Eyes alliance, Britain can coordinate intelligence and provide regional access through a network that includes all four fellow members—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The Commonwealth, meanwhile, offers unparalleled diplomatic and cultural influence, spanning over 56 countries and 2.7 billion people worldwide—the majority of whom are located in the Indo-Pacific.

Joining ASEAN as a dialogue partner in 2021, Britain has also become more deeply embedded in the region’s diplomatic architecture. Through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus framework, Britain now has a seat at the table on key regional issues. The government should build on this progress by pushing for greater participation in ASEAN and hosting annual ASEAN-UK dialogues.

Beyond this, British soft power remains unparalleled in scale and reach. The BBC World Service, with hundreds of millions of listeners worldwide, projects influence and credibility while countering disinformation from authoritarian actors such as China. In addition, entities such as the British Council foster education, cultural exchange, and goodwill throughout the region, strengthening trust and engagement. Meanwhile, Britain’s universities, legal system, and creative sectors are deeply revered and wield considerable influence across the Indo-Pacific. Together, these assets give Britain an influence disproportionate to its size, enabling it to continue to “punch above its weight.”

As the global economic center of gravity continues to shift eastward, Britain has a unique opportunity—particularly with its post-Brexit freedom to strike independent trade agreements—to capitalize on the commercial potential of the Indo-Pacific. The region accounts for 40 percent of global GDP, two-thirds of global growth, and more than half of world trade. Additionally, its rising young population, expanding middle class, and central role in global supply chains further amplify its importance.

The United Kingdom’s accession to the CPTPP in 2024 was a landmark step. With a combined market worth £11 trillion—around 15 percent of global GDP—and over 500 million consumers, the pact offers significant long-term economic benefits for Britain. Although the initial economic gains are projected to be modest, the CPTPP is expected to expand in the coming years, compounding the benefits. Importantly, our membership of CPTPP embeds Britain as a rule-maker within a growing liberal bloc, allowing it to help shape the rules governing a region that will account for the majority of economic growth in the decades ahead. Deepening economic ties through the CPTPP also enables Britain to diversify its trade routes and reduce its economic dependencies on the United States and the European Union.

Beyond the CPTPP, Britain has concluded free trade agreements with states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as a recently finalized landmark deal with India—a traditionally protectionist economy. With 1.4 billion people and rapid economic growth, India is a market of major strategic importance. The deal cuts most tariffs and strengthens Britain’s “Strategic Partnership” with the world’s most populous nation and largest democracy. Britain has also sought to access and protect critical supply chains, signing agreements on minerals cooperation with Australia, Japan, and Indonesia, and joining the Minerals Security Partnership alongside other partners in the region. As rare earth minerals and raw materials become increasingly critical, it is vital that the government continues to strike similar agreements.

The Indo-Pacific’s expanding services sector and vast consumer markets offer immense potential. As the world’s second-largest exporter of services—with strengths in financial, legal, and professional domains—Britain is well-placed to meet this demand by using the City of London as a financial bridge between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Deeper links with financial hubs such as Singapore, Tokyo, and Mumbai would help direct capital and expertise into the region’s growing technological, infrastructural, and green sectors.

Over half of global maritime trade flows through the Indo-Pacific’s sea lanes, particularly the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. That is why strengthening our diplomatic presence and enhancing our defense capabilities in the region are so essential: to safeguard critical trade routes, uphold freedom of navigation, and protect our mutual prosperity.

The strategic benefits are also immense. We can ensure that London, not Beijing, captures this opportunity. As a counterweight to China, Britain should also expand development finance through tools such as British International Investment and UK Export Finance, supporting economic projects in the region. At the same time, Britain should seek to engage with, and ultimately join, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—fostering investment and integration across continents, while offering a serious liberal alternative to China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.

Beyond this, the United Kingdom must continue to pursue ambitious free trade agreements and regional initiatives to seize the economic opportunities presented by the Indo-Pacific’s economic potential. Following the deal with India, Britain ought to prioritize trade agreements with countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines—growing nations with youthful populations, increasing consumption, and rising strategic importance along vital maritime routes.

In essence, the economic opportunities presented by the Indo-Pacific are vast, with long-term benefits for jobs, investment, and prosperity at home. Strategically, deeper economic engagement also strengthens Britain’s hand in shaping the regional order, which demands a corresponding expansion of diplomatic and military reach to safeguard supply chains.

 

The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality

The Labour government has rightly acknowledged the region’s importance. The 2025 National Security Strategy affirmed that “the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is inextricably linked.” Britain’s presence at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore underscored a renewed commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Yet, though the “tilt” has established a foothold in the region, and the rhetoric offers significant promise, the government needs to go faster and further.

Overall, Britain’s permanent presence across the Indo-Pacific remains modest: a battalion in Brunei, logistics in Singapore, a training support unit in Kenya, and naval hubs in Oman and Bahrain. Moreover, the UK’s footprint is set to shrink further with the prospective return to Mauritius of the strategically vital Chagos Islands, which contain the Diego Garcia naval base that is currently leased to the United States.

Political will and economic resources to carry out the “tilt” are also in short supply. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, has conceded that Britain cannot be a “strong military force” in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific simultaneously, and urged “realism.” The Armed Forces remain underfunded and overstretched. We have the lowest number of troops since the nineteenth century, and the government is only on track to reach a defense spending level of 3 percent of GDP by 2034.

Furthermore, entities like the World Service and the British Council are on the brink, facing potential funding cuts in the coming Autumn Budget and the years ahead. The government’s decision to slash the overseas aid budget from 0.5 to 0.3 percent of national income by 2027 will erode Britain’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, where development spending, climate finance, and education remain vital instruments of engagement. With a major funding gap already deepened by Western cuts, many nations are instead turning to China and Russia to fill the void.

 

Policy Recommendations

The government should address the military constraints by playing to Britain’s unique ability to build coalitions and alliances. It should consider a “Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)”-type model for the Indo-Pacific. As in Northern Europe, a “JEF for the Indo-Pacific” could make full use of interoperability and intelligence-sharing to deepen defense cooperation, enhance maritime domain awareness, and enable rapid coordinated responses to regional crises. Thereby, we would bolster deterrence, resilience, and long-term stability across the region. London should also consider an “AUKUS-Plus” dialogue—bringing in partners such as Japan, South Korea, and India on advanced technologies such as cyber, AI, undersea capabilities, and space security. All this will cost money, so Britain needs to get to spending 3 percent of GDP on defense within the next two years.

Simultaneously, since our influence and credibility rest as much on soft power as hard power, the government must reinvest in tools like the BBC World Service, the British Council, and our diplomatic service. Restoring the development budget to the legally enshrined target of 0.7 per cent of national income is not an act of charity but an act of strategic common sense. Overseas aid is a pillar of British influence—projecting stability, values, and partnership. In the Indo-Pacific, a revitalized program would offer a credible, values-driven alternative to China’s model.

In parallel, the government should fully seize the economic opportunities created by the Indo-Pacific’s inexorable rise. Our accession to the CPTPP must serve as a springboard for deeper regional engagement: pursuing further trade agreements, exploring participation in IMEC, and using our CPTPP membership to bring in new partners and shape the rules of commerce across the fastest-growing region. We should also expand bilateral economic partnerships in strategically vital sectors such as critical minerals, semiconductors, and clean technology.

The government should make clearer that security in Europe and Asia is indivisible. Britain should use its voice and influence to knit these theatres together: institutionalizing regular dialogue between NATO and key Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea to integrate threat assessments and military planning across theatres. It should also promote transcontinental exercises and interoperability—linking AUKUS and NATO air and naval assets—thereby ensuring a cohesive deterrent posture from the Baltic to the Pacific, a “Community of Deterrence” which saves us from being defeated in detail and keeps us all safe.

Of course, these measures should be flanked with an attempt to reduce political tensions with China, so long as this does not compromise core principles. For example, while the UK should help to deter a PRC attack on Taiwan, it should join with others in discouraging the island from declaring independence because that might needlessly precipitate an invasion.

Ultimately, Britain’s future influence and credibility will depend on its willingness to think and act globally. The Indo-Pacific is not a distant arena, but the frontline of the coming confrontation—one that will determine whether liberal open societies or authoritarian powers will write and shape the rules of the decades ahead. By playing to its historic strengths—alliance-building, diplomacy, and soft power—Britain can once again play a leading role in defending a free and open international order.

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