Jürgen Hardt is Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the CDU-CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, having formerly served as the German Government’s Co-Coordinator for Transatlantic Cooperation.

Europe and America have long been natural allies, bound by shared values and more than two centuries of history. As a German politician and former Navy officer, I carry the memory of how my country and continent were safeguarded—economically and militarily—by the United States throughout the Cold War. That legacy means I begin from a deep, almost familial trust in our transatlantic partnership. Yet trust cannot be blind. It must be earned anew with each generation. Today, the Atlantic bond remains solid, but its foundations are being tested: a China seeking a new world order, a furiously belligerent Russia, and a less predictable America. These challenges do not loom on the horizon—they are sitting on the front porch of European politics. As the next chapter in European politics begins under German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, we must ask ourselves: How can we become an equal partner to the U.S. and give this alliance a new balance? I truly believe in the longevity of that bond—but a lot is at stake.

“The Atlantic bond remains solid, but its foundations are being tested” | Source: Guliver Image

From Seattle to Strasbourg, policymakers rightly celebrate the “democratic alliance” between Europe and the U.S. We need that optimism. Without it, cynicism would take hold. Still, words like “ally” and “friend” ring hollow if they are not backed by deeds. Europeans have sometimes taken America’s security guarantees and market access for granted. We polished our shoes on the U.S. peacekeeping shoulders, even as we spent too little on defense at home, bickered over quotas and red tape, and failed to share intelligence in real time. The new U.S. administration—and possibly the next ones—has already shown that Washington expects us to do better. We should not “start panicking” over these demands but rather accept legitimate concerns and expectations from our ally: strengthening our defense capability, protecting our trade interests, and defining our understanding of freedom. In short, Europe must man up—because these American demands are European needs. Like all European politicians, the “how” sometimes leaves me ill at ease, but the “what” has so far proven more than reasonable.

 

An Alliance Worth Believing In

The U.S.-EU relationship has been a boon for both sides. When I look back, I see Europe’s many transformations—from the rubble of World War II to the prosperity of today—and I remember who made that possible. History tells us two things. First, Europe’s strength has always been multiplied through partnership with the United States, not achieved in isolation. Nothing about trade tariffs or defense companies should blind us to the fact that we owe our modern welfare to that postwar alliance. We became strong because America stood by us when it mattered. Second, that alliance cannot be taken for granted. If we forget where we came from, we risk losing the trust that future grand challenges will demand. Indeed, cooperation between America and Europe remains the only realistic way to shape global events. German politicians must urgently abandon the madman’s idea of a German Mittelmacht (a so-called “middle power”), meandering between the United States and China, behaving opportunistically in a way they brand as a more sovereign and implicitly “freer” way of doing politics. This is a complete lapse in judgment regarding Chinese goals and interests in Europe. As a member of multiple coalition treaty negotiation teams, I have been surprised by some naïve positions more than once.

We cannot expect the U.S. to bail us out of every crisis while we do nothing. If Europe were a household roommate, it would mean paying our share of the rent—not just mooching off American social services. And America’s own leadership may be less reliable in the years ahead. We are seeing that already: U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO or slap tariffs on our exports once again remind us how fragile our security arrangement can be. Even the ostentatiously friendly characters like former Presidents Joseph Biden and Barack Obama turned their gaze to China or the Pacific, and this development will—and must—continue if the U.S. is to get a handle vis-à-vis China. This must not come at the expense of Europe, as long as we support the U.S. in this huge challenge. The only way to make America behave as a true partner is to behave as a true partner ourselves.

 

Europe’s Wake-Up Call

NATO’s June 2025 summit in The Hague marked the dawn of an ambitious new era. The Alliance decided to embrace a 5 percent defense investment target by 2035, split into 3.5 percent for core military spending and 1.5 percent for broader security needs—covering everything from cyber defense to military infrastructure. This historic compromise reflects confidence in collective strength.

Key to delivering this breakthrough was German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, who threw his full weight behind NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s pragmatic formula, helping to shift EU partners toward agreement. Wadephul signaled that Germany is ready not just to meet expectations, but to lead—reinforcing both NATO’s credibility and the resolve of Chancellor Merz’s new government.

Cybersecurity is another Achilles’ heel. Americans complain that our police are still calling them for help on digital crime. U.S. agents feed child pornography leads back to Europe on a daily basis. That’s the blunt reality: even in the fight against these despicable crimes, data protection and privacy laws have, for decades, impeded our police agencies, which must turn to the U.S. for assistance. If we’re going to be treated as equals, we must invest in our own cyber police, border controls, and intelligence networks—so we’re not always wearing the jerseys of a junior partner.

The same goes for trade and economics. For years, some in Europe tried to appease America with protectionist gestures (remember those early Trump-era threats of steel tariffs?). We have learned that ill will is not overcome by cozy talk—but rather by tangible concessions. But we must also remind the U.S. that protectionism hurts both sides. We share the world’s largest trading relationship: European companies employ millions of Americans, and vice versa. If Washington tries to wall us out with tariffs or digital taxes, Brussels will retaliate in kind—but that is not what either side truly wants. The answer is not a revived old dream like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which failed on both ends, but a new spirit of cooperation on tech standards, a joint digital industrial policy, or common green-industry initiatives. We should not demonize each other’s data rules or carbon plans, but work to synchronize them when we can. After all, if one day our automotive industry and Mittelstand champions fall behind Asia, we need a single Atlantic market to sustain us.

 

The China Conundrum

Beijing is the one power that truly challenges both the American military presence and the European economy at the same time. Yet Europe has been slow to realize it. Until recently, the EU tiptoed around China as a market and minor ally, passing the buck to the Americans on strategic rivalry. Now our governments finally admit the truth: China is a partner in some ways, a competitor in many, and a systemic rival where basic values are concerned. In the EU, a new “de-risking” toolkit of regulations—from anti-subsidy laws to stricter investment screening—is emerging. Some commissioners are openly saying Europe needs to align with Washington in holding China to account. This shift is positive and was called for in the German CDU-CSU’s China strategy, written while our coalition was in opposition.

Still, coordination is lagging. Some European leaders have shown great reluctance to take the same hard line as the United States on China’s unfair trade policies and economic subsidies. We saw Brussels finally levy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles—but only after the carmakers in Detroit and Silicon Valley demanded it. We need to go further, together. If Washington widens sanctions on Chinese tech giants or sets tougher export controls, Europe shouldn’t dither because one member state wants to keep Huawei in its 5G. We also can’t confuse China with America’s ideological foe. Beijing tests authoritarian limits, funds Putin’s war machine, and tries to pry us apart—yet it’s not a “threat to destroy the international order” in quite the same way as a nuclear-armed Russia. Europe and America will sometimes have slightly different short-term interests vis-à-vis China (say, tariffs on agriculture or cars), but our long-term interests are the same: a free Pacific, a fair global marketplace, and a limit on tech hegemony. We must speak with one voice there. Every time a French farmer is upset about corn imports or a German carmaker frets about China’s EVs, the whole alliance feels a ripple. If we want a collective China policy, we must develop it collectively—and then reinforce it across the Atlantic.

 

Cybersecurity and Defense: Europe’s Work Cut Out

Europe fights twenty-first-century wars in slower and less effective ways than America. We have not yet created a U.S.-style Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) for the whole EU; our EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is just getting started. Many European nations still refuse to join rapid-sharing intelligence networks. When Russian hackers or Chinese spies target European infrastructure, we tend to request confirmation from the Kremlin, whereas the U.S. is already responding with digital means. The bigger Chinese and Russian cyber threats loom, the more worrisome that becomes—and we have not internalized Kyiv’s lessons fast or deeply enough.

When it comes to the defense industry, we remain fragmented. We have the Eurofighter jet, the NH90 helicopter, the Puma and Boxer infantry tanks, and the Leopard heavy tank—but not one European soldier has all that equipment interoperable on the same battlefield, because each country kept picking its favorite. America’s Defense Department works with a unified industry that can deliver everything from F-35 fighter jets to Javelin missile systems seamlessly to its forces. Europe, by contrast, still argues about who buys whose submarine. We simply cannot continue like this.

I know that Merz’s government will try to change that. We need clear signals: joint procurement projects, a European Defence Fund that works, and a credible doctrine to use the forces we buy. If Washington sees Europe sending business-as-usual letters about Franco-German tiffs, as a former Transatlantic Coordinator under Merkel, I can guarantee a shrug. If we jointly announce a plan to funnel billions into pan-European missile defense or AI-driven drones, even the Pentagon will perk up. It must be clear—for the sake of transatlantic relations—that European rearmament must avoid duplicating industrial capacities with the U.S. wherever possible. There is so much to do, and money is being spent so fast, and the U.S. does have fields where it lacks capacity—we cannot engage in an intra-NATO battle over those sectors within defense that provide the most jobs.

We’ve recently had examples of Europe stepping up. Look at Ukraine, which has been a testbed. The European armament industry—Belgium’s Leopard tanks, Germany’s IRIS-T missiles, Italian drones—has started delivering real support, albeit slowly. If it hadn’t been for the U.S. Congress and American surges of arms, Kyiv might have slipped further. But together we did something astonishing: we have armed a country at war more effectively than any in history, all the while reforming this country on many levels toward a more resilient structure that serves its purpose not only in wartime but also in addressing its citizens’ needs. That’s a success we should trumpet—but also one we should learn from. It shows that when Europe does its part, the Atlantic alliance can move mountains. It also shows that Russia can be slowed only by united action. The lesson is clear: next time the eastern flank trembles, we must respond in hours, not months.

We must also remember those we left just outside our door. Moldova is tiny, but it sits between us and Ukraine like a cork in a bottle. If Ukraine falls, the waves of destabilization will pound on Chisinau’s door immediately. Germany, France, and Poland have already said they will support Moldova and even help it get closer to the EU—but the truth is, we can no longer treat our neighborhood as optional. Our fellow EU partners in the Baltics, too, feel the cold breath of Moscow. That is why the presence of German, British, and Canadian troops is so crucial, and we should see even more of that—in training missions, troop rotations, air-policing—so that if the Kremlin thinks again about slicing through the Baltic or Balkan corridor, it sees a united wall. That means joint European battlegroups, simultaneous deployment plans, and emergency budgets that can activate on short notice—and possibly more German troops abroad, invited by Eastern European partners.

 

Shared Burdens in the Americas and Beyond

A saying in international relations goes: “The U.S. plays in its own hemisphere first.” Fair enough. But friends help each other—even in their respective backyards. If Latin America teeters into crisis, or Africa’s markets erupt in chaos due to climate or conflict, the U.S. will pay attention. If Europe stays aloof, we look parochial. I’ve met Latin American leaders from Mexico to Argentina who frankly wish Europe would show up more often—with development projects, trade talks, and even military exercises. If they see only U.S. ships in the Caribbean or U.S. envoys brokering peace, they assume Europe either doesn’t care or can’t.

Let’s imagine a continent-to-continent example: when drug cartels pump resources into Mexico, when China builds ports in Brazil, or when Venezuela collapses, the implications are global. Europe has the competence—economic, technological, and yes, military if needed—to pitch in. We can back the U.S.: send in aid convoys, invest in Latin American industries, and share intelligence on narco-routes. In a world of great-power competition, Europe shining brightly next to America in those regions would multiply the effect. The logic of alliances is that you carry each other’s weight—even outside your comfort zones. By contrast, the stalled momentum behind EU-Mercosur trade has only left losers. This is an endeavor we urgently need to reinvigorate.

 

The Economic Front: Trade, Tech, and Investment

Let’s not reduce transatlantic relations to weapon systems and warzones. The EU and the U.S. are each other’s largest investors and largest export markets after China. That gives us incredible leverage and shared interest. Technology, trade rules, green energy—these are the battlegrounds where we shape the future, and we’re supposed to be on the same side. We should end those futile squabbles—or at least contain them. A transatlantic free-trade agreement is unlikely anytime soon, but we can do much more to align standards on digital privacy, green industrial subsidies, and semiconductor supply. America’s CHIPS Act and Europe’s Chips Act are both pouring billions into new factories. Why not commit to sharing production lines and research projects? If we openly compete with one another to fund every individual plant, China and Taiwan will win the race by default. Instead, a coordinated approach would show that together we outspend any rival.

Another issue is regulation. Europe can’t snooze while America sets the global internet rules—and vice versa. On 5G and 6G networks, our security standards need to match. On AI ethics, perhaps our frameworks can at least be compatible, so companies operate in a single market. The exclusion of touchy topics like our different understandings of free speech must not hinder finding common ground on the other 95 percent of AI topics. On debt crises and inflation, if Europe turns to red ink and America slams interest rates, global markets panic out of confusion. Every time we prove that we can come to agreements at summits—be it Airbus subsidies, vaccine production, or even sending moon rocks into space—faith is built. Conversely, if a French phone company is blocked by U.S. law and Europe retaliates by taxing Californian tech, we damage the patient. A mature transatlantic partnership must manage trade fights without losing sight of the larger benefit of free exchange.

 

A New Momentum Under Merz

Germany’s new government under Friedrich Merz could be a game-changer. Merz has long been an advocate of strong transatlantic ties, and he understands business like few others. He also campaigned on a platform of rebuilding German strength after the previous administration’s more cautious approach. Germany has woken up to the fact that European security cannot wait for voters to commit new money during awkward election years. Chancellor Merz might turn out to be what Angela Merkel never quite was in her final years—a friendly face for Washington. Europe should seize the new energy that comes with the change in Berlin. We should spend any new credibility we gain by offering concrete proposals—and businessman Merz knows that.

I am fundamentally optimistic about Europe and the U.S. Together, we have so much going for us: common values, shared veterans, tremendous economic interdependence, and, crucially, a bedrock of trust from decades of cooperation. None of that has disappeared overnight. But alliances require continual maintenance. There is no guarantee that the future will give us a friendly America or a well-tuned Europe without effort. The good news is that we can take charge of our fate.

In practical terms, this means Europe must earn its keep. We do that by first being frank about our shortcomings (defense, cyber, unity), and then by decisively addressing them. We should welcome America’s help against high-tech crime and use it as motivation to double our own capacity. We should work every day to align on China and Russia strategies, rather than complain when disagreement surfaces. We should show up—financially, politically, and even militarily—in places like Moldova or Latin America to prove we’re not freeloading on U.S. leadership. And at home, we in Europe must resolve our intra-national squabbles with the seriousness that the transatlantic audience deserves.

The bottom line: being a good ally means sometimes doing the hard work behind the scenes, not just cheering on social media. If Europe can summon the discipline to address these problems—even those we may not want to fix—we will show the U.S. that Europe is finally “manning up,” and our partnership will not only survive the Trump scare; it will thrive as never before.

Looking ahead, we stand at a fork in the road. One path leads to gentle coasting on past laurels until the next crisis hits, forcing us to scramble. The other path leads to a proactive, energetic Europe that leverages transatlantic friendship to build security, prosperity, and justice for both sides of the Atlantic. I know which path I want to take. Germany—and Europe—may have had politicians slow to recognize the change ahead. But now, guided by new leadership and clear-eyed realism, I believe we will step forward boldly.

Because that is what allies do. We face the music together, we do our jobs, and we trust that by behaving like full partners, we will be treated as such. The challenges—from Latin America to the Baltics, from cyber threats to statecraft—are real, and they are serious. But none are beyond our reach if Europe and the United States stand together to face them. The future of this continent, and indeed of the transatlantic family, can be bright—as long as we make it so.

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