Kostantinos A. Karamanlis is a former Prime Minister of Greece.

The war in Ukraine has acted as a catalyst for redefining the direction of the European edifice. Just as the end of World War II marked the construction of the European Community, this war could also become the cause for a forward momentum within the framework of the European vision. The challenge for the next decade will be to see the European Union become stronger, more cohesive, more independent, and with a larger and more credible footprint on the international stage.

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine took us back to a dark past that was widely believed to have been left behind, as large-scale war on European soil should be unthinkable in the twenty-first century—especially in Europe, which has a long and painful history of wars. The EU was caught unprepared. The significant power deficit that characterizes it was, once again, revealed, along with its consequent inability to support its decisions and shape developments on its own continent. This led to a great awakening.

The Hellenic Parliament overlooks Syntagma Square in Athens, a symbolic center at the heart of southern Europe | Source: Shutterstock

Due to the EU’s deficiencies, it was the United States that took the lead in establishing a unified stance for the West in this crisis and in providing substantial military support to Ukraine. The U.S. had no strong incentives to bring the war to a rapid end, since it does not suffer its consequences to the same extent as the EU, for whom they proved particularly painful. However, the new U.S. administration—reluctant to pursue a war in Europe—with its emphasis on power dramatically changed the equation. For the first time, the United States is withdrawing from competition with Russia and is willing to approach and cooperate with Moscow, even in the midst of a war in Europe. Hence, the position in which the EU found itself demonstrates the Union’s current inadequacy on the international stage, the inability to execute on its decisions for its own continent, and the path it should follow in the next decade. The way the Union attempted to respond—in a state of shock, with meetings in various configurations and with non-EU countries—is telling. The result was that Europe and Ukraine were ultimately dragged into a peace process under the most unfavorable conditions possible. This outcome strays far from the principles of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, for which the West was supposedly fighting until recently. At the same time, the EU appears repeatedly unprepared to implement its policies, while trailing behind strategies formulated by others on its own continent. It is, therefore, crucial that the Union finally address the power deficit that prevents it from materializing its decisions—even for its own continent and its future. This can be achieved by acquiring the necessary defense tools and strong leadership.

 

Ending the War in Ukraine

The EU has failed to take initiatives for a ceasefire, an end to the war, and a return to the negotiating table—possibly on the basis of the Minsk agreements. It is Europe that should assume the leading role in seeking a diplomatic solution, stabilizing the situation, relieving the Ukrainian people, and shaping the new European security architecture.

The end of the war is of crucial importance for everyone, as further prolongation carries grave risks:

First, there is a possibility that the war will expand beyond Ukrainian territory—either to the wider neighboring region or further afield—whether intentionally or by miscalculation. This would risk an uncontrolled escalation, potentially on a global level. Even the use of nuclear weapons is not entirely out of the question.

Second, an international landscape is already taking shape, suggesting a return to the Cold War. Yet the new Cold War will not represent a revival of the old one, but something much worse and more unpredictable. This is due to two particular reasons. One, there was a clear dividing line in the past, with the tacit understanding that neither side would violate the other’s red lines. And two, the bipolar world that emerged out of the ashes of World War II—despite its frictions and climaxes—contained an element of stability that is completely absent in today’s multipolar world. In other words, tensions and conflicts today will unfold in a far more uncertain and unstable environment.

Third, a scenario is already emerging that carries the risk of a West-Russia confrontation taking on global dimensions, evolving into a clash between the West and a broad anti-Western front. These are countries that, for their own reasons, believe the post-Cold War international system—political, economic, monetary—was shaped according to the priorities of the West (and is largely controlled by it to the detriment of their own interests). In response, they could choose to unite in a front that questions, opposes, or even undermines the functioning of this system. Such a convergence between Russia, China, Iran, India, and other medium-sized or rising international actors would constitute a major challenge for the West and would herald tectonic shifts in the existing rules of the game, with undefined consequences and an uncertain final outcome of such a confrontation.

Fourth, the prolongation of the war makes it nearly impossible to effectively address global challenges that require urgent, worldwide understanding and cooperation—such as climate change.

Finally, the effects on the economy are grim, as demonstrated by disruptions in the energy sector, the supply chain, prices, production, and trade. For Europe in particular, these have led to stagnation and inflation, as the effort to wean itself off Russian hydrocarbons is proving costly.

This last parameter also has serious social implications, as it leads to growing dissatisfaction and unrest within society. Especially in the energy sector, European societies are being seriously affected. The prolonged economic crisis, combined with the one that struck European societies in the past decade, has a tangible impact on social peace and the broader quality of democracy—particularly in Europe. If one considers the widening of social inequalities worldwide, as the distribution of wealth continues to concentrate in fewer hands while an increasing number of social groups are marginalized, the outlook becomes even more unfavorable. In this context, social cohesion—a prerequisite for a healthy democracy—is at stake. At the same time, the prolongation of the war raises concerns about the quality of public life and information. Although it is true that in times of war there is some control over the free flow of information and freedom of expression, the arbitrary exclusion of opposing media, dissenting views, or any form of critical thinking is deeply troubling. All these are ominous signs for the overall health of our political system. The danger of delegitimizing parliamentary democracies in the eyes of growing segments of the population is imminent. We are already witnessing disappointment and disillusionment among an increasing portion of our fellow citizens. If the trend continues, the very foundations of our social and political order will be at risk. 

Since this war is so destructive and its prolongation entails multiple dangers, terminating it is an urgent task. In the end, all participants have nothing but to lose from its continuation. First and foremost the victim, Ukraine, with enormous losses in human lives and material destruction. But also the aggressor, Russia, which has suffered significant losses, serious costs from sanctions, and enormous damage to its reputation, regardless of the military outcome. Finally, the war reflects badly on Europe too, which is already experiencing the negative consequences of the conflict and will pay a very heavy price for its perpetuation.

 

The New EU Defense Architecture

After World War II, and during the Cold War that followed, American commitment to the security of Europe was essential. This was justified both by the need for European reconstruction—which left little room for a strong defense—and by the scale of the USSR’s military power. But even then, and even more so after the end of the Cold War, the United States kept urging Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own continent’s security.

Nevertheless, the EU continued to take American commitment for granted. At the same time, there was a perception that the days of major wars on European soil were definitively over. The outbreak of war in Ukraine, in the heart of Europe was the first major shock for European states. However, the biggest shock came from the realization that the U.S. security guarantee that Europe had relied on for all these years is no longer a given.

Today, the EU must understand that the grace period is over and that it cannot continue to rely on American forces for its security—nor can it expect that a change of government in the U.S. will once again ensure the defense cover that Washington has long provided. The shift in American focus from Europe to Asia has been evident already over the past decade. American society is also changing, and it believes that the United States should not shoulder the burden of European security. Therefore, the EU must accept that there is no going back and must immediately promote the necessary initiatives that will allow it to become self-sufficient in the defense sector.

The current effort to build up the EU’s defense capacity is nothing new. The Union has already wavered in this direction since the Cold War, culminating in the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which in reality has proven to be a half-measure. The hastening of efforts now underway, combined with a lack of clear political will, are leading to initiatives that are sloppy and lacking a comprehensive plan.

A correct strategic assessment of the international environment should be an important first step. Today’s world is returning to a realpolitik of spheres of influence and brute force as a means of settling international disputes, with complete disregard for the rule of law, international treaties, and organizations. It is a return to the competition among great and rising powers. In this context, the trend toward a much more multipolar world is becoming stronger, increasingly challenging the primacy of the West and the rules-based order it has imposed on the international system—a world sliding into a state of international anarchy, where violence imposes the law of the strongest, and is characterized by fragmentation, revisionism, and hegemonic aspirations. This environment increases instability, unpredictability, and danger. In this context, the course of events on the Ukrainian front is a strategic challenge for the collective West—and now, even more so, for the EU. The Union’s credibility is judged here by its inability to support its decisions with sufficient military capacity. This lack of credibility is reflected in the EU’s position on the international stage, as well as in its deterrence capacity. Furthermore, the Union must realize that the dangers in its region are far greater than it acknowledges, and stem not only from the east—that is, as some believe, from Russia—but also from the south, namely from Turkey and other sources of instability along its southern borders.

This assessment of the international environment, and the member states’ awareness of the challenges it poses for the EU, should also lead to the demonstration of the necessary political will on their part to build a truly unified EU defense. These challenges presuppose substantial steps toward a genuinely common foreign and defense policy. Ultimately, they require European unification—the vision that inspired the great leaders of the European idea. Unfortunately, to date, the European edifice has remained incomplete and does not meet the expectations of its visionaries. The EU is consumed by introversion and indecision, often appears divided, and adopts short-sighted policies that temporarily conceal, rather than resolve, its problems. As for the Union’s geopolitical role, it is equally disappointing that a union of states comprising some of the world’s most powerful countries—politically, economically, and militarily—has not managed to translate this union into actual power. This is because, in reality, it has not succeeded in achieving a basic understanding, a fundamental alignment among member states behind the core principles and values of the European edifice. The awareness of a common European identity, a shared destiny, and genuine solidarity has not been achieved: not just assisting one another, but addressing each other’s problems as common European issues. Solidarity, in particular, has not yet been embedded in the member states—not necessarily as a moral value, but as a pragmatic realization that the particular interests of each are better served when the European edifice is strong. On the contrary, the defense of member states’ narrow interests has prevailed over the defense of our pan-European principles and values, which are precisely what defines us and makes our Union unique. At the same time, EU self-confidence—the awareness of participation in a global power with international influence and a meaningful role—has also not been achieved.

In addition, it is very important to recognize another key issue. For the EU’s defense capability to be effective and serve as a real tool for supporting the Union’s decisions, values, and interests, it must avoid any form of dependency. It is already evident that American priorities are distancing Washington from the defense of European territory. Moreover, reliance on NATO for the same purpose is no longer a panacea. The expressed ambiguity surrounding the binding nature of Article 5 is a first warning sign. We should also be prepared for the possibility that the United States may steer NATO toward addressing challenges in other parts of the world. The trend toward transforming NATO into a global security organization and promoting so-called global partnerships is telling. In such a case, NATO assets will not be sufficient to address two simultaneous high-intensity conflicts. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the EU to acquire an autonomous defense capability that does not depend on the U.S. or NATO. The same applies to any dependencies on so-called like-minded non-EU partners. If the Union wishes to develop a defense capability that can effectively protect its own principles and interests—and not become hostage to the aspirations of others—it must make the bold decisions that will allow it to stand on its own feet and avoid depending on third parties once more.

A typical example is the attempt to integrate Turkey into the new EU defense architecture. Turkey has a very low rate of alignment with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) statements and decisions. Its avoidance of imposing sanctions against Russia is the most indicative. Turkey has also adopted a neo-Ottoman, revisionist, and aggressive policy by intervening militarily in all its neighboring countries and threatening them with war, in order to carve out its own zones of influence and defend what it considers its historical rights. It is currently militarily present in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Caucasus, and the Balkans (in Albania and Kosovo). It occupies 37 percent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, while constantly threatening Greece with war, claiming 152 of Greece’s islands in the Aegean Sea and, through its Blue Homeland Doctrine, asserting claims over half of the Aegean and all of the Greek and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also threatens Israel with war, while promoting an Islamist agenda, as demonstrated by its support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other radical movements, and by its use of the Turkish and Islamist diaspora as a means of meddling in the domestic affairs and policies of EU member states. Most importantly, it leverages any influence it has over the EU as a means of pressure, as demonstrated by its state-organized, failed attempt at a massive migrant invasion at the Greek borders, in an effort to pressure the EU. Therefore, it is paradoxical that the EU seeks independence in the defense sector from the United States, only to become dependent on Turkey.

This last point raises another issue for the EU’s defense. The Union was built as a fundamentally values-based community. Therefore, for its defense policy to be credible, the EU must prove that it actually operates on the basis of principles and values, not broader geopolitical antagonisms. However, Greece, an EU member state, borders Turkey, which is considered a partner by most other members despite its revisionist objectives, constant threats of war against Greece, and frequent propensity to violence in support of its aspirations. Especially with regard to Cyprus, another EU member state, there is a glaring discrepancy in the stance of most allies and partners. That is, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine is condemned, sanctions are imposed, and the defender is supported in every way, the equivalent suffering of Cyprus—ongoing for almost half a century—is not addressed. Even worse, efforts have been made over time to promote solutions that place the aggressor and the victim on equal footing, even abolish the existing state entity of Cyprus, legitimize the illegal occupation, and place Cyprus in a hostage situation vis-à-vis Turkey, in complete contradiction to the European acquis. This mismatch seriously exposes those who claim to be fighting for values and principles and raises the suspicion that support for Ukraine is not driven by principles, but by geopolitical interests. In fact, this weakens the political, legal, and moral superiority of the Western narrative.

Therefore, the Union must build a strong defense mechanism with the capacity to intervene where required, without dependence on the U.S. or other non-member countries. Only in this way will the member states of the Union be able to feel safe, defend their own values and interests, and be capable of implementing their decisions.

Moreover, for the Union to exercise an autonomous foreign and defense policy based on its values and interests, it must become as independent as possible from all strategic dependencies. Or, at the very least, it should pursue diversification, so that alternatives are always available. In this direction, energy independence is crucial. Hence, the exploitation of the EU’s energy resources is a key issue in itself. Accordingly, the deposits of its member states in the Eastern Mediterranean—namely Greece and Cyprus—as well as the development of Renewable Energy Sources (especially in this resource-rich region) acquire great importance. Furthermore, the EU should prioritize transporting these resources, as much as possible, through its own territory to ensure its independence. In this context, the “solution” of transportation through Turkey would only render the Union hostage to Ankara’s blackmailing practices.

Therefore, the new challenges emerging today require bold decisions—ones that demand not only the necessary resources but also courageous political will. This is a great opportunity for the EU to agree on the fundamentals, correctly define the threats it faces, and identify its real interests. Decisive steps must finally be taken toward a common, autonomous European defense—a defense mechanism independent of NATO, with the will and capacity to defend the EU’s borders when, where, and if required. However, for this mechanism to be credible, the Union must avoid double standards, thereby confirming that it truly operates on the basis of principles, values, and International Law. In this context, European solidarity must not be demonstrated only on the EU’s eastern borders, but also in the south, where threats are equally present.

 

Challenges for the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans, a region with a past burdened by bloody conflicts, national antagonisms, economic and social instability, and a disproportionate presence of organized crime groups, requires Europe’s special attention. To these challenges, we should also add the still-open wounds of the Yugoslav civil wars, the unfortunate unilateral intervention of the West at the time, and the jockeying of great powers for spheres of influence in the region. Those who enthusiastically encouraged the forced and disorderly dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the discriminatory military intervention in the region, and the imposition of artificial solutions did not solve the problem. They have only made it more complicated and postponed it to the future.

The continuation of the war in Ukraine can be seen as an opportunity for the manifestation of separatist tendencies, conflicts, and even border changes. As the risk of war spilling over is visible in many directions, the most plausible and dangerous scenario is, of course, the powder keg of Europe—the Balkans. A region that has been located, both historically and very recently, between East and West, and which to this day harbors within itself the ambivalence between the West and Russia. And given that—whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine—the polarization between the West and Russia seems to be returning, the Balkans will likely once again become a field of confrontation between the two coalitions.

In Serbia, the wound of Kosovo remains open. The dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina continues to be fruitless and is a constant source of friction. The people are divided between the two camps—the West and Russia—especially since the memories and bitterness about NATO’s intervention remain alive. That is why Serbia is a country that should be treated with sensitivity. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its complex and dysfunctional state construction, continues to be plagued by division, while Republika Srpska has long displayed separatist tendencies that have alarmed the EU and the United States. Bosnia’s bid for NATO membership has been met with resistance from both Moscow and the country’s Serb entity. Consequently, any destabilization in Bosnia or Kosovo is almost certain to trigger chain reactions throughout the region. In Albania, corruption and organized crime are deeply entrenched, and issues of minority protection are still very problematic. In Skopje, irredentism is never-ending.

The European Union must therefore remain committed to this region and continue to reach out to the Western Balkan states, sending clear messages about the prospect of accession (still subject to full alignment with the European acquis, the conditions that have been set, and the principles and values of the Union).

Today, the Union is called upon to face an unpredictable and ever-changing environment—geopolitically, politically, economically, socially. This cannot be addressed with the tools of the past, nor can it be addressed with the usual balancing exercises. And, most importantly, it cannot be addressed by individual states. This last and only point is enough for us all to plan the future together by focusing on common challenges. With a vision and conviction that together we have already achieved a lot, and that this is the only way to become stronger. But it is crucial that now we become militarily self-sufficient and independent, able to stand on our own feet, enforce our principles and values, and protect the EU’s common borders and territorial integrity.

Back to Table of Contents