Stanislav Pritchin is Head of the Central Asia Sector at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO) RAS.

Russia sees cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus as one of the most important aspects of its foreign and domestic policy, due to a number of factors. The modern model of Russia’s relations with the countries of the region rests on a long history of interaction with neighbors, then as part of a single state within the Russian Empire, and later, the USSR. During the Soviet period, the region managed to create a unified financial, economic, and infrastructural system with common standards, norms, and rules of economic activity, as well as a unified labor distribution system. In this regard, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, maintaining a common economic space was required to sustain trade turnover and increase industrial cooperation. Russia’s borders with Central Asia and the Caspian region opened up opportunities to develop regional connectivity projects: from transport corridors to pipeline networks to China, Turkey, Iran, India, and others.

 

The most important factor in Russia’s cooperation with countries of Central Asia and the Caspian region is their geostrategic position. The two regions play a crucial role in ensuring the security of Russia’s southern borders. Historically, and largely thanks to Russia’s efforts, a system has been developed that includes joint military facilities and infrastructure—such as those within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a unified air defense system, a zone with no non-regional military facilities, and an expanded system of bilateral security agreements with each of the countries in the region.

 

From the point of view of the social and political space, Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus represent a visa-free region (with the exception of Turkmenistan), with a stable system of migration flows, primarily to Russia. Accordingly, any crises and conflicts in the region directly affect Russia itself in the form of migration flow surges, extremism exports, and terrorism. It is thus critically important for Moscow to maintain a high level of political trust with the countries of the region and establish institutions for joint action through a legislative framework that allows for a coordinated response to security challenges. Based on such deep interdependence, Russian diplomacy has sought to create conditions for ensuring security through the establishment of institutions and the formation of a regulatory framework. In Russian doctrinal documents, the post-Soviet space has occupied a priority position since the first Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 1993 and in subsequent editions, although the region’s real significance has not always aligned with its doctrinal position.

 

The beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in February 2022, and the subsequent systemic deterioration of relations with the West, marked a turning point in Russia’s relations with Eurasian countries. In a short period, Russia has qualitatively rebuilt relations with its neighbors, increased their share and importance in foreign trade, strengthened political and economic contacts, and formed a new package of strategic projects in the transport, energy, and investment spheres. These efforts have allowed Russia to maintain—and in many areas, strengthen—its influence in the region despite negative external factors.

Russia-led CSTO forces patrol the streets of Almaty after stabilizing the situation in January 2022. / Source: Shutterstock

Relations with Eurasian Countries Before 2022

In the 1990s, despite high levels of interdependence, the Central Asian vector was not among Russia’s real foreign policy priorities due to its own socio-economic problems. The first stage of relations with the region’s countries captures the period until 2000, which represents a “civilized divorce”—the separation of the political, economic, and ideological systems of the post-Soviet states. At the same time, the international legal framework for a new model of relations was formed during this period. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) became the main instrument of multilateral dialogue, and the main mission of the organization at this stage was above all else to mitigate the shocks of the “divorce.” The political model of interaction in the CIS format was mainly inert and reactive in nature, involving the use of existing and remaining factors of political and economic proximity from the Soviet period for cooperation, without initiating new forms and mechanisms to enhance interaction.

 

Russian policy in Eurasia noticeably picked up pace after Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. During the first year of his presidency, he visited or received high-level delegations from all Central Asian and South Caucasian republics without exception. The intensity of this dialogue remains unchanged to this day: the leaders of Russia and the states of the region regularly meet in bilateral and multilateral formats. Thus, personal dialogue at the highest level is one of the most important tools of Russian foreign policy in the region.

 

The intensification of diplomacy was accompanied by a revision of the main strategic documents. In July 2000, an updated Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was adopted, and the CIS countries, including the Central Asian republics, were designated as a priority area in terms of regional aspects of foreign policy. This provided a new impetus to regional cooperation. New multilateral initiatives emerged: in 2000, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established, which included all the Central Asian republics, with the exception of Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Belarus. The organization was designed to identify the core of the CIS member states most interested in deepening economic relations and to intensify economic integration in the region. The EurAsEC became the institutional basis for further, even more targeted, integration within the framework of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (2007-2010), then the Single Economic Space (2010-2014), and finally the Eurasian Economic Union (2014), with the addition of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in 2015.

 

Integration processes contributed to maintaining a high level of political communication between the leaders of the states of the region during this period. Alongside the dialogue on economic issues, discussions in the field of security also continued. Initially, Russia supported the United States and NATO’s anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001. However, over time, the growing presence of Western allies in the region began to be perceived as conflicting with Russian interests. One of the arguments supporting this thesis was the fact that the U.S. military used bases in the region, which contributed to spreading American influence and indirectly encouraged “color” revolutions, particularly in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Accordingly, Russia began taking steps to facilitate the gradual closure of American military facilities, primarily the Manas airbase. Due to intensive political dialogue, by 2014, Kyrgyzstan had closed the American airbase at the national airport. That same year, Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU, taking relations with Russia and other partners to a new level by adapting its legislation to the requirements and standards of the Union.

 

At the same time, Russia intensified cooperation with Uzbekistan, which, after the death of Islam Karimov in 2016, has been led by the country’s long-time Prime Minister, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. As the new leader of the country, Mirziyoyev quickly reshaped Uzbekistan’s foreign policy to meet the needs of a developing economy. Russia has become one of Uzbekistan’s most important economic development partners, serving as its main trading partner and largest investor. Taking into account the increasing importance of Eurasian integration for economic growth, Uzbekistan joined the EAEU as an observer in December 2020.

 

Security as the Basis for Cooperation

Despite internal political weakness and a complex set of internal problems in the 1990s, Russia remained the most important guarantor and mediator on security issues for all crisis and conflict points in the Central Asian and Caspian region. Until the 2000s, Russia guarded the southern borders of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, ensuring their security in the face of the spiraling Afghan crisis. Russia acted as the main mediator and guarantor in resolving the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997. It has also served as a mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as well as the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, on both the bilateral and multilateral bases. Complementing the security system in Central Asia within the framework of the CSTO is the existence of bilateral security agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which allow for a flexible and prompt response to various security challenges in the region. For example, after the withdrawal of American troops and their allies from Afghanistan in August 2021, the threat of destabilization on the border with Central Asia arose once again. To mitigate any risks emanating from Afghanistan, Moscow, together with its CSTO partners and non-member Uzbekistan, conducted a series of exercises on the southern border of the region, preparing joint actions in case of threats from Afghanistan.

 

Another striking example of Russia’s responsible approach to security and stability in Central Asia—and the effectiveness of the security system within the CSTO framework—is the involvement of the CSTO’s peacekeeping contingent in stabilizing the situation in protest-ridden Kazakhstan in January 2022. Largely due to the deployment of rapid reaction troops, the organization managed to normalize the situation in a matter of days and assist Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies in restoring order in Almaty and other major cities.

 

Russia maintains a number of military facilities in the region that are important elements of regional security, including the 201st base in Tajikistan and the CSTO air base in the Kyrgyz city of Kant, among others. All of these are crucial components of the overall regional security system.

 

Another important element of the Eurasian regional security system that involves China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which in 2001—following Uzbekistan’s accession to the previously existing Shanghai Treaty—was transformed into a full-fledged organization with a wide range of tasks aimed at jointly ensuring regional security and combating three key challenges: extremism, terrorism, and separatism. The organization systematically addresses major regional problems, including drug trafficking, terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Within the SCO framework, exercises are regularly organized with the participation of all member countries, and intensive work is carried out through special services and law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and other security challenges.

 

At the same time, there is a positive synergy in the interaction between the SCO and the CSTO. The first organization focuses on the broader Eurasian level, creating a constructive political agenda for a joint approach to regional security challenges, while the second remains a regional executive element of the security system with more developed mechanisms for ensuring internal political security and responding to external threats.

 

The SMO and a New Stage of Relations

Undoubtedly, the new stage of Russia’s interaction with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus began after Russia launched the special military operation in February 2022. Western sanctions significantly complicated political and economic cooperation with the region’s countries, jeopardizing the maintenance of strategic relations with the Russian Federation. Against the background of threats of secondary sanctions, Russia’s geopolitical partners and competitors in Eurasia, primarily China, Turkey, the Persian Gulf countries, the European Union, South Korea, and others, became noticeably more active. The period between 2022 and 2024 is when various kinds of engagement summits in the region peaked. The summits in the “Central Asia + 1” format in particular, have become a powerful impetus for the region’s countries to diversify foreign relations and reinforce multi-vector foreign policies. Another important ideological aspect influencing relations between Russia and Central Asia was the perception by some regional elites of their position by analogy with the Ukrainian one, and the fear of possible harsh steps by Moscow in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This topic is actively promoted by Western instruments of influence in the region—most notably the media and the non-governmental sector.

 

However, even under Western pressure and the intensification of geopolitical projects by Russia’s competitors, the strategic nature of Moscow’s relations with the region has not changed. On the contrary, over the past three years, Russia has systematically intensified its political, economic, and investment contacts with countries of the region.

 

First of all, trust-based political dialogue at the highest levels is intensively developing. The number of contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his counterparts in the region usually exceeds the combined contacts of the leaders of the Eurasian countries with Russian geopolitical competitors. Moscow remains the main external partner of the region’s countries and plays the role of the most important external “legitimizer” of elections and other political processes taking place in the countries of Central Asia.

 

The institutional framework of political interaction is maintained through integration processes. The existence of multiple cooperation formats—including the more inclusive but less binding CIS, the economic integration of the EAEU, and security-focused organizations such as the SCO and CSTO—alongside bilateral agreements and an extensive legislative framework, creates a stable foundation for dialogue and cooperation. Furthermore, the developed system of contacts at regional and departmental levels makes Russia a strategic partner. These factors allow Moscow to create unified legal and institutional superstructures, providing a stable basis for dialogue and cooperation. Relative to other external players in the region—like China, Turkey, and the West—Moscow has the widest range of tools at its disposal, including institutions with a balanced and detailed legal framework for deepening multilateral cooperation.

 

In recent years, Russia has become the region’s main partner and its main energy security guarantor. One of the most breakthrough and promising projects, announced during the visit of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Moscow in December 2022, is a project to create a “triple gas union,” which can positively impact the energy security of not only the announced participants—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—but also Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

 

The fact is that all the necessary infrastructure for natural gas supplies to the region already exists: the Central Asia-Center main gas pipeline system, originally built to supply Central Asian gas to Russia and European countries. For Kazakhstan, the creation of the “triple gas union” will resolve the issue of the resulting shortage of natural gas in the domestic market. Thus, according to forecasts by the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan, a gas deficit of 1.7 billion cubic meters is expected in 2023. According to the country’s Energy Minister Bolat Akchulakov, Kazakhstan is conducting preliminary negotiations with Russia’s Gazprom on increasing gas purchases. The specific volumes will depend on the speed and breadth of the country’s gasification plans. Initially, as early as 2025, supplies may amount to 4 billion cubic meters, and in the future, up to 10 billion cubic meters per year.

 

At the same time, Kazakhstan has a very low level of gasification in its regions, especially in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The implementation of the trilateral cooperation plans will allow Kazakhstan—in addition to receiving transit payments for the transportation of Russian raw materials to Uzbekistan—to partially solve the problem of gas supply to its northern and eastern regions.

 

The problem of gas shortage is acute for Uzbekistan today. Taking into account the fact that 80 percent of electricity generation takes place at gas-fired thermal power plants, as well as the development of the gas chemical industry of the republic’s economy, stable supplies of natural gas are in urgent need. Among the country’s neighbors, only Russia and Turkmenistan can meet its growing needs, and the latter already uses most of its gas for domestic consumption and export to China. At the same time, Turkmenistan’s capabilities are quite limited due to high domestic consumption and commitments to supply raw materials to China.

 

Thus, the list of potential beneficiaries of a gas alliance between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan includes neighbors in the region—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the latter, Gazprom is already the owner of the local GTS and ensures its gas supply. The export of Russian raw materials to the region, particularly Uzbekistan—which until recently was Kyrgyzstan’s main supplier of raw materials—will ensure uninterrupted direct supplies for the needs of the Kyrgyz Republic.

 

Nuclear power generation is an extremely promising and reliable long-term source of electricity for Central Asian countries. The impressive reserves of uranium in the region (with Kazakhstan being the largest supplier of uranium to the world market with a share of 42 percent), and the existing facilities for processing this type of fuel in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, together with the capabilities of the Russian Rosatom, create prerequisites for an integrated interaction in nuclear energy—from extraction, processing to the construction of several nuclear power plants in the region. A nuclear power plant construction project in Uzbekistan is in its most advanced stage. In May 2024, during President Putin’s visit to Tashkent, an agreement was signed on the construction of six small nuclear power plant units with a total capacity of 330 MW until 2033. After holding a national referendum on nuclear energy, Kazakhstan is also considering the possibility of building a nuclear power plant, having already chosen a site for the station in the proximity of Lake Balkhash. Again, Russian Rosatom is considered one of the potential partners for the construction of these nuclear power plants.

 

Kyrgyzstan also has plans to build small nuclear power plants on its territory. In particular, in January 2023, the Minister of Energy stated that the country was considering the option of jointly building two small nuclear power plant units with Russian Rosatom, each with a capacity of 55 MW.

 

The threats of secondary sanctions against the region’s countries as a tool of reducing cooperation with Russia has had limited effects in practice. The success of Western companies was the curtailment of direct cooperation in the banking sector. Russian banks were forced to sell their assets in the region and reduce their presence. The countries refused to use the Russian Mir payment system under Western pressure. At the same time, in economic terms, despite the threat of sanctions, Russia has significantly increased trade with all its neighbors in Eurasia since 2022, maintaining its status as the most important trading partner and investor in the region. The number of companies with Russian ownership participation in Kazakhstan has reached 23,000 enterprises (more than 50 percent of all companies with foreign ownership shares), and 3,000 in Uzbekistan (about 25 percent of the total number).

 

In humanitarian and educational cooperation, Russia also retains the status of the region’s most important partner. Thus, Russian universities and their branches in the region are a key external provider of educational services to students from Central Asian countries, with about 20 branches of Russian universities operating in the region. And when it comes to educational migration, Russia remains the primary destination for applicants, with about 10 percent of all students in Kazakhstan enrolled in Russian universities. This means that for a significant portion of Central Asian youth, Russia remains an attractive and promising partner, offering an educational and cultural system they trust and to which they are prepared to tie their future.

Thus, by using its strengths and the region’s pressing need to diversify foreign policy and economic relations, Russia has not only maintained its influence but has also intensified and deepened its cooperation with countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus since February 2022. Furthermore, by capitalizing on the region’s strong demand for investment and technology—particularly in the energy sector—Russia continues to reinforce its status as a key partner by offering a range of strategically significant projects. Western attempts to hinder the deepening cooperation between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Russia through mere threats of sanctions—without providing viable alternative projects or markets—have largely failed.

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