Kurt Volker is a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and a former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goals are crystal clear. Indeed, amid all the distracting disinformation coming out of Russia, Putin has spoken and written about his objectives quite openly and consistently. He has compared himself to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. He seeks to re-build the Russian Empire, taking over lands from other countries that he feels rightfully belong to Russia (such as Ukraine and Moldova), and dominating other neighboring countries as perceived parts of the “Russian World.” He has disparaged post-Cold-War European security architecture as unfair and violated key elements of the Helsinki Principles. As part of his strategy, Putin seeks to strategically weaken and divide the West, because the West is the only source of potentially effective resistance to his designs.

 

There are no borders to this “Russian World.” Indeed, Putin’s 2024 presidential campaign slogan was, “Russia has no borders.” For Russia itself, he seeks to annex parts of Ukraine and to physically control, if not entirely annex, parts of Georgia and Moldova. He is always on the lookout for possible gains in Kazakhstan, the Baltic States, and other parts of the former Soviet Union, especially where there are Russian-speaking people.

 

Putin’s vision of the “Russian World” extends to the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions at a minimum. Yet he has also sought to project Russian influence globally in order to build advantageous relationships, gain access to sources of external wealth, and weaken and distract potential opposition to his goals in Eurasia.

Deterrence through investment in the military industrial capacity / Source: Guliver Image

Putin’s Black Sea Strategy: Ukraine and Beyond

Central to Putin’s vision of re-establishing the Russian Empire is the elimination of Ukraine. He has constructed an entire, false historical narrative in which Russians and Ukrainians are all one people, in which Moscow is the sole natural heir of the Kievan Rus, and where anyone who believes themselves to be Ukrainian is either a fascist or has been brainwashed by the West. Never mind that Kyiv was a thriving city when Moscow was just a forest, or that the means and timing of Russia’s military conquests of Ukraine are well-documented throughout history. Putin wants the world to believe that Ukraine was always Russian in order to justify his aggression today.

 

Putin is also afraid that a successful Ukrainian democracy would undermine the rationale for his authoritarian rule inside Russia: Russian citizens might ask, “If Ukrainians can live in freedom, why can’t we?” This would undermine the legitimacy not only of Putin’s war against Ukraine, but of his rule inside Russia. The Russian Federation is always at risk of unravelling internally because it is not truly a nation-state, but an Empire in itself, made up of many different nationalities who were subdued by Russia through various conquests under multiple tsars. This is why one of the first steps Putin took as President of Russia was to abolish the direct election of regional governors, as they could represent a source of political legitimacy greater than Moscow itself.

 

The desire to rewrite the historical record is the main reason for Putin’s genocidal policies against Ukraine, which are inherent to his conduct of the war: kidnapping and indoctrinating children; destroying historical sites, monuments and buildings; eliminating the Ukrainian language in occupied territories; replacing teachers and school textbooks in occupied territories; restricting free access to news and information inside Russia and in areas it occupies; murdering Ukrainian prisoners of war; and blocking all religious institutions other than the Russian Orthodox Church. And these are just a few of such policies. Putin wants to erase all evidence of Ukrainian identity in areas that he has seized.

 

While the world is rightly focused on Putin’s use of conventional warfare in Ukraine—and his occasional use of chemical weapons in covert intelligence operations and other battlefield theaters—these are far from being the only tools he uses, or the only country where he is active. As part of his war against Ukraine, Putin deliberately targets civilian infrastructure, especially the energy system, in order to deprive the population of heat and light. He seeks to sow fear, exhaustion, and resignation in the population through nightly bombings of Ukrainian cities. He has attacked Ukraine’s port infrastructure in order to disrupt grain and other exports and weaken Ukraine’s economy. He regularly engages in cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, assassination attempts, and influence operations inside Ukraine.

 

And while he engages in this kind of aggressive war in Ukraine with kinetic and hybrid elements alike, he has made (thus far) non-kinetic efforts in other nations in the Black Sea region as well. The purposes are the same: to subjugate these nearby countries. Only the methods are different.

 

In Moldova, Russia is using energy as a tool to foment instability and cause economic dissatisfaction in the local population. For years, Russia has provided free natural gas to the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria. This is a narrow, landlocked sliver of land with a small number of active Russian military, intelligence, and special forces officers, and a local population that has Slavic roots and historical ties to Moscow. The free gas provided to Transnistria is used both by the local population directly, and also to generate electricity, which is then sold cheaply to the rest of Moldova. This generates operating revenue for the separatist administration, but also an addiction to cheap Russian-sourced energy throughout the country. (It reminds one of energy policies toward Germany during the tenure of Angela Merkel.) The gas arrives in Moldova by transiting through Ukraine, for which Russia pays Ukraine a transit fee.

 

This mechanism has continued to operate despite Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia benefitted by maintaining its leverage on Moldova; Ukraine benefitted from transit fees; and Moldova benefitted from cheap electricity. As of January 1st, 2025, however, Ukraine has shut off Russian gas transits. Once the Austrian company, OMV, discontinued its purchases of Russian gas—also through Ukraine’s territory—it no longer made economic sense for Ukraine to continue the incremental transits to Moldova.

 

While maintaining the gas transits to Moldova gave Russia modest leverage indefinitely, shutting down the transits gives Russia intense leverage for a limited period of time. Moldova is neither financially nor structurally capable of replacing all Russian gas, or Russian-gas-generated electricity, until 2026. While Russia may seek to provide gas to Moldova via another route (e.g., the Turkstream pipeline) it will charge Moldova for any gas beyond Transnistria’s immediate needs, thereby creating a spike in electricity prices inside Moldova. Moreover, because Moldova’s main electricity interconnectors with the EU will not be fully operational until 2026, it could also mean rolling blackouts in the middle of winter during this transition period.

 

All of this takes place just months ahead of Moldova’s parliamentary elections (expected by July 2025), where Russia is actively funding a handful of political parties aimed at toppling Moldova’s sitting pro-Western government. The economic hardships of high electricity prices and rolling blackouts are calculated to cause voters to blame President Maia Sandu and Prime Minister Dorin Recean, shifting votes instead to parties who are perceived as being able to cut a deal with Russia. If this strategy succeeds, Moldova could flip from being an ally of the West and Ukraine in defending against Russian aggression to an entity doing Russia’s bidding right on Ukraine’s Western border.

 

The only bright spot in this series of unfolding events is the decision by DTEK, the largest private energy company in Ukraine, to import U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) to Ukraine through a pipeline beginning in Greece and transiting Bulgaria, Romania, and providing access to Moldova. This opens the door to a non-Russian source of gas for Moldova, although it will come at a market price. Here, the EBRD could step in with financing to help Moldova through this delicate transition in 2025.

 

While this scenario has yet to play out in Moldova, other moves to assert Russian dominance have already unfolded in Georgia. Russia has successfully convinced Georgia’s biggest oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, that his personal fortune and longevity, as well as the future of the country, are threatened by any association with the West, and instead depend upon Georgia being disconnected from the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, many of Ivanishvili’s former friends found themselves falling out of windows in Moscow. This has led Ivanishvili to label the United States and Europe as the “Party of War,” even though the only war being waged is by Putin against Ukraine, to ensure that his own Georgian Dream party remains unilaterally in power through fraudulent elections, and to suspend Georgia’s efforts to join the European Union for at least four years.

 

These decisions have prompted spontaneous and massive protests across Georgia. But as of this writing, the Georgian Dream appears determined to assert one-party-rule in Georgia, much as Lukashenka did in Belarus, and Maduro did in Venezuela.

 

Building the “Russian World” in the Balkans

Putin has already formed alignments with sympathetic leaders in Hungary and Slovakia, where he rewards their illiberal and nationalist tendencies, in contrast to the reprimands they used to regularly receive from Brussels and the Biden Administration in Washington. Orban and Fico’s main objectives are to stay in power, and this suits Putin well, not least because it helps block the formation of unified EU positions on critical issues. Yet Putin seeks to extend his influence in as many other European countries as possible.

 

In Romania, Russia so significantly interfered in the first round of presidential elections that the Constitutional Court suspended the run-off election between an “out-of-nowhere” pro-Russian candidate and a more traditional pro-European candidate. While the election of a hyper-nationalist and pro-Russian president (any irony here?) was avoided, Romania now faces a constitutional and electoral interruption that needs to be managed carefully to avoid claims that democratic institutions were themselves to blame for disrupting Romanian democracy.

 

In Bulgaria, as in Georgia, one key oligarch, Delyan Peevski, runs a key political party and plays an outsized role in the corruption of the judiciary and of national politics. He has made common cause with the GERB party, led by fellow multi-millionaire (if not billionaire) Boyko Borisov. Borisov, a populist former Prime Minister, maintained pro-EU and pro-American policies while in government, while at the same time blocking any reforms that would weaken his own, or Peevski’s, grip on power. This has in turn created dysfunctional governing institutions, widespread corruption, and a perpetually weak economy in Bulgaria. Multiple efforts to change government through elections have led to inconclusive results, so that Bulgaria seems perpetually faced with a weak government that will struggle to govern at all. Instability such as this plays perfectly into Putin’s hands, as a weak and divided government allows Russia to pursue its own agenda without interference.

 

Putin’s main effort in the Western Balkans is through his strategic alignment with Serbia. President Aleksandar Vučić flouts democratic standards, easily manipulates Serbian nationalist sentiment that still resents NATO’s air campaign to protect ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, and has his own ambitions of reasserting Serbian domination in the wider region. This makes Serbian nationalism a natural ally of Russian Imperialism. Putin has made the Serbian Orthodox Church, which carries popular sway throughout the region, a subordinate instrument of the Russian Orthodox Church. Together, Putin and Vučić seek to undermine pro-Western governments throughout the region—not just in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also in Montenegro, North Macedonia, and even Slovenia.

 

Putin’s Wider War on the West

As important as it is to focus on Putin’s strategies to dominate the Black Sea and Balkan regions, it is vital to understand that Putin’s efforts to fragment the West are also an integral part of Putin’s overall strategy. The West is the only source of potential countervailing force that can prevent Russia from achieving its regional and global objectives.

 

Russia is therefore active with a variety of hybrid activities in Western countries. The toolbox includes cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns (amplified by bot-farms), bribery and corruption of politicians and party financing, preferential business practices for political influence, energy access and pricing as a means of political pressure, and fomenting instability by means such as paid rallies and demonstrations, arson, and intelligence operations (which includes targeted beatings and assassinations of Russian “traitors” living in the West). By being willing to violate all the rules, Putin is able to turn the West’s adherence to democratic practices and the rule of law against itself.

 

Putin is also deliberately cultivating strategic partnerships around the world with other authoritarians who seek to weaken the West. As the West has mobilized to provide financial and military support to Ukraine, preventing a Russian takeover, Putin’s hybrid attacks against the West and coordination with other anti-Western authoritarians, including in Iran, North Korea, China, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have intensified. 

 

A Strategy for the West: Contain, Counter, and Build

In the face of Putin’s deliberate, organized, and persistent efforts to rebuild the Russian Empire, dominate the Black Sea and Balkan regions, and weaken the West globally, the West has been remarkably unfocused. For the most part, Western publics and political leaders seem to be in denial about Putin’s ambitions or complacent about their ability to absorb Putin’s aggressions. The West lacks its own clear goals and resultingly strategic purpose and coherence in its policies, even though it has taken some actions to respond to Russia’s aggression.

 

Indeed, many steps have already been taken, such as the application of sanctions. But implementation has been spotty. Secondary sanctions have hardly been used. Payments to Russia for energy sales have been exempted from sanctions, meaning that the single greatest source of revenue for Putin has continued to fund his war machine. Many Western nations have reduced their consumption of Russian energy, but it has not been eliminated from the EU as a whole, and there has been no serious effort to go after third parties who buy and re-sell Russian energy. Western nations have refused to seize some $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, opting to seize only future interest instead.

 

The West has provided substantial military and financial aid to Ukraine, but not in enough quantity, quality, or speed to ensure that Russia’s aggression is defeated. The West’s focus has been on avoiding escalation, rather than defining and achieving its own objectives. NATO has reinforced its eastern flank with available resources to deter a direct conventional attack by Russia but has made no effort to respond to Russia’s ongoing hybrid attacks.

 

The West has no proactive strategy for preventing Russia’s flipping of governments in its neighborhood, or for stabilizing and integrating the Black Sea and Balkan regions into the rest of Europe. Conflicts and threats in the Middle East, East Asia, the Sahel, and Latin America are treated as stand-alone crises also meant to be de-escalated, rather than part of a coherent picture that demands a coherent strategy.

 

It is long past time for the West to articulate its own clear goals and develop comprehensive strategies for achieving them. The goals: prevent Russia from re-establishing a Russian Empire, strengthen the freedom-loving, prosperous, and secure community in the world, starting with Europe, and break up the nascent alliances among authoritarian regimes. To do this, there are three elements of strategy: contain, counter, and build. 

 

Containment

A centerpiece of Western strategy should be containing Russia to its own recognized territory. There should be zero-tolerance for Russia seizing territory from other countries. Once any change of borders is tacitly accepted, it opens the door to other changes as well. Feeding the beast only increases its appetite.

 

Regarding Ukraine, focusing only on a ceasefire or avoiding escalation allows Putin to keep the territorial gains he has made in Ukraine and continue his long-run efforts at even greater acquisition. This has already occurred with Georgia and Moldova. NATO nations, led by the United States, should provide all necessary military means to block Putin’s further military advancements in Ukraine, deter any future aggression there or elsewhere in Europe, and establish a clear goal—backed up by non-military means—of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

 

NATO should also move to bring these countries—as well as still-aspiring members in the Balkans—into membership as quickly as possible. The need for strategic clarity now overrides the need for demanding near-perfect implementation of NATO standards as a rite of passage. The EU must adopt the same mindset, although implementation standards are more critical.

 

Essential to containment is continuing to deter any Russian attacks on existing NATO territory, including by active defense of air and sea space, freedom of navigation operations, prevention of piracy on the high seas, and forward deployed ground forces to deter ground attacks. Until now, NATO has looked the other way as Russia routinely violates NATO airspace in order to attack Ukraine. This must be stopped. Deterrence requires that an adversary be convinced by a combination of capability and will. In addition to military capabilities, NATO must convey iron-clad resolve through its messaging.

 

All elements of national and multinational power must be applied toward this strategy of containment. Sanctions, energy and visa policies, technology firewalls, intelligence and information operations, and more must all be applied alongside military power to achieve the effect of containment.

 

Countering

Beyond containing Russian expansionism in its neighborhood, the West must actively counter Russian hybrid efforts and global ambitions. Every Russian hybrid effort—whether it is cyber-attacks, bribery and corruption, fomenting instability inside the transatlantic community, or building alliances with autocrats—needs to be countered and contested. There should be no instance of the West concluding that such an attack does not matter or fearing that any tough response would lead to escalation. Faced with a determined adversary such as Putin, the lack of response is what leads to escalation.

 

We need to establish norms of deterrence outside of the conventional and nuclear military spheres. Strategic nuclear deterrence still works: Russia knows the West has the capability and the will to destroy Russia if it attacks with nuclear weapons. Deterrence against conventional military attacks on NATO countries has also worked until now, as Putin believes the West has superior conventional military capabilities and the will to use them if attacked. But Putin is undeterred when it comes to hybrid means of attack. In these grey areas, the West must harden itself, develop its own offensive capabilities that could damage Russia more than it damages the West or its neighbors, and demonstrate the will to act, rather than a preference for de-escalation.

 

NATO should immediately call an Article 4 consultation to discuss the issue of Russian hybrid attacks against NATO countries and develop a doctrine and capabilities for countering and deterring hybrid attacks.

 

Building

The West has let itself atrophy for far too long. Putin’s aggression against Ukraine served as a wake-up call, but that initial shock has still not prompted the West to invest sufficiently in its own military and non-military capacities to be able to defeat Russia. This must change.

 

In 2014, all NATO Allies pledged to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense—a number that should now be revised to at least 3 percent. Ten years later, only 24 out of 32 NATO allies meet that lower target. The West must get serious both about defending itself and investing the resources necessary to withstand and deter Russia’s assaults for the long-term. Putin is dedicating 40 percent or more of his state budget to wage war. The West’s spending is well under a third of this figure.

 

Not only should NATO countries buy more for their militaries, but they should also invest in the expansion of defense industrial capacity. As Russia’s war on Ukraine has ground on, the limits of Western defense industrial production have been exposed. The United States and the EU both need to find mechanisms of guaranteeing long-term procurement in order to convince the defense industry (and its lenders) to invest substantial sums of money in increasing defense industrial capacity. The appointment Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian Prime Minister, as Commissioner for Defense in the European Union, is a good start. But he needs to have a strategy and budget to be able to truly expand European defense industrial capacity. Just as in America, the immediate cause of such investment is Russia, but the long-term need will be having the capability to affect China’s future calculations.

 

Building the West is not only about military capacity. The West must again establish “high walls” around certain technologies. It must actively police the rules of a global trading system. It should work toward a single transatlantic investment, growth, and resilience pact, protecting law-abiding societies against lawbreakers. 

 

Putin’s aims are clear, and he is serious about achieving them. The West must establish similarly clear aims, and develop the strategies needed to achieve them. Ultimately, the west is more prosperous, more successful and more resilient. It can surely prevail. But actually prevailing will require focus, determination, clear goals, and strategies for achieving them. Thus far, the advantage has gone to Putin. But a determined West can change that.

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