Borut Pahor is a former President of the Republic of Slovenia (2012-2022) and the Founder and Director of the Friends of the Western Balkans Institute. You may follow him on X @BorutPahor.

In mid-July 2021, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and I exchanged letters in which we officially confirmed our agreement that the Republic of Slovenia and the Russian Federation would commemorate the Day of Slovenian-Russian Friendship every year, traditionally in July, on the day of the ceremony at the Russian Chapel on the Vršič Pass. In this context, in July 2016, at my invitation, Putin visited Slovenia to mark the 100th anniversary of the chapel’s construction in honor of the Russian soldiers who perished in an avalanche during World War I. His visit was very warmly received. The exchange of letters was followed by a lengthy telephone conversation, during which we expressed hope that such a commemoration would further deepen the comprehensive cooperation and friendship between our nations and countries.

 

With this decision, the Russian Federation became the fourth country with which, as President of the Republic of Slovenia, I reached a mutual agreement on establishing a dedicated friendship commemoration day. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel were also part of this group. Through such symbolic gestures, Slovenia expressed its sincere desire to consolidate and strengthen friendly relations with all countries, particularly those that held special significance for us for various reasons. Allow me to mention another symbolic initiative—the ‘Bench of Friendship,’ which was placed in different parts of the country in collaboration with visiting heads of state during my two presidential terms. This initiative aimed to symbolically demonstrate Slovenia’s enduring commitment to fostering strong international relationships.

“Serbia’s position is critical for peace and stability in the region…” / Source: Guliver Image

However, the decision to mark the Day of Slovenian-Russian Friendship was not taken lightly. There were numerous reasons in favor of it, ranging from historical traditions to modern bilateral cooperation, but there were also reasons against it. Following Russia’s aggression and occupation of Crimea, relations between the West and Russia cooled significantly, and sanctions were eventually imposed. In the years following the occupation, the West and the Russian Federation attempted to ease tensions and safeguard peace and security in the region through the Minsk agreements. While the West did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it responded by imposing sanctions and symbolically joining forces within the framework of the so-called Crimean Platform. The goal of this initiative was to ensure that Ukraine, with Western support, continued to highlight the illegality of Russia’s occupation of Crimea and its determination to restore its territorial integrity.

 

From today’s perspective, it is evident that the West underestimated Russia’s annexation of Crimea, as if it wished to believe that Russia’s ambitions in Ukraine ended there. Although the West never explicitly stated this, over the years, it behaved as though trust could be restored and good cooperation with Russia could resume. It was clear to all, however, that Putin’s Russia was increasingly dissatisfied with its international standing. Moscow felt that the West failed to acknowledge its status as a major power and, at times, treated it condescendingly. Over time, as Putin consolidated his power in the Kremlin, it became increasingly evident from his statements and actions that he viewed Russia’s imperial role not merely through a lens of nostalgia but with a growing geopolitical ambition.

 

His speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 marked a turning point, signaling a shift in Russian foreign and security policy. From today’s perspective, it is easier to see that he was laying the groundwork for Russia to use force to protect its national and security interests whenever deemed necessary. The Kremlin increasingly criticized and rejected the West's efforts to expand the European Union and NATO, perceiving them as direct challenges to its influence in what it considered its rightful sphere of interest—one that, from the very beginning of Putin’s presidency, included Ukraine.

 

When participants of the security conference gathered in Munich in February 2022, one question was at the forefront: would the Russian Federation carry out military aggression against Ukraine? Virtually all participants, especially senior officials from Washington, were convinced that all signs undeniably pointed to this ominous possibility. Only a few of us had doubts, believing that such a move would pose too great a risk for Russia, as Ukraine was prepared to resist and had the full support of the West. Although I was ultimately wrong in my assessment, and the Russian army crossed Ukraine’s borders just days later, I was essentially correct in believing that the risks were too high and that Russia would struggle to achieve its expected objectives. The way Russia’s military operations unfolded in the first days of the aggression made it clear that Moscow’s aim was to completely subjugate Kyiv and Ukraine. Today, some may argue that the Russian army might remain in the occupied territories even after a ceasefire is reached—at least for the foreseeable future. Perhaps this is true. However, it falls far short of the geopolitical ambitions Putin held at the outset of his aggression, which aimed at the complete conquest of Ukraine and its full integration into Russia’s sphere of influence. While Putin may succeed in creating a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine, leaving the country territorially and politically weakened, Russia has ultimately lost more than it has gained from its military aggression.

 

For now, Russia has completely lost trust and cooperation it once enjoyed with the West. Slovenia has fully and unequivocally aligned itself with the Western consensus in supporting Ukraine. The Day of Slovenian-Russian Friendship was suspended, and all diplomatic relations remain frozen to this day. Putin did not anticipate this level of response. After the annexation of Crimea, he expected Western opposition and sanctions following an invasion of Ukraine, but he assumed that their impact would not significantly paralyze Russia’s economic interests. However, it turned out that the Western consensus encompassed not only comprehensive sanctions but also direct military assistance to Ukraine—something Moscow had underestimated before it launched its war of aggression.

“Serbia’s position is critical for peace and stability in the region…” / Source: Guliver Image

In particular, NATO and EU countries that were once members of the Warsaw Pact—having experienced the geopolitical and social consequences of the Cold War—worked tirelessly to convince their Western counterparts that Russian aggression in Ukraine marked a turning point in relations with Moscow. They argued that failure to resist Russia would only embolden its territorial ambitions. Although many Western politicians initially viewed the concerns of Central and Eastern European leaders as exaggerated, the invasion of Ukraine was taken extremely seriously. As a result, the West reached a consensus on comprehensive opposition to Russia’s geopolitical strategy—ranging from economic sanctions to direct military aid to Ukraine—an unprecedented response in modern international relations.

 

All of this has significantly altered Russia’s position in the international community. Its isolation from the West has pushed it into the arms of the People’s Republic of China. Due to the geopolitically sensitive issue of Taiwan, China has viewed Russia—now in conflict with Ukraine and the West—as a silent ally. However, Beijing has made it clear that, while it does not endorse the use of force to achieve political goals, it offers Russia patronizing support—an alliance born out of necessity rather than true partnership. At this time, China understands that the United States’ comprehensive support for Ukraine serves, in part, as a warning against any potential Chinese military action against Taiwan. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in history, Russia has become a collateral element in the primary geopolitical rivalry of the modern world—the competition between the United States and China. From this perspective, it appears that Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has ultimately harmed its national interests. If my assessment is correct, then this aggression and its subsequent consequences on the international stage have weakened Russia rather than strengthened it. It has accelerated the evolution of a global order in which China, rather than Russia, emerges as the second dominant power alongside the United States.

 

Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in early November 2024. Throughout his campaign, Trump eagerly and quite convincingly reiterated that, under his leadership, the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East would not have happened. He presented himself as a statesman capable of resolving disputes peacefully. Trump strongly criticized the manner in which the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, arguing that it was one of the key factors that emboldened Putin and triggered Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. He has promised to swiftly end the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. Even if he does not achieve this overnight, his election clearly represents a major shift in the widely discussed Western consensus on providing comprehensive support to Ukraine in its resistance against Russian occupation.

 

At present, it is impossible to accurately predict the course of future events, but a ceasefire and subsequent peace negotiations seem inevitable at some point. It is difficult to imagine Europe—particularly the European Union—being able to oppose Russia effectively for an extended period, including providing military assistance to Ukraine, without the backing of the United States. This is especially true given the prevailing stance that peace must be just if it is to be lasting. Thus, any peace agreement must be legitimate in the eyes of Ukraine’s leadership and people and should ultimately address the status of the occupied territories. In this context, a scenario leading to a ceasefire and a frozen conflict appears increasingly likely. While this would bring an end to active hostilities, it would by no means resolve the numerous issues left in the wake of the nearly three-year war.

 

Under such circumstances, a swift normalization of relations between the West and the Russian Federation seems unlikely—particularly if there is no consensus within the West on how to engage with Moscow, and if Russia continues to use military force against neighboring countries that it unilaterally considers part of its sphere of influence. One of the key consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine appears to be the emergence of a new division within Europe. In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe seemed to move toward unity; however, a new “iron curtain” is now poised to rise, dividing the continent into a Western, democratic bloc and an Eastern, authoritarian one. For the purposes of this discussion, an important question arises: where will this dividing line fall in the Western Balkans?

 

With this in mind, it is crucial to examine the EU’s shift in its enlargement strategy. Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, EU enlargement has taken on a strong geopolitical dimension. While many member states had previously expressed concerns and reservations—largely due to enlargement fatigue—the invasion made it clear that expansion is a geopolitical necessity to safeguard the EU’s most vital security and strategic interests. As a result, Ukraine, along with Moldova and Georgia, suddenly moved to the forefront of the enlargement agenda. This shift in strategy has also partially influenced the Western Balkans. The EU has sought to finally commence negotiations with North Macedonia, accelerate talks with Montenegro, grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status without the usual preconditions, and allocate €6 billion in financial assistance to the region to expedite the alignment of their economic and social systems with the EU acquis.

 

Regarding sanctions against Russia, most countries in the Western Balkans supported and joined them, except for Serbia. However, the region’s geopolitical stability owes much to NATO enlargement, which has expanded to include North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro. While other countries in the region have not formally become members of the Alliance, they maintain close cooperation with it. NATO forces are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo, within the framework of international peacekeeping operations.

 

The newly appointed European Commission, once again led by Ursula von der Leyen, has symbolically given new momentum to the enlargement process by appointing a dedicated Commissioner and seasoned Slovenian diplomat, Marta Kos, to focus specifically on this issue. Following the initial steps taken by the new Commission regarding enlargement, there is no doubt that future efforts will primarily center on Ukraine, while also placing renewed emphasis on the EU expansion into the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, optimism should be tempered with caution. Key officials responsible for enlargement in Brussels consistently stress that candidate countries must meet the required conditions, emphasizing that compliance with these criteria remains the decisive factor. In other words, despite the increased geopolitical significance of enlargement, the so-called merit-based approach remains crucial. This, in turn, raises concerns that the process may continue to be overly technical and insufficiently political.

 

While I understand the rationale behind such an enlargement strategy, I still find myself questioning it. The EU’s decision to fast-track the accession of one or two countries—such as Montenegro and Albania—is feasible but fraught with potential pitfalls. I believe it would be more prudent for the EU to consider the integration of the entire Western Balkans region as a package, focusing on those countries that are sufficiently prepared and genuinely interested in joining. It appears that a strategy of this kind has been contemplated. The EU’s approach to the Western Balkans rests on two key premises: first, that securing approval for enlargement in the coming years will be easier if only one or two countries are involved; and second, that the relatively rapid inclusion of select countries could serve as an impetus for broader reform and structural adjustments across the region.

 

Of course, a package enlargement approach is not without its challenges, but it addresses more issues than the EU might face if it proceeds with only one or two countries at a time. However, the core problem with the EU’s current enlargement strategy is that it ultimately fails to address the Union’s pressing need to ensure peace and security in the region—along with its own security—through the swift and comprehensive inclusion of the entire Western Balkans. In this context, Serbia’s actions in the coming years regarding EU enlargement will be of paramount importance. If, for any reason, Serbia is left out of the EU after the conclusion of the enlargement process in the Western Balkans, this would inevitably create a factor of instability in the region. In such a scenario, Serbia would likely fall further into Russia’s sphere of influence.

 

Therefore, as we consider where the dividing line between the West and Russia’s sphere of influence will lie after the war in Ukraine, it is crucial to determine which side of the new Iron Curtain Serbia will find itself on in terms of security and stability in the Western Balkans. This outcome depends on all involved parties—the EU and its member states, Serbia itself, and Russia. Serbia’s position is critical for peace and stability in the region, as it shares with Russia the dominant philosophy of the so-called “Serbian World.” This concept prioritizes the welfare of Serbs across the region, regardless of their country of residence, with particular focus on Serbs in Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Kosovo, and, to some extent, Montenegro. The full inclusion of the Western Balkans into the EU would effectively resolve this issue. However, any delay in Serbia’s accession—or its exclusion altogether—would only serve to preserve or even exacerbate the problem.

 

Incidentally, if Albania’s EU integration were to accelerate, it could have significant implications for the sentiments of Albanians in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and, to some extent, Montenegro. It is not inconceivable that Albanians living in these countries might perceive Albania’s EU accession as an opportunity for greater security and a better life, aligning themselves more closely with Albania and its integration into the EU. At present, however, the EU does not appear to consider this perspective. Instead, it reassures itself with the notion that peace prevails in the region for the time being, assuming that there is little inclination among the people to resolve longstanding international issues through military means.

 

Of course, Serbia itself bears the greatest responsibility for its own future. Much depends on the internal political developments that shape public sentiment regarding key issues such as Kosovo, relations with the Russian Federation, and the EU. Conceptually, one can conclude that greater democratization of Serbia’s political landscape would likely lead to a stronger inclination toward EU membership, while increased authoritarianism would fuel nationalist sentiment and pro-Russian tendencies. In any case, it should be emphasized that, regarding Kosovo—a crucial issue for Serbia’s EU accession—there is little difference between the stance of the opposition and that of Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić. From this standpoint as well, a package enlargement of the EU would provide a solution to a challenge that might otherwise prove difficult, if not impossible, to resolve swiftly and effectively.

 

In recent years, Serbia has experienced a decline in public support for EU integration. This sentiment is, to some extent, reinforced by official policies that position Serbia equidistantly between Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing in addressing its political, economic, and other challenges. The prevailing impression is that the majority of Serbia’s political leadership lacks confidence in the EU enlargement process and keeps its options open for closer alignment with Russia and China. Additionally, Serbia maintains strong political and economic ties based on Yugoslavia’s legacy with the Non-Aligned Movement, a policy that is particularly evident in its relations with African countries.

 

Following the aforementioned July 2016 ceremony at the Russian Chapel, parts of my informal conversations with Putin involved the Western Balkans. I vividly recall his pointed remark that, regarding Russia’s interests in the region, he did not intend to repeat the mistakes made during NATO’s enlargement process. He made it clear that Russia has strategic interests in this part of Europe and cannot simply stand by and watch the expansion of NATO and the EU into the region. The pro-Russian sentiments that are visible in the Western Balkans—particularly among the Serbian population—play strongly in favor of the Russian Federation. In this context, Putin uses the President of Republika Srpska (a majority Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina), Milorad Dodik, as a key influence in the region, even in relation to Serbia. By supporting Dodik, Russia exerts indirect control over Serbia as well, since the Serbian political leadership cannot afford for ethnic Serbs outside Serbia to align more closely with Moscow than with Belgrade.

 

All of this creates an environment in which Russia’s influence in the region is more significant than it might appear from an external perspective. In particular, Russia benefits from exerting control over certain processes in ways that are not immediately visible, which ultimately works to its advantage.

 

In conclusion, the European Union’s focus on Ukraine is understandable and justified, but it remains insufficient if the EU aims to safeguard its security, political, and economic interests across Europe. The Western Balkans are equally important. This fact may not be fully recognized in Brussels today, and one can only hope that future events will not compel us to acknowledge it as starkly as we now do in Ukraine. The future of relations between the West and Russia will undoubtedly be complex. In the context of the Western Balkans, Serbia’s European trajectory may well prove to be the pivotal issue in shaping this relationship.

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