Denys Reva is a Researcher at the Africa in the World Project of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa. You may follow him on X @Denys_Reva. 

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a defining moment for the modern international system. The Russo-Ukrainian war is not the first armed conflict to arise since the end of the Cold War, but it was the first time that a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) unilaterally invaded another sovereign state without seeking or securing international legitimacy. Such an act by a custodian of the UN Charter exemplifies the effective end of the U.S.-led liberal international order that existed since 1991.

 

What is also clear is that Russia did not intend to challenge the international order in such a manner, but the failure to end the war quickly locked Moscow in a protracted conflict it was not prepared for. The drawn-out hostilities that followed made the return to the pre-2022 status quo nearly impossible. Russia’s possible reintegration would either come at the cost of severe political concessions, which Moscow would be unlikely to agree to, or at the cost of the integrity of the rules-based international order, which would be counterproductive to the preservation of the system.

One of Russia’s Summits with African countries, a trend that has noticeably picked up pace since 2022. / Source: Guliver Image

As relationships with Moscow’s traditional partners became strained, Russia had to urgently reorient its foreign policy outreach to cultivate partnerships with the countries of the ‘Global South.’ The African continent was arguably one of the biggest winners of this diplomatic redirection. While previously existing on the periphery of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, the continent now represents not only a vital source of political support in international forums like the United Nations, but also an important part of its newly envisioned multipolar order.

 

Moscow framed its new strategy for the African continent around the shared grievances towards the West, historical ties forged during the Soviet era, and ideological solidarity against the unfair international system, ‘Western hegemony,’ and ‘neo-colonialism.’ Within this framework, Russia came to present itself as an alternative and pragmatic partner for the continent, achieving notable diplomatic traction within just three years. Moscow’s proactive engagement resulted in several new arms, trade, diplomatic and security agreements, challenging several traditional African partners, such as France.

 

However, in practical terms, Russia’s gains on the continent have been primarily due to ideological alignment, as the trade volume and the level of investment remain insignificant. This begs the question of whether Russia can once again establish itself as an important and proactive partner to Africa, beyond diplomatic rhetorics and symbolic acts of support for African sovereignty, peace and security.

 

For instance, while sharing grievances towards the international system, Africa and Russia seem to differ on how the international system of the future should look. African states have long advocated for the reform of international institutions to better reflect the interests and assert greater agency of the continent. The reforms, however, are meant to preserve the rules-based international system as the basis for the new multipolar world. To this end, African countries seek strategic economic and diplomatic partnerships with like-minded non-African partners, and Russia’s renewed attention towards African states has been welcomed.

 

Russia, by contrast, seeks to reassert itself as a great power, and ultimately favors a reassessment of global power structures and norms. While Moscow maintains its commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, including the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference, it is clear that there are divergences in its interpretation of these principles. This is especially important as the rapprochement was necessitated by and is driven by the existential threat that Russia is facing due to the ongoing war. In this regard, Moscow’s ability to balance its ideological aspirations with its actual interests and strategic objectives, dictated by the realities of the ongoing war in Ukraine and its struggle with the West, will test the sustainability and longevity of the relationship between Russia and Africa. 

 

Russia and Africa: A Friendship Rediscovered

Moscow has secured significant political and diplomatic gains on the continent since 2023. Russia’s state-owned companies signed several MoUs and secured bilateral deals with African countries on oil and gas, nuclear energy, arms and military cooperation, space cooperation, and exploration of raw minerals. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, undertook six visits to the continent in a span of two years, which highlights Moscow’s continued commitment to developing this relationship. In 2024, Russia also hosted several high-level diplomatic meetings attended by top African officials, including the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the 16th BRICS Summit, and the First Ministerial Summit—a follow-up to the 2023 Africa-Russia Summit.

 

Perhaps more importantly, Moscow managed to become an influential actor that can have a say on several peace and security issues on the continent. For instance, following the 2023 coup in Niger, Russia publicly cautioned the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) against resorting to military intervention. At the time, ECOWAS considered  military action to restore constitutional order in Niamey in accordance with ECOWAS’s own Treaty. Moscow’s activities in the region could potentially undermine the effectiveness of ECOWAS and the African Union in responding to unconstitutional power transitions—a

growing concern on the continent. Moscow was also risking being perceived as a destabilizing force within West Africa. Instead, Russia has adeptly framed its involvement as supportive of regional sovereignty and non-interference which resonated with many African governments wary of external involvement.

 

Russia’s strategy for rapprochement in Africa has thus yielded remarkable returns despite its relatively modest investment. In 2024, the Russian Government announced that around $50 million would be allocated to finance the implementation of investment projects in Africa in 2025, primarily in the raw materials sector. This is important but limited in scope and less than what some of the traditional partners spend or invest on the continent. Similarly, bilateral trade has increased from $18.4 billion in 2022 to $24.5 billion by the end of 2024, though it seems that the balance of trade is not in Africa’s favor, and the increase is driven primarily by growing Russian exports to Africa. Furthermore, this value pales in comparison not only to established African partners such as the EU, China and the United States, but also the new partners, like India, the UAE, and Turkey.

 

Against this background, it might be fair to suggest that Russia’s initial diplomatic success stemmed largely from two factors, both of which were mostly outside of Moscow’s immediate control. Firstly, Russia is still seen through the prism of the Soviet Union’s historical support for African independence movements, inheriting a lot of goodwill. This means that even as the relationship faded in 1991, and Russia’s presence became largely symbolic, the country retained its ‘special partner’ status on the continent.

 

Secondly, Russia’s pivot towards Africa occurred at the same time when the traditional partners were losing their positions on the continent. As for the United States, Donald Trump’s first presidential term coincided with a steady decline in military and diplomatic relations. While President Biden made several attempts to reestablish the relationship, with the first U.S. presidential visit to Africa in nine years, the relationship remained lukewarm. The war in Ukraine, in particular, and South Africa’s refusal to join Western isolation efforts against Russia, was a significant sticking point for Washington, and resulted in several diplomatic scandals.

 

For France, the Paris-led Sahel stabilization and counterterrorism effort failed, resulting in a complete military and partial diplomatic withdrawal from the region. The failure was so dire it triggered a wave of military coups in the region, with opposition forces relying on anti-French sentiments for public support. Moscow managed to capitalize and quickly fill in the security and diplomatic spaces that emerged, positioning itself as a reliable partner, especially on matters of counterterrorism, military training and capacity building, and broader security cooperation.

 

But in a broader sense, Russia’s immediate success can be attributed to the ideological narrative resonating with African leaders, as its messaging around its return and objectives overlapped with the deep-seated grievances African states hold against the existing global order and some of the traditional non-African partners. In this regard, there are three broad areas of concern that African states have towards the international system. These concerns underscore Africa’s long-term interests and also align with Moscow’s political and ideological position.

 

Firstly, the current international system emerged following World War II, at a time when most African countries were still under colonial rule. Today, the continent represents the largest voting bloc at the UN, but has only three non-permanent two-year seats rotated among the 54 members. As such, the system does not reflect the current state of the world, nor does it adequately address the historical injustices and the lingering legacy of colonialism, oppression and slavery.

 

The African common position on this matter, also known as the Ezulwini Consensus, outlines the continent’s outlook on the future of the international system. In particular, the continent argues for the expansion of the UNSC to include at least two permanent African seats with the veto power, and at least five non-permanent rotating seats. The question of the veto remains pertinent, as, in principle, the continent opposes the idea of the veto being used as a tool at the UNSC, favoring a more democratic approach based on consensus and compromise.

 

While Africa’s position has not received support outside of the continent, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the failure of the international system to prevent, mitigate, or respond to these crises have resurrected conversations about the urgent need to create a more fair, democratic, and multipolar world.

 

Secondly, Africa’s primary concerns remain economic development and job creation. The continent still struggles with poverty, with 67 percent of the population living in extreme poverty. At the same time, Africa is undergoing an unprecedented demographic transition, as Africa’s population is both increasing and becoming younger. Currently, around 60 percent of Africa’s 1.3 billion people are aged below 25, and it is estimated that this trend will continue with the population reaching 3.1 billion in 2063. While this provides Africa with an unprecedented opportunity for economic acceleration and development, it is clear that this would only be possible if African economies meet the growing labor demands of the continent.

 

Historically, several factors have hindered economic growth in Africa, including violence, the burden of debt, political instability, and bad governance. Other factors are expected to hinder Africa’s development in the future, including the low resilience to the impact of climate change and an increasing number of extreme weather events. However, one particular grievance concerns the state of the global financial system. Statistically, it is more expensive for African states to borrow money, and the continent is struggling to access affordable and reliable financing. Furthermore, the terms and conditions for the loans tend to be stringent and may have a destabilizing effect. For instance, in June 2024, the Kenyan capital of Nairobi was hit by mass protests, driven primarily by the youth, in response to planned tax increases linked to IMF loans, resulting in a severe political crisis.

 

Finally, African states have long voiced their grievances about the double standards they perceive in the so-called rules-based international order. These grievances often centered on the selective enforcement of international norms and the prioritization of geopolitical interests over legal principles, especially when it comes to interventions in the countries of the Global South.

 

These double standards are seen in the alleged prejudicial application of international law, where principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are upheld for some nations but disregarded for others. Arguably, the changing moment came in 2011 when the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, authorizing member states to deploy any means necessary to protect the civilian population in Libya. All three non-permanent African members, including South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon, voted in favor of the resolution. What followed has been described by South Africa and other African nations as a regime change and a gross violation of the principles of sovereignty that led to the death of Muammar Gaddafi and the collapse of the Libyan state. NATO, which took part in the Libyan operation, is now seen as a tool for coercion.

 

This is also part of the reason why the continent’s initial reaction to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been lukewarm, and differed from the firm positions of the EU and the United States. Russia’s narrative about the threat of NATO expansion and potential aggression resonated with the worldview of African political elites. Still, while several African countries went as far as supporting Russia, the majority condemned the invasion but adopted a position of neutrality and declared their non-alignment. The position indicates that African states will pursue their national interests and will not restrict their relationship with either party to the conflict while also avoiding becoming part of the conflict.

 

Interestingly, the position of African countries was met with frustration in Europe, as European leaders fully expected the continent to support its position in line with the values of the UN Charter. The position of several African countries resulted in calls for an audit of aid and humanitarian support, as well as trade preferences provided to these countries by the EU member states and the United States. In turn, African countries interpreted this frustration as another attempt to exert pressure and force the continent to adopt a position, without fully appreciating Africa’s interests and needs.

 

These grievances worked out in favor of Russia and fed into what Moscow promotes as its own vision of the multipolar world. Russia’s approach seeks to diminish Western hegemony and dismantle the unipolar world by cultivating robust alliances with countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America—to which Russian elites have been referring as the “World Majority.” Russia thus supports the reform of the global governance structure and generally supports Africa’s position on UN reform, including the expansion of the number of permanent members. Under the umbrella of BRICS, the new monetary institutions and alternative trade and financial structure were created to serve as a preferred substitute to the established institutions. This created a promise of better and fairer engagements for Africa, but also aligns with Moscow’s need to address financial and trade sanctions.

 

The African continent itself occupies a pivotal position within this strategic framework for the future. Russia acknowledges the continent’s growing geopolitical importance, and the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept refers to Africa as a ‘distinctive and influential center of world development.’ The document further highlights that Russia intends to support the continent through improved trade, scientific, and humanitarian cooperation. In addition, Moscow has stressed the ‘neocolonial tendencies’ of Western engagement with Africa, and stressed the importance of mutual respect and adherence to the principle of non-interference.

 

The Challenges in Russia-Africa Relations

Moscow’s vision for a multipolar world seeks to diminish Western unipolar dominance in favor of fostering regional autonomy and agency, with the African region occupying an important role. Beyond political, security, and diplomatic support, the growing partnership with Russia promises African countries new investments and development, new partnerships and cooperation on science and technology, as well as energy and food security.

 

For now, however, these plans should be seen more as an expression of intent and aspirations, rather than set markers on the roadmap. As was previously stated, the relationship and the high-level summits are yet to result in greater levels of trade or broader economic and financial cooperation between Russia and Africa. In that regard, while projecting the trajectory of Africa-Russia relations into the future, it is important to note that the pivot towards Africa occurred primarily because of the impact of the war in Ukraine. Despite the first Russia-Africa Summit taking place in 2019, Moscow has admitted that very little progress has actually been made on implementing the outcomes of the Summit. It was the necessity to respond to the impact of the war, rather than a common interest or vision, that prompted Moscow to seek new partnerships in Africa.

 

This is not a problem in itself, as every state pursues its foreign relations based on its national interests. For Russia, however, the war presents an existential threat, evidenced by the growing number of statements from the Kremlin concerning possible nuclear war and the recent changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine with a clear intent to communicate its concerns. While it is unlikely that Ukraine will defeat Russia on the battlefield, the war aggravates existing domestic issues and increases political and security risks for Moscow. One example of this risk would be the 2023 Wagner mutiny, which seemingly took Russian military and secret service officials by surprise and nearly resulted in a violent internal conflict.

 

Within this context, the ongoing war in Ukraine presents Russia with three challenges which may affect its relationship with Africa. Firstly, for Russia, responding to emerging security threats will likely take immediate priority over possible long-term objectives, if these two are in conflict.

 

Despite the Kremlin’s statements that Russia opposes interference in the internal affairs of its partners, and that it rejects acting in a way that harms its partners, its national interests have taken precedence in the past. This rift between the official stance and the reality of Russia’s actions could result in growing grievances towards Moscow from its African partners over time. For instance, Russia’s principled position on the UN Pact for the Future nearly derailed the initiative on the day of the vote. While Russia rationalized its decision in terms of its concerns for sovereignty, African states are already projected to miss the targets for most of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Thus, for the continent, the Pact represents an important tool to ensure the well-being of Africa’s increasingly youthful population. It is obvious that Russia might have been more amenable to compromise and dialogue if it were not for the ongoing war. 

 

Another example concerns Russia’s veto of the UNSC resolution on the war in Sudan. The resolution was meant to address the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support forces that has raged since 2023. The conflict has already resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe and the world’s largest displacement crisis. Yet, the government of Sudan was against the initiative, and Russia echoed Khartoum’s concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity, vowing to support “African brothers.” The Resolution, however, was co-initiated by Sierra Leone and supported by two other African members, namely Algeria and Mozambique. While this is unlikely to undermine Moscow’s bilateral relations with Sierra Leone, Mozambique, or Algeria, this decision went against and thus undermined a common African position on a serious peace and security issue. Similar to the way Russia’s position on the coup in Niger undermined the collective position of the ECOWAS. While for Russia, the decision will go a long way to improve Moscow’s standing with Khartoum, and might help with the long pending decision on establishing a Russian naval base in the Port of Sudan.

 

Secondly, the Ukraine war clearly restricts Russia’s resources and its ability to deliver on its commitments. In 2023, the Russian government anticipated a budget deficit for 2024 to be around 1.6 trillion roubles (around $14.8 billion), but the actual deficit was more than double that amount. The projected deficit for 2025 is likely also underestimated, especially since Russia’s State Duma expects the budget to run on a deficit for the next three years as finances are diverted towards military needs. At the same time, the deficit has resulted in budget cuts targeting social programs, economic programs, and even state security and law enforcement funding.

 

Several examples point to Moscow’s restricted ability to deploy its resources. Most notably, the recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia’s close ally and a strategic partner in the Eastern Mediterranean, illustrates this point. The Russian military has been involved in Syria since 2015, fighting on the side of al-Assad against the forces of ISIS, Kurds and various opposition forces. And yet, when the opposition forces mounted a surprise counterattack in December 2024, Moscow was either incapable of meeting the military challenge or unwilling to spare scarce human and military resources to assist. This lack of action might undermine Russia’s further attempts to improve security cooperation with African states, especially since the military logistics for Africa Corps, which ran through Syria, has now been disrupted.

 

But in the long term, the aforementioned issues raise questions about the extent to which Moscow will be able to continue to subsidize its relations with African states meaningfully, especially if the war in Ukraine continues at this pace. Furthermore, Western sanctions also constrain the relationship. In 2023, the state-owned Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA) selected Gazprombank Africa to invest R3.7 billion (around $ 200 million) in refurbishing the Mossel Bay gas-to-liquids refinery. Despite strong political support, the deal collapsed by 2025 as Gazprombank failed to provide the promised funds, reportedly due to the impact of the U.S. sanctions. While South Africa is not part of the sanctions regime, its financial institutions are wary of engaging with Russian entities subject to international sanctions. Overall, the inability to develop the relationship beyond the promises made during the previous high-level Summits could halt the momentum of Russia-Africa relations.

 

Notably, 43 African heads of state or government attended the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019. The second Summit in 2023, in contrast, attracted only around 27 African leaders, of whom only 17 were heads of state. A year later, Russia hosted the first Russia-Africa Ministerial Conference, which once again attracted only around 27 political leaders from the continent. The decline in participation and engagement could be attributed to political pressure on African states, or the fatigue with ‘Africa+1 Summits’ that several African leaders have previously noted. But it is also clear that the lack of practical progress since 2019 has not helped. It is also important to note that as new generations of Africans take power, their affinity for the legacy of the Soviet Union may wane, while their disappointment with the relationship might undermine Moscow’s ambitious plans for the future of the new multilateral system.

 

Finally, the invasion of Ukraine signaled the return of geopolitics, as the war triggered the emergence of several blocks and alliances, vying for strategic autonomy and influence. While the question of cessation of hostilities in Ukraine has been gaining momentum for a while, it is unlikely that the end of the war will be permanent, or that it will reduce the friction between Russia and the West. It is, therefore, important to ensure that Africa does not become a new battleground for geopolitical control and influence.

 

The three challenges that Africa-Russia relations may face do not shed the responsibility from African states, as they also have the agency to shape the relationship with Russia, China, and the West. But Moscow needs to be careful to avoid the mistakes that the traditional partners have made, as the relationship has the potential to bring mutual benefits for both parties. In the short term, Moscow was fortunate to make use of several opportunities that have quickly elevated its diplomatic status. In the long term, however, it will be important for Moscow to demonstrate that it perceives African countries as equals in their partnership, and not as a tool for geopolitical competition. 

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